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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND     
Throughout recorded history, military strategists have sought to increase the 
reach, responsiveness, and lethality of their military forces.  In the earliest days of 
military confrontation and conquest, projecting forces abroad requires marching land 
armies great distances over potentially hostile terrain.  To affect strategic centers of 
gravity, such as regime leadership, these land armies would have to first battle and defeat 
the adversary’s fielded forces, which often involved lengthy and bloody struggles.  Later, 
navies provided a faster method to project force to distant lands, at least those accessible 
by sea.  Navies provided (and still provide) a means for direct attack via bombardment 
from off-shore.  Their reach was extended by deploying troops ashore.  Still, the journeys 
were long and dangerous.   
In the twentieth century, the combination of modern ships with aircraft, in the 
form of aircraft carriers, greatly increased the reach and lethality of navies as instruments 
for force projection and warfighting.  In addition to increases in reach and lethality, the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 demonstrated the ability to conduct 
major offensive operations against distant targets with little or no advance warning.  
Land-based aircraft also demonstrated the ability to strike directly at enemy leadership, 
industry, and populations without having to first battle and defeat enemy land and sea 
forces.  However, the heavy bombers employed by the Allies in the Second World War 
relied on forward bases in Britain, North Africa, China, and the Pacific to strike the 
German and Japanese homelands.  The strikes by lone B-29s against the Japanese cities 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic weapons were a foreshadowing of methods for 
global force protection to come. 
In the Cold War years following World War II, heavy bombers evolved to possess 
true global reach (enhanced by air-to-air refueling) and ever-increasing ability to 
penetrate enemy defenses.  The emergence of the intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) revolutionized the ability to project power over global distances through its 
unprecedented speed and responsiveness.  The time necessary to project military force, 
capable of achieving strategic effects, has shrunk from years to mere minutes.  Today, 
2 
there are those who seek to exploit the rapid power projection capabilities borne out of 
the Cold War, married with recent advances in precision guidance, to deliver 
conventional weapons over global ranges as a tool to meet the uncertain security 
environment of the post-Cold War and post-September 11th world.   
The capability to strike targets at global ranges from bases within the continental 
United States with conventional weapons is generally known as “global strike.”  
Currently deployed B-52, B-1B, and B-2A heavy bombers have demonstrated this 
capability, with the aid of in-air refueling, in numerous exercises and real-world 
contingencies.  The ability to accomplish this same mission within hours (and ideally 
within 90 minutes) of a decision to do so is often referred to as “prompt” global strike 
(PGS).  Currently, nuclear-armed ICBMs are the only weapons that possess this 
capability, but none are configured to deliver conventional weapons.  Some would argue 
that submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) provide a similar capability, 
however, due to their shorter range the submarine must first deploy to an operating 
location within range of the intended target.  Due to the effects of time and distance and 
the limitations of technology expected to be available within the next ten years, PGS 
weapons must rely either on intercontinental missiles (modified ICBMs or space launch 
vehicles) or orbiting space platforms for delivery.  Both of these options attract 
significant controversy. 
B. A NIGHTMARE SCENARIO 
Early in the next decade, on a typical Wednesday afternoon, U.S. defense analysts 
were reviewing recently collected imagery of one of the few remaining Russian Topol 
(SS-25) ICBM bases near Irkutsk, located in south-central Russia near the border with 
Kazakhstan.  What the imagery reveled was unexpected and deeply disturbing.  Three 
Topol road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), presumably loaded with their 
ICBMs, and several support vehicles were seen leaving the site’s garrison.  This was 
highly unusual since Russian mobile ICBMs normally remained in garrison unless part of 
a pre-coordinated exercise.  Also, the Irkutsk base, manned by the 51st Guards Missile 
Division, was in the final stages of deactivating the thirty-six Topol ICBMs originally 
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deployed there.1  Most disturbing was the fact that the imagery was almost a day old, and 
the Topols, assuming an average speed of 30 miles per hour, could be anywhere within a 
500-mile radius of Irkutsk, a distance that was increasing with every passing moment.  
Other intelligence analysts began to take notice of increased Russian military activity and 
communications in the military districts in the vicinity of Irkutsk.  Something was 
definitely up, but what?  Available U.S. intelligence assets were immediately retasked to 
gain better situational awareness and hopefully track down the wayward ICBMs. 
As the intelligence organizations worked to unravel the mystery, diplomatic 
inquiries on Thursday morning by the U.S. government received the typical Russian reply 
that “it was an internal matter, there was nothing to be concerned about, and no foreign 
assistance was needed or welcome.”  Later that day, CNN broadcast a taped message they 
had received from an anonymous source.  A mid-level Russian military officer read a 
prepared statement that accused the United States of maintaining a threatening, offensive 
nuclear capability even in spite of the fact that Russian nuclear forces were being retired 
at a significantly faster rate than they were being replaced.  He explained that he and his 
comrades made a decision to act before Russia’s unilateral disarmament made it 
impossible.  Unless the United States took immediate and verifiable action to remove its 
offensive nuclear forces from alert, he and his comrades would fire their missiles at 
targets in the United States.   
Despite assurances from the Russian government that the conspirators would not 
be able to fire the missiles because of various safeguards designed to prevent such 
eventualities, the United States remained unconvinced.  U.S. officials were concerned 
that since the missiles in question were mobile, it might be possible to gain access to the 
internal components of the missile.  If given enough time, the rogues could, in theory, 
circumvent the safeguards and carryout their threat.  Even if they proved incapable of 
actually launching the missiles, it was feared the warheads could eventually fall into the 
hands of terrorists.  Three days into the crisis, tensions were rising between the United 
States and Russia.  The United States accused Russia of not doing enough to resolve the 
situation and threatened to do what ever was necessary to prevent the missiles from being 
 
1 Unit, deployment location, and number of ICBMs referenced from:  “Strategic Rocket Forces,” 
Russian Strategic Forces Project, April 2005 [on-line] ; available from http://www.russianforces.org/ 
eng/missiles; Internet; accessed May 2005.  
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fired.  Russia claimed that it was doing everything possible to find the missiles, but 
would not grant U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance aircraft access to their 
airspace.  Russia was also increasingly concerned about a U.S. preemptive strike against 
its territory if it was the first to discover the location of the missiles.  Russia warned the 
United States that any strike against its territory would be regarded as an act of war, 
regardless of the reason. 
On the fourth day of the developing crisis, U.S. intelligence assets detected the 
missiles outside Russian territory in Kazakhstan.  This further complicated the situation 
because a fundamentalist Islamic regime had recently come to power and relations 
between Kazakhstan and both Russia and the United States had been under significant 
strain ever since.  The vehicles were stationary for the moment, but there was no 
guarantee they would remain that way. 
The nearest American forces in the region were in the Persian Gulf.  These forces 
were ruled out because it would take several hours to plan the mission and several more 
to carry it out.  Also, the aircraft (or cruise missiles) would have to penetrate the airspace 
of several countries – most not on friendly terms with the United States.  A strike 
conducted with long-range bombers, such as B-2s, from bases in the United States was 
also not an option due to the time it would take to prepare for the mission and reach the 
target (nearly a day).2  Over-flight of hostile third-party airspace would also be a 
consideration against long-range bombers.   
The President of the United States would face the dilemma of having to choose 
among several unattractive options.  First, he could give into the stated demands, but 
have no guarantee that the rogues would not fire the missiles anyway or hand them over 
to Islamic extremists.  Second, he could take no immediate action in the hopes that 
Russian Special Forces could arrive before the missiles moved out again, fell into the 
hands of a third party, or were launched against the United States.  If the missiles were 
launched, all hopes then rest with a limited and unproven missile defense system that was 
designed to defeat the relatively unsophisticated missiles that might be launched by rogue 
states or terrorists.   
 
2 This estimate was derived from numbers presented for a notional strike against Iran in:  Headquarters 
U.S. Air Force, “The Common Aero Vehicle:  Addressing Congressional Concerns,” (briefing presented to 
U.S. Congress, Washington D.C., December 2004), 12. 
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Third, the President could order a strike against the three TELs with nuclear-
armed ICBMs or SLBMs.  The Minuteman III possesses excellent responsiveness and a 
warhead with sufficient yield to destroy the Topols – assuming they do not move out 
again before the warheads arrive.  If the Topols move, even just a few miles, after the 
Minutemen launch they could escape destruction.  Attacks with Trident II (D-5) SLBMs 
would face similar constraints.  Of course, this option also entails the use of nuclear 
weapons against a non-nuclear, third-party country and the potential for collateral 
damage from nuclear fallout down-wind of the target.  Also, given the heightened 
tensions, the launch of U.S. nuclear-armed missiles, could result in a Russian decision to 
launch a retaliatory strike in the belief the missiles were headed their way. 
 Unfortunately for the President, efforts to develop and deploy conventional 
prompt global strike (PGS) capabilities languished due to Washington politics and had 
not progressed beyond the concept stage and a few limited demonstration flights.  A 
conventional PGS system may offer the President a better option than those described 
above.  With similar responsiveness to the Minuteman III, a conventional PGS system 
could deploy a Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to strike the target within 45 minutes of 
launch.3  However, unlike the Minuteman, the CAV can maneuver to adjust its trajectory 
if the target moves after launch.4  Also, the CAV can carry six Wide Area Autonomous 
Search Munitions (WAASMs), basically miniature cruise missiles, with the capability to 
search out and destroy mobile targets.5  One should note, however, conventional PGS 
capabilities are no panacea.  Given the high tensions between Russia and the United 
States in this scenario, the launch of conventional PGS weapons could have been 
mistaken for a nuclear launch by the Russians with potentially devastating results.  
 
3 Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Common Aero Vehicle, 25. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 Ibid. 
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Hopefully, the above scenario will remain a work of fiction, but the issues presented 
warrant further investigation.6   
C. FRAMING THE DEBATE  
This thesis examines and seeks to expand the debate regarding the development 
and deployment of conventional PGS that operate through or from space.  In doing so, 
this thesis aims to influence the decisions of national-level policy makers and senior 
leaders in the Department of Defense by illuminating the positive role these weapons can 
play in America’s national security posture while simultaneously highlighting the 
potential unanticipated consequences deployment of these weapons could have on the 
fundamental tenets of global stability. 
Conventional PGS weapons capable of striking targets anywhere on Earth within 
minutes of a decision to do so represent a transformational capability and greatly expand 
the options available to the President for responding to imminent threats to the national 
security interests of the United States.  Even though there is a strong basis for 
conventional PGS weapons in current national security policy, deployment of weapon 
systems that can accomplish this mission in minutes over global distances - without 
resorting to the use of nuclear weapons - have encountered controversy on several fronts.  
Uncharacteristically for a major modern weapons program, conventional PGS weapons 
suffer relatively little criticism over their potential cost or technical feasibility.  While 
they will no doubt be expensive and will likely encounter technical challenges, the 
primary source of controversy revolves around their perceived effect on global stability.  
Currently, defense programs backed by national security policy appear to be on a 
collision course with core beliefs about the foundations of global stability and numerous 
elements of international and domestic public opinion. 
A methodical review of current scholarly work on this subject or even a quick 
“Google” search on the topics of “prompt global strike,” “conventional ICBM,” or “space 
weapons” yields relatively accurate insights into the status of the debate over 
 
6 While I do not personally believe this type of scenario is likely, the events of 11 September 2001 
should serve as a reminder that anything is possible.  I constructed this scenario specifically to illustrate the 
various themes this thesis addresses in detail.  For example, conventional PGS capabilities are responsive, 
enable access to denied areas, and provide a non-nuclear option.  While these capabilities could provide the 
President with a better option in some future crisis, there are aspects of the enduring Cold War nuclear 
force postures of the United States and Russia that make the deployment and employment of conventional 
PGS weapons problematic at best, and at worst a prescription for disaster. 
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conventional PGS capabilities.  As one might expect, there are numerous military 
planning documents and statements by military leaders that present the virtues of 
conventional PGS.7  Military leaders, including General James Cartwright (Commander 
of United States Strategic Command) and General Lance Lord (Commander of Air Force 
Space Command), see these weapons as a potentially effective means to address the 
uncertain security environment of the post-Cold War world.  Additional support for 
conventional PGS is found in current American policy documents, such as the National 
Security Strategy, that call for quick responses to aggression or even preemption in the 
face of significant threats by rouge states or terrorist organizations.  These views are 
counterbalanced by those who, while not necessarily doubting the utility of conventional 
PGS, see these weapons as potentially destabilizing.  The critics’ primary concerns 
involve the potential weaponization of space and the “nuclear baggage” associated with 
intercontinental missiles.  The “space sanctuary” advocates argue that placing strike 
weapons in orbit is unnecessary because there are adequate terrestrially-based alternatives 
(manned bombers, cruise missiles, conventional ballistic missiles, etc.) and that doing so 
will lead to a space arms race.8  Others, including members of Congress who succeeded 
in “zeroing” funding for “weaponized” tests of conventional PGS technologies, fear that 
a nuclear-armed nation (the target or a third-party observer) could mistake the launch of a 
conventional PGS weapon for a nuclear attack with the potential consequence of 
inadvertent nuclear war.9  This is, by far, the most commonly used argument against the 
case for conventional PGS weapons.  A recent Congressional Research Service report 
again raises this issue, but fails to assess the true likelihood of this possibility or its root 
 
7 Please see:  Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Future Concepts and Transformation Division, The U.S. 
Air Force Transformation Flight Plan (Washington D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 2004), [on-line] ; 
available from http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2004.pdf; Internet; 
accessed August 2005, and Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Directorate of Plans and Programs, 
Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond (October 2003). 
8 For examples please see:  Bruce M. Deblois, Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy C. 
Marwell, “Space Weapons:  Crossing the U.S. Rubicon,” International Security 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004) : 50-
84; Michael Krepron, “Weapons in the Heavens:  A Radical and Reckless Option,” Arms Control Today 
34, no. 9 (November 2004) : 11-18; and James Clay Moltz, “Reining In the Space Cowboys,” Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 1 (January/February 2003) : 61-6. 
9 Congress, House, Committee of Conference, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense 
for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 2004, Rpt 
108-622, 240. 
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causes.10  Also, though outside the scope of this thesis which focuses on the scholarly and 
political debate surrounding this issue, there is a body of public opinion that sees the 
potential deployment of conventional PGS weapons by the United States as a “Death 
Star” for global domination.  They see conventional PGS as a dangerous tool that an 
increasingly unilateralist and aggressive United States will use to intimidate and coerce 
the “peace-loving” peoples of the world.11
This thesis seeks to widen the scholarly debate over conventional PGS 
capabilities.  Weapons of this type will affect the global security environment when (not 
if) they are eventually deployed by the United States or others.  As noted above, much of 
the existing debate has focused on deployment mediums (terrestrial or space) and 
delivery vehicles (missiles or spacecraft).  Recommendations to terrestrially base 
conventional PGS weapons defuse one source of potential destabilization (weapons in 
space), but leaves the other issues of global stability largely unaddressed.  It has become 
almost “conventional wisdom” that the difficulty in differentiating the launch of 
conventional PGS capabilities from a nuclear attack raises the risk of inadvertent nuclear 
war to unacceptably high levels.  To remedy these concerns, the Air Force has proposed 
numerous technical and procedural methods to reduce the possibility for instances of 
mistaken identity.12  These measures treat the symptoms resulting from attempting to 
introduce a capability designed to address twenty first century security concerns into a 
global security environment that remains locked in a twentieth century mindset.  “Band-
aid” fixes may suffice, but the ideal solution involves finally moving beyond Cold War 
force structures and nuclear postures that make it possible for inadvertent nuclear war to 
be launched on false or misinterpreted warning.   
The definitive debate over conventional PGS capabilities has yet to occur.  Will 
conventional PGS capabilities increase or decrease other nations’ perceptions of 
vulnerability with regard to the United States?  Will conventional PGS capabilities 
 
10 Please see:  Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles (Washington 
D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, 2005), 15-20, 24. 
11 For two of many examples please see:  Environmentalists Against War at www. 
envirosagainstwar.org; and Neil McKay, “US Plan to Own Space,” Scotland Herald (22 June 2003) ; [on-
line] ; available from http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/MCK306A.html; Internet; accessed September 
2005.   
12 Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Common Aero Vehicle, 19-26. 
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increase or decrease nations’ reliance on nuclear weapons?  Are conventional PGS 
capabilities vital contributors to national security or threats to global stability?  These are 
questions our national leaders have not yet answered but will have to address in the 
relatively near future.  Momentum is increasing within the Department of Defense on 
several conventional PGS concepts as they near the transition from drawing board to 
development.  The debate over conventional PGS weapons spans the spectrum from well 
reasoned analysis to emotionally charged disinformation.  This debate will and must 
occur, but should be driven by thoughtful analysis rather than emotion and 
disinformation.                
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The overarching research question addressed by this thesis is, “are conventional 
PGS capabilities militarily usable weapons or too destabilizing and disruptive to the 
international security environment to deploy?”  This overarching question is broken into 
several parts, which in basic terms, amount to the “background, how, why, and so what” 
questions regarding conventional PGS. 
1. Global Strike Then and Now 
The second chapter provides the background or historical context for conventional 
PGS capabilities by examining their nuclear heritage and then surveys current global 
strike capabilities.  The first section of this chapter chronicles the development of global 
strike technologies during the Cold War.  Key technological milestones include the 
introduction of long-range bombers aided by aerial refueling and the advent of true PGS 
capabilities with the advent of the ICBM and space technology.  The nuclear heritage of 
global strike technologies is a significant factor in the controversy conventional PGS 
capabilities generate today.  The second section surveys current global strike capabilities.  
Many of these capabilities, including long-range bombers and cruise missiles that while 
originally designed to deliver nuclear weapons, have made the transition to dual-role or 
conventional-only delivery vehicles.  These cases demonstrate that it is possible to shed 





2. Conventional PGS Concepts  
Chapter three addresses the first part of “how” to accomplish conventional PGS.  
The chapter identifies several conventional PGS concepts that could come to fruition over 
the near or mid-terms (within the next fifteen years) and evaluates their associated 
operational strengths and limitations.  At least one possible system, derived from the 
retired Peacekeeper ICBM, could become operational almost immediately.  Current 
technology allows for two general alternatives for striking targets at global ranges within 
minutes of a decision to do so:  1) terrestrially-based (i.e., air, land, or sea) weapon 
systems that use modified intercontinental missile or space launch vehicles to transit 
space and strike distant targets, or 2) space-based weapon systems that are de-orbited to 
strike targets on the Earth’s surface.  This chapter splits discussion of conventional PGS 
concepts into two parts.  First, the chapter surveys possible munitions for conventional 
PGS weapon systems including penetrating warheads, GPS-aided maneuverable reentry 
vehicles, and the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV).  Second, the chapter presents several 
potential terrestrially-based and space-based conventional PGS delivery systems.  
Possible terrestrially-based systems include modified land or sea-based intercontinental 
missiles and small space launch vehicles.  Potential space-based systems could place 
numerous individual weapons into various orbital planes to provide overlapping global 
coverage or employ satellites designed to carry and dispense multiple weapons.   
3. Political, Regulatory, and Treaty Constraints on Conventional PGS 
To address the second portion of “how” to accomplish conventional PGS, the 
fourth chapter examines the often intertwined political, regulatory, and treaty 
implications of the various conventional PGS concepts.  The basic question addressed by 
this chapter is, “do political, regulatory, and treaty constraints erect insurmountable 
barriers to deploying or employing conventional PGS capabilities?”   
There are two general areas of political constraints that act to constrain the 
development of conventional PGS capabilities.  The first, and most significant political 
issue involves the “nuclear baggage” often associated with PGS capabilities that 
contributes to the perception that the operational employment of conventional PGS 
weapons could be mistaken for a nuclear strike and result in inadvertent nuclear war.  
Successful resolution of this issue is necessary in order for conventional PGS capabilities 
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to win congressional support and be operationally relevant if deployed.  The second 
general political constraint involves the perceived or actual weaponization of space which 
has significant political ramifications both domestically and internationally.  There is a 
large and vocal following of the “space sanctuary” philosophy that oppose any increase 
in the military uses of space.  The distinction between “transiting space” and “space-
based” will likely be lost on many critics.     
Current U.S. launch range safety rules and practices could significantly 
undermine the responsiveness of proposed conventional PGS capabilities.  During 
peacetime, public safety (i.e., liability) concerns prohibit missile or space launch vehicle 
trajectories from passing over populated land masses during the early phases of powered 
flight.13   Downrange airspace and ocean areas where spent booster stages and 
components are predicted to fall also must be cleared.14  All safety rules may be waived 
in times of war or significant national need, but it is worth noting that conventional PGS 
weapons would likely be used prior to or in lieu of major combat operations.  In order to 
retain the ability for rapid response, conventional PGS weapons require accepting 
calculated risks to public safety during launch operations.   
Finally, conventional PGS weapons face significant constraints from treaties and 
agreements between the United States and Russia and other nations.  Even though non-
nuclear in nature, provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) could 
limit the number, type, and deployment locations of conventional PGS weapons.15  The 
Launch Notification Agreement could also act to restrict the responsive launch capability 
of terrestrially-based PGS systems.  Space-based alternatives, in particular, face potential 
legal challenges based on provisions of the Multilateral Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) and the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (the Liability Convention).  
 
13 Air Force Space Command Manual 97-710:  Air Force Space Command Range Safety Policies and 
Procedures, 1 July 2004, 52-73 and 105-12. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 31 July 1991 [on-line] ; Available from 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/start1.htm#ArtI; Internet; Accessed July 2005. 
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Satisfactory resolution of these political, regulatory, and treaty issues should ideally 
occur before conventional PGS capabilities move from the drawing board to reality. 
4. Rationale for Conventional PGS Capabilities 
The fifth chapter examines the rationale behind U.S. efforts to develop and deploy 
conventional PGS capabilities.  The rationale comes in two primary forms.  First, current 
U.S. national security policy provides a strong foundation for developing and deploying 
conventional PGS capabilities.  Second, conventional PGS systems enhance the 
warfighting abilities of the United States by increasing the responsiveness, access, and 
“economy of force” of the United States military.  Both sources of rationale for 
conventional PGS capabilities are examined in detail. 
The chapter begins with a look at relevant policy documents including The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and The National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America.  A consistent theme within all three documents is the recognition that 
in the post-Cold War world, deterrence may not be enough to ensure the safety of the 
American population against emerging threats from rogue states and non-state actors.  
Each of these documents provides a policy foundation for the prompt and potentially 
preemptive use of military force to address urgent threats to the national security interests 
of the United States.     
The remainder of the chapter examines the military rationale behind the pursuit of 
conventional PGS systems by comparing their expected performance capabilities with 
existing global strike capabilities and forward deployed forces.  In line with U.S. national 
security policy, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) describes a world security 
environment where there is “increasing diversity in the sources and the unpredictability 
of the locations of conflict” that could result in requirements for U.S. military 
intervention or activities on “virtually every continent” against a “wide variety of 
adversaries” with “widely varying capabilities.”16  To meet the challenges presented by 
this environment, the Department of Defense, and in particular the United States Air 
Force, view conventional PGS systems as a transformational capability that could 
 
16 Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2001), 6; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf; 
accessed August 2005. 
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increase the responsiveness, reach and economy of force of  U.S. military response 
options available to back up desired national security policy objectives.  In addition to 
providing access to denied areas, conventional PGS capabilities may reduce reliance on 
forward-deployed forces and reduce the need to send U.S. forces into harm’s way. 
5. Conventional PGS and Global Stability 
The previous chapters of this thesis examined various aspects of conventional and 
nuclear global strike capabilities including:  the development and evolution of global 
strike capabilities during the Cold War; current U.S. global strike capabilities; concepts 
for terrestrially-based and space-based PGS capabilities; potential constraints on 
conventional PGS deployment and employment; and the policy and military rationale for 
conventional PGS weapons.  In sum, these chapters addressed the “how” and “why” 
questions regarding conventional PGS.  This chapter addresses the “so what” aspect of a 
United States deployment of conventional PGS capabilities and serves as a counterpoint 
to the rationale for these capabilities presented in chapter five.  While it is technically 
feasible to deploy conventional PGS capabilities in the near-term, and there is significant 
rationale to do so from both policy and military utility standpoints, there is a potential 
price to be paid.  The presence of these weapons may produce unintended consequences 
for the stability of the global security environment, particularly among the existing 
nuclear powers.  This chapter seeks to illuminate these risks and to characterize their 
severity.   
This chapter opens with a general discussion of nuclear deterrence theory, which 
arguably remains a key pillar in support of global stability, even in this post-Cold War 
era.  The contributions of several well-known deterrence theorists are presented to serve 
as a basis for the case studies and analysis that follow.  The next section presents three 
case studies that examine the strategic thinking and nuclear strategy, doctrine, force 
structure, and posture of the United States, Russia, and China.  The final section analyzes 
the potential impact of conventional PGS capabilities on the stability of the global 
security environment by drawing on the tenets of nuclear deterrence theory and the three 
case studies.  Does the presence of responsive conventional global strike weapons 
capable of precision strikes anywhere on the global in less than 90 minutes create a 
“security dilemma” that undermines the perceived credibility or security of the Russian 
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and Chinese nuclear deterrent forces?  If so, will these weapons produce a “tipping point” 
that drives unintended consequences in the posture or size of their nuclear arsenals?  Will 
the deployment or employment of U.S. conventional PGS weapons contribute to an 
increased likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war?  Some fear that the inability of an 
adversary or third party country to differentiate the launch of a conventional PGS weapon 
from a nuclear-armed missile could instigate a nuclear retaliatory strike.  How valid is 
this concern regarding Russia and China?  The deployment of conventional PGS 
capabilities present a golden opportunity to de-emphasize nuclear weapons, but must be 
accompanied by significant changes to the nuclear force postures of the major nuclear 
powers, particularly the United States and Russia, to avoid detrimental effects to the 
stability of the global security environment.    
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This thesis was written with the intent to expand the debate over conventional 
PGS weapons and cut through the perceptions and propaganda to the true core issues 
affecting the future of this transformational capability.  The ultimate aim of this thesis is 
to influence the decision calculus of senior Department of Defense and government 
policy makers on this important topic.  Several key policy implications are highlighted: 
1. Findings 
The follow paragraphs highlight the key findings of this thesis: 
a. Precedents for Nuclear-to-Conventional Conversion 
 All American global strike systems were originally developed and 
deployed to deliver nuclear weapons.  The B-52, B-1, B-2, ALCM, and Ohio-class 
submarine have successfully transformed from dedicated instruments of Armageddon 
into dual-role or conventional-only platforms. 
b. Conventional ICBMs? 
 Recent improvements in guidance technology make it feasible to consider 
intercontinental missiles armed with conventional munitions.  But, the question remains – 
will intercontinental missiles ever be able to shed their “nuclear baggage” in the same 




c. Near and Mid-Term Conventional PGS  
 Near-term conventional PGS options include modified Trident II or 
Peacekeeper intercontinental missiles.  Mid-term alternatives could leverage small space 
launch vehicles like the SpaceX Falcon to boost CAVs carrying a variety of conventional 
munitions over intercontinental ranges or place CAVs into orbit for later use.   
d. Launch Misidentification Safeguards 
 The comprehensive set of risk mitigation measures proposed by the Air 
Force should ensure adequate safeguards against launch identification mishaps for near-
term, single sortie conventional PGS operations. 
e. START Constraints 
 The constraints imposed by START will effectively delay conventional 
PGS deployment until after the Treaty expires in 2009.  Treaty negotiators must look 
beyond the current situation to consider how treaty provisions might constrain future 
options if world security conditions change. 
f. Policy Rationale 
 The policy objectives espoused in the National Security Strategy and 
supporting polices place a premium on rapid response, or in some cases preemptive 
action to defeat adversaries before they can inflict catastrophic damage against American 
territory or deployed forces. 
g. Responsiveness 
 Conventional PGS capabilities promise to provide unmatched 
responsiveness.  Conventional PGS capabilities enable global reach within 90 minutes 
from an “on-alert” posture. 
h. Hard and Deeply Buried Targets 
 Conventional PGS weapons have the potential ability to hold additional 
hard and deeply buried facilities at risk without resorting to nuclear weapons. 
i. Economy of Force 
 Conventional PGS capabilities offer significant “economy of force” 
improvements over existing capabilities.  More importantly, conventional PGS 
capabilities offer the ultimate “economy of force” by the ability to strike highly-defended 
targets without risking the lives of friendly forces. 
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j. Defeat Anti-Access 
 Conventional PGS capabilities offer unsurpassed ability to defeat 
adversary anti-access strategies.  Advanced air defenses, denial of forward basing, over-
flight restrictions, and hardened and deeply buried facilities do not constrain the ability of 
conventional PGS weapons to hold vital enemy centers of gravity at risk. 
k. Nuclear Deterrence Theory 
 Nuclear deterrence theory serves as an important predictor of potential 
“security dilemmas” created by conventional PGS capabilities.  Of particular note is the 
potentially destabilizing interaction between deterrence theories designed to “inflict a 
cost” and those intended to “deny benefits.” 
l. Cold War Legacy 
 Russia’s contracting nuclear force structure, high-alert posture, and 
deteriorating early warning system present a series of risk factors for inadvertent nuclear 
war that are exacerbated by the potential employment of conventional PGS capabilities.  
In contrast, China’s low-alert level and policy of “no first use” present virtually no 
opportunity for an inadvertent nuclear exchange. 
2. Recommendations 
Based on the research and analysis conducted in the course of preparing this 
thesis, the following recommendations are made: 
a. Conventional Peacekeeper 
 The Peacekeeper ICBM should be converted to a conventional role.  The 
missiles are paid for, available, and provide an excellent opportunity to leverage sunk 
costs.  The missile has sufficient range and payload capabilities to provide a militarily 
effective conventional capability. 
b. GPS-Aided Reentry Vehicles 
 The Air Force should seek to capitalize on the technology developed in the 
currently unfunded Trident II Enhanced Effectiveness Program.  The goal should be the 
development, testing, and eventual production of modified Mk 21 reentry vehicles to 
allow GPS-aided operation and precision maneuver during reentry.  Project could provide 
a near-term, low-risk capability until such time that the Common Aero Vehicle becomes 
available. 
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c. CAV Development 
 The Air Force should continue to aggressively seek Congressional 
restoration of funding for “weaponized” CAV development.  Resolution of the launch 
misidentification issue should be worked concurrently with weapon system development 
to provide an incentive for reaching resolution. 
d. Launch Safety 
 Balancing launch responsiveness for conventional PGS systems with 
range safety requirements require a willingness to accept greater risk to the public 
(foreign and domestic) during launch operations.  Unfortunately, a better solution will not 
be available until the far-term (or way-far-term) when a fully-reusable booster eliminates 
the danger posed by discarded booster stages. 
e. Nuclear ICBM Divestiture 
 In the near future, the Air Force will face a decision on whether to proceed 
with the Land Based Strategic Deterrent (or Minuteman replacement).  The Air Force 
should take this opportunity to pursue land-based conventional PGS capabilities in 
accordance with the New Triad.  Funding for LBSD should be reprogrammed into 
providing a responsive space launch capability for that supports PGS and launch-on-
demand. 
f. De-Alerting 
In order to fully exploit the potential of conventional PGS capabilities, the 
United States must pursue an end to the Cold war nuclear force postures maintained by 
itself and Russia.  Force postures of both the United States and Russia must be altered so 
that the launch of nuclear weapons “on warning” is no longer possible or necessary. 
3. Conclusion 
The most significant finding of this thesis is that conventional PGS weapons are 
not in and of themselves destabilizing, but when they are combined with the enduring 
Cold War postures of American and Russian nuclear forces they become a valid cause for 
concern.  The possible implications of conventional PGS capabilities simply highlight the 
danger we quietly face everyday.  The continued presence of American and Russian 
nuclear forces on “hair trigger” alert poses a risk to our nations inconsistent with the 
other aspects of our relationship.  To not deploy conventional PGS capabilities because of 
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perceptions of a renewed nuclear arms race or inadvertent nuclear war, allows us to 
dodge the tough decision.  We must finally clear away the last vestiges of the Cold War 
in order to be able to deploy capabilities necessary to protect American security interests 
in the post-Cold War world. 
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II. GLOBAL STRIKE THEN AND NOW   
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the historical context and current state of U.S. global strike 
capabilities.  I begin by chronicling the evolution of global strike capabilities during the 
Cold War.  All current global strike platforms originally were developed as nuclear 
weapons delivery platforms.  Many of these Cold War systems successfully dumped their 
“nuclear baggage” and made the transition from nuclear to dual-role, or conventional-
only, delivery vehicles.  These systems now form the backbone of the current U.S. global 
strike capabilities.  However, the shadow of the Cold War still looms over the 
development of conventional PGS capabilities.  Lessons learned through the transition of 
other nuclear delivery systems to new roles may provide insights helpful in breaking the 
paradigm that associates PGS capabilities exclusively with nuclear warfare. 
B. EVOLUTION OF PGS CAPABILITIES DURING THE COLD WAR                      
American capabilities for striking targets at global ranges from bases in the 
continental United States developed quickly following the Second World War in 
response to the growing political, ideological, and military standoff with the Soviet 
Union.  Building on U.S. experience gained from the strategic bombing campaigns 
against Germany and Japan, the long-range bomber became the global strike platform of 
choice.  In March 1946, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was established with the 
mission to “be prepared to conduct long-range offensive operations in any part of the 
world” and “to provide combat units capable of intense and sustained combat operations 
employing the latest and most advanced weapons.”17   
The United States had a small, but growing, nuclear arsenal in 1946 but lacked the 
means to deliver these weapons over the great distances necessary to reach possible 
targets in the Soviet Union.  Initially, SAC’s bomber force consisted of 148 B-29s, only 
about 30 of which were configured to carry nuclear weapons.18  These bombers lacked a 
true global strike capability and would have relied upon forward basing in Europe or 
elsewhere to strike targets in the Soviet Union.  By the late 1940s, SAC became truly 
 
17 Norman Polmar and Timothy M. Laur, eds., Strategic Air Command:  People, Aircraft, and 
Missiles, 2d ed (Baltimore:  Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1990), 7. 
18 Ibid. 
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capable of conducting global strike operations with the introduction of the B-36, the B-50 
(a modified B-29), and dedicated air refueling aircraft.  In 1949, SAC demonstrated its 
global strike capabilities for the first time.  In March a B-50 completed the first nonstop 
around-the-world flight in 94 hours with the aid of four in-flight refuelings.19  Also in 
March, a B-36 flew a 43 hour and 37 minute mission that covered 9,600 miles nonstop 
without refueling.20
The Cold War intensified in the 1950s and with both superpowers now armed 
with nuclear weapons, some came to view the true enemy as war itself.  In recognition of 
this new reality, the focus of SAC’s bomber force shifted from offensive capabilities to 
deterring aggression.  To be an effective deterrent, SAC would have to convincingly 
demonstrate the ability to inflict a devastating retaliatory attack upon the Soviet Union 
following a preemptive strike against the United States.  In 1958 SAC adopted the motto 
“Peace is Our Profession” in recognition of the fact that if it were ever necessary to 
execute its nominal mission of striking targets in the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, 
that it would have failed in its primary mission to prevent nuclear war from occurring in 
the first place.21     
Introduction of more and faster jet aircraft, such as the B-47, B-52, and KC-135 
greatly enhanced the speed and effectiveness of SAC’s nuclear global strike capabilities.  
However, these gains were overshadowed by the October 1957 launch of Sputnik by the 
Soviet Union.  The ability to launch an artificial satellite into earth orbit also provided an 
inherent capability for ICBMs, which represented a revolution in global strike capability.  
Even early ICBMs reduced the time necessary to strike targets at global ranges from 
several hours to around 30 minutes.  The relative inaccuracy of early ICBMs was 
mitigated by the use of high-yield thermonuclear warheads.  The threat posed by Soviet 
ICBMs, though later found to have been greatly overstated, shifted American ICBM 
development efforts into high gear and drove the United States to develop new early 
warning systems, capabilities for airborne command and control of strategic forces, and 
 
19 Polmar and Laur, 18. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 60. 
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alert procedures to ensure the survivability of at least a portion of the SAC bomber force 
in the event of a Soviet surprise attack.22
Throughout the 1960s, the United States continued to field incremental 
improvements to its nuclear global strike forces.  Improvements were made to the bomber 
force in the form of new aircraft (B-52G/H models and the B-58), self-protection 
equipment (Quail decoy missiles), and standoff weapons (Hound Dog missiles).23  
Likewise, by 1965 new Minuteman and Titan ICBMs replaced the earlier Atlas and Titan 
I missiles deployed in the early 1960s and greatly improved the accuracy, responsiveness 
and survivability of American ICBMs.24  From the mid-1960s forward the composition 
of the SAC alert force would increasingly favor ICBMs over bombers.25  By the late-
1960s the assured destruction capability of the ICBM was under threat by the growing 
capability of defensive systems.  The potential introduction of large numbers of anti-
ballistic missiles (ABMs) presented a possible (if unlikely) scenario where one of the 
superpowers could execute a preemptive strike that destroyed a large portion of the 
other’s nuclear forces and then shoot-down the few remaining missiles launched in 
retaliation before they reach their targets.   
Two developments, however, in the early-1970s would combine to assure the 
ICBM’s status as the premier global strike weapon for the foreseeable future.  In 1970 the 
United States fielded its first squadron of fifty Minuteman III missiles, each of which 
carried three Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).26  For the 
first time, individual ICBMs had the ability to hit multiple, geographically separated 
targets.  The use of MIRVs alone undermined arguments for deploying ABM systems on 
a cost versus benefit basis since it could require multiple ABMs to defeat the warheads 
from a single ICBM.  The second development was the Treaty Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems in 1972 that strictly limited the size and scope of allowable ABM system 
 
22 Polmar and Laur, 73, 75-6. 
23 Ibid., 67-8, 75. 
24 Office of the Historian Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Alert Operations and the Strategic 
Air Command 1957-1991 (Washington D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office), 20. 
25 Ibid., 23. 
26 Polmar and Laur, 121. 
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deployment and development.27  The net effect of MIRVs and the ABM Treaty was to 
ensure that as far as ICBMs were concerned “the only defense was a good offense” 
because, baring mechanical failure, the ICBM would almost certainly make it to its 
intended target(s). 
For the remainder of the Cold War little changed in terms of global strike 
capabilities.  Granted, new systems were introduced to replace obsolete systems, but 
these represented incremental improvements to existing capabilities.  In the 1980s the 
United States undertook three initiatives to increase the survivability and effectiveness of 
the strategic bomber.  First, Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) were introduced to 
extend the utility of the B-52 by providing it the ability to strike targets from beyond the 
range of Soviet air-defenses.28  Second, 100 B-1Bs were deployed and relied upon a 
reduced radar signature and near-supersonic speed at low-level to penetrate Soviet air-
defenses.29  Finally, development began on the B-2 stealth bomber to ensure the ability to 
penetrate the expected next generation of Soviet air-defenses.30   
There were also measures taken to address the vulnerability of American silo-
based ICBMs to a preemptive strike by Soviet heavy, multi-warhead SS-18s.  
Theoretically, it would only take about two-thirds of the Soviet SS-18 force (then over 
300 strong with ten warheads each) to destroy all American ICBMs in their silos.  As a 
stop-gap measure to increase the offensive punch of the American ICBM force, fifty 
Peacekeeper ICBMs with up to ten warheads each were deployed into existing 
Minuteman III silos and an additional fifty Peacekeepers were to have been deployed on 
rail-mobile launchers to enhance their survivability.31  Additionally, a new small, road-
mobile ICBM was developed to replace the Minuteman.32  Due to budgetary factors and 
the end of the Cold War the rail-mobile Peacekeepers and the road-mobile small ICBMs 
 
27 “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” 26 May 1972 [on-line] ;  available from 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abm2.htm;  Internet;  accessed July 2005. 
28 Polmar and Laur, 169-70. 
29 Ibid., 169, 254. 
30 Ibid., 169. 
31 Ibid., 308. 
32 Ibid., 314. 
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were cancelled.  The Soviet Union did, however, deploy rail-mobile SS-24 and road-
mobile SS-25 ICBMs in significant quantities. 
C. CURRENT GLOBAL STRIKE CAPABILITIES 
The United States currently possesses unrivalled capabilities for conducting 
global strike operations.  All of these capabilities are products of the Cold War and 
initially were developed to deliver thermonuclear weapons to targets in the Soviet Union.  
Thankfully, that was a mission that they never had to perform.  Several platforms have 
made the switch from full-time instruments of Armageddon to dual-role or conventional 
only delivery vehicles including:  B-52 bombers, ALCMs, B-1B bombers, B-2 bombers, 
and Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile submarines.  So far, these transitions have not 
included ICBMs or SLBMs, the only existing systems capable of conducting prompt 
global strikes.  The following paragraphs survey current American capabilities for 
conducting global strike operations.  While not technically capable of global strike, the 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) armed with SLBMs is included 
because of its potential for rapid response and its ability to project force into multiple 
theaters of operation simultaneously (depending on deployment location). 
1. B-52H Stratofortress 
The B-52 first flew in 1952 and a total of 744 were produced in eight different 
versions over an eleven-year period from 1952 to 1962.33  While initially conceived and 
built exclusively to deliver nuclear weapons, the B-52’s large payload and inherent 
flexibility were called upon as American involvement in the Vietnam conflict began to 
escalate.34  The decision to deploy B-52s for combat duty in Vietnam in a conventional 
capacity was not without controversy.  The United States began to increase the number of 
B-52s deployed to Guam in February of 1965, but the first combat mission was not flown 
until 18 June.35  The delay was due to a combination of “political considerations” and 
questions over the utility of the B-52 against the planned targets.36  However, there is no 
evidence to suggest that this deployment of B-52s was interpreted by the Soviets as 
signaling the intent or willingness of the United States to use nuclear weapons in 
 
33 William G. Holder, Boeing B-52 Stratofortress (Fallbrook, CA:  Aero Publishers, 1975), 13, 23. 
34 Ibid., 41. 
35 Lindsay T. Peacock, Strategic Air Command (London:  Arms and Armour Press, 1988), 90. 
36 Ibid. 
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Vietnam.  Media commentators at the time were familiar with the B-52’s primary 
function as a nuclear bomber and likened its use against the Viet Cong to “swatting flies 
with a sledge hammer.”37   
Pressed into service as a conventional bomber, the B-52Fs initially committed to 
combat in Vietnam packed a considerable punch, but they were limited to carrying just 
51 bombs (27 internally and 24 on wing-mounted pylons).38  In order to increase the B-
52’s conventional striking-power, the entire lot of B-52Ds underwent “big belly” 
modifications to increase the volume of the internal weapons bay to allow for carriage of 
84 500 pound bombs.39  The total bomb load of the B-52D was 108 500 pound bombs, 
which gave new meaning to phrase “carpet bombing.”   
During eight years of participation in such operations as “Arc Light,” “Rolling 
Thunder,” and “Linebacker II,” with numbers of deployed aircraft reaching 200 by 
February 1972, B-52s flew 124,532 sorties and dropped 2.63 million tons of conventional 
bombs on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.40  A total of 29 B-52s were lost during 
operations in Southeast Asia including 17 as a direct result of enemy fire (15 of these in 
“Linebacker II”).41  Throughout the heavy involvement of B-52s in the Vietnam conflict, 
the majority of the force remained in the United States performing the nuclear deterrence 
mission with up to 40 percent on alert for immediate takeoff in response to a Soviet 
attack.42   
Following the Vietnam War, the B-52 retained both conventional and nuclear 
capabilities.  The losses incurred during the Linebacker II campaign contributed to 
growing concerns over the ability of the B-52 to penetrate modern Soviet air defenses.  
To increase the B-52’s survivability, the G and H models were modified to carry up to 20 
nuclear-armed short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) and tactics were changed from high-
altitude flight to low-level penetration.43  The B-52Ds, however, were limited to free-fall 
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weapons and were thus principally tasked with conventional warfighting until they were 
retired from service in 1984.44  In the 1980s, the G and H model B-52s continued to 
demonstrate their potential for conventional global strike operations through participation 
in “Bright Star” exercises that involved flying 15,000 mile, 31 hour non-stop missions 
(with the aid of in-flight refueling) from the United States to bomb targets in Egypt and 
back.45  The deployment of the AGM-86B ALCM in 1981 enhanced the survivability and 
nuclear striking-power of the B-52 by allowing the aircraft to strike targets from a 1,500 
mile stand-off range, safely outside the range of Soviet air defenses.46
Just as its B-52 carrier aircraft had done in 1965, the ALCM also made the cross-
over from nuclear to conventional capability.  Beginning in 1986 under a “black 
program” code-named “Senior Surprise,” several AGM-86B ALCMs were converted into 
AGM-86C conventional ALCMs (CALCMs) which carry a conventional high-explosive, 
blast-fragmentation warhead in place of the W-80 nuclear warhead.47  To increase the 
payload weight (i.e., warhead size), the CALCM’s range is reduced from 1,500 to 600 
miles.48  There are no obvious external distinguishing features between the two versions.   
Unlike the initial B-52 operations in Vietnam, the first combat employment of the 
CALCM was conducted under a shroud of secrecy and was not revealed until well after 
the fact.  At 6:36 A.M. local time on 16 January 1991, seven B-52s armed with CALCMs 
took off from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana to strike communications, power 
generation, and power transmission targets in Iraq as part of the opening wave of the 
Operation DESERT STORM air campaign.49  If the departure of the aircraft had aroused 
any media attention, a cover story stating that the aircraft were deploying to Loring Air 
Force Base, Maine as a staging location for possible deployment overseas was to be used 
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in order to protect the secrecy of the operation.50  The mission was flown as a non-stop 
35-hour round trip returning to Barksdale because of concerns that if there were any 
“hangers” (unlaunched missiles) after the mission, the media at the recovery bases in 
Saudi Arabia might notice the ALCM-armed B-52s and draw attention to a capability the 
United States preferred to keep secret.51  The desire to keep the existence of CALCMs 
secret was not simply due to operational security concerns, but was much more strategic 
in nature.  The United States needed Soviet political support for the operations in the Gulf 
and so as not to offend Soviet sensitivities, the Bush administration chose not to “notify 
Moscow that air-launched cruise missiles, a system that the Soviets associated 
exclusively with nuclear weaponry, were going to make an operational debut.”52  The use 
of thirty-five CALCMs in DESERT STORM was a relatively insignificant portion of the 
overall air campaign but it provided the Air Force an opportunity to validate the 
operational capabilities of the ALCM in combat and to “show that the service could reach 
out globally to strike an enemy from bases in the United States.”53
By the time the CALCM was employed in combat for the second time, its 
existence had been fully disclosed.  However, unlike in 1991, it was employed relatively 
close to Russian territory with little consideration given to potential Russian sensitivity 
regarding its use.54  The conflict between NATO and Serbia over ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo and the on-going eastward expansion of NATO greatly increased tensions 
between NATO and Russia.  Russian President Yeltsin and the Russian military engaged 
in a significant amount of saber rattling throughout the conflict.55  From the U.S. and 
NATO perspective the conflict with Serbia was a limited war for limited objectives, 
however, the Russian perspective was significantly different.  Former Russian Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin, an envoy to negotiations with NATO over the Kosovo crisis 
stated on 28 May 1999, “The world has never in this decade been so close as now to the 
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brink of nuclear war.”56  Statements such as this illustrate the fact that while NATO was 
tightly focused on events in Serbia, Russia was concerned that Operation ALLIED 
FORCE could easily shift into operations against Russia.  One can surmise that the 
Russians were well aware that the B-52’s CALCM launch points over the Mediterranean 
Sea were well within striking distance of targets in Russia. 
Today, even though the newest B-52H is 43 years old, it is arguably a much more 
effective and versatile weapon system than when it was brand new.  Current engineering 
estimates show the B-52 has a lot of life left in it and is predicted to remain structurally 
viable until at least 2040.57  The published range of the B-52H is 8,800 miles, but with 
aerial refueling it is limited only by crew endurance.58  The exceptional versatility of the 
B-52 has led to its certification to drop or launch the widest array of different weapon 
types of any aircraft in the U.S. arsenal.59  In the conventional role, the B-52 can employ 
the CALCM for standoff strikes against heavily defended targets, and in relatively 
permissive environments, such as Afghanistan, it can employ the full range of unguided 
and precision guided direct attack munitions.60  Even though no longer standing nuclear 
alert, the B-52 retains a significant nuclear warfighting capability.  While no longer 
survivable against modern air defenses in a penetration role, the B-52 remains effective 
as a cruise missile “truck” for either the AGM-86B ALCM or the AGM-129 Advanced 
Cruise Missile, a low-observable design first deployed in 1992.61  Both cruise missile 
types are undergoing service life extension programs to ensure operational viability until 
at least 2030.62  The B-52 has been involved in nearly every major conflict the United 
States has fought in since it entered service and it is probably not a leap of faith to 
envision a role for the B-52 in any future conflict between now and 2040.  
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2. B-1B Lancer 
The B-1A was the second attempt to replace the B-52 as SAC’s primary nuclear-
armed strategic bomber following the cancellation of the XB-70 in the 1960s.  The B-1A 
could virtually match the B-52’s range and payload, but also had the option of high-
altitude flight at Mach 2 or low-level penetration at near supersonic speeds.  The B-1A 
first flew in December of 1974 and four prototypes participated in the development 
program, however, President Carter cancelled the program in June 1977.63  Production 
was to have totaled 240 aircraft, but the administration chose to rely on ALCM equipped 
B-52s instead.64
As part of his strategic modernization program, President Regan resurrected the 
B-1 program with a decision to build 100 B-1B aircraft to supplement the ALCM-armed 
B-52s.  The B-1B is very similar to the B-1A in range and payload, but modifications to 
the engine intakes to reduce their radar signature limit its top speed to Mach 1.25.65  The 
B-1B has a radar signature approximately 85 percent less than the B-1A and 98 percent 
less than the B-52H.66  The B-1B first flew in October of 1984 and entered service with 
SAC in July 1985, with initial operational capability declared in October of 1986.67   
As with the B-52 before it, the B-1B’s reason for being was to penetrate deep into 
enemy territory to deliver nuclear weapons to assigned targets as part of the Single 
Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP).  Upon entry into service the B-1B was certified to 
carry B61 and B83 nuclear bombs and the nuclear-armed SRAM.68  Also like the B-52, 
the B-1B later evolved into an effective conventional attack platform.  The B-1B was 
certified to carry the unguided Mk 82 500 pound bomb in July of 1989, which remained 
the only conventional weapon available to the aircraft until 1995.69  In 1991, the Air 
Force decided to restrict the B-1B fleet to the delivery of conventional weapons only.70  
 
63 Lou Drendel, Bone:  B-1 Lancer in Action (Carrollton, TX:  Squadron/Signal Publications, 2002), 8. 
64 Ibid, 8. 
65 Ibid., 12 
66 Ibid. 
67 Polmar and Laur, 186, 191, and 196. 




                                                
The Conventional Mission Upgrade Program permanently removed the ability for the B-
1B to carry nuclear weapons and greatly expanded the variety of conventional weapons it 
could employ.71  In 1995, Russian teams were allowed to inspect every B-1B to verify its 
nuclear capability had been removed in accordance with arms control treaty 
requirements.72  Today, the B-1B can strike targets anywhere on earth (with the aid of in-
flight refueling), in any weather, with a wide selection of unguided and precision guided 
conventional weapons, including up to eighty-four Mk 82 500 pound bombs or twenty-
four GBU-31 GPS-aided 2000 pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).73  The fact 
that the B-1B delivered nearly 40 percent of the total bomb tonnage and 67 percent of the 
JDAMs (nearly 3,900) during the first six months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
is testament to the B-1B’s superb payload and precision strike capabilities.74
The B-1B has been the subject of intense controversy, especially early in its 
operational career, over perceived operational shortcomings.  The political battles that 
resulted in the program’s initial cancellation and later resurrection likely helped to 
intensify (and certainly politicize) criticism of the B-1B.  An example of politically 
motivated criticism involves the B-1B’s non-participation in Operation DESERT 
STORM.  Soon after the air campaign against Iraq began in January of 1991, the media 
(CNN in particular) and several Congressmen used the B-1B’s absence from combat to 
further criticize the aircraft as an expensive “white elephant.”75  The B-1B remained 
home to perform its primary, and at the time only, mission of nuclear deterrence.  What 
makes this criticism significant is that there appeared to be absolutely no concern over the 
potential “nuclear baggage” associated with introducing the country’s front-line nuclear 
bomber into a conventional campaign in 1991.     
While apparently lacking at the time of DESERT STORM in 1991, the B-1B 
seemed to acquire “nuclear baggage” at the time of its first potential combat employment 
in 1998.  In a period of rising tensions between Iraq and the United States over Iraqi 
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interference with United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States prepared to strike 
suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) targets in Iraq.76  In addition to 
preparations for massive cruise missile strikes, the United States deployed a small 
number of B-1Bs to the Persian Gulf for their potential combat debut.77  Moscow reacted 
quite strongly to this deployment, believing that the presence of B-1Bs in the region 
indicated that the United States was on the verge of launching a preemptive nuclear strike 
on Iraq.78  Russian President Yeltsin even stated in televised remarks that “Clinton’s 
actions could lead to a world war.”79  Yeltsin’s remarks were echoed by members of the 
Russian Duma and high-ranking members of the Russian military who also believed the 
presence of B-1Bs were meant to “blackmail Iraq” by threatening to use nuclear 
weapons.80  Russian press reports claimed that the pending U.S. strike on Iraq was meant 
to “subvert Russian interests” and would be the first step in a “dash for the Caspian Sea” 
as part of a NATO conspiracy to capture the oil wealth of the region.81  The passage of 
nearly a year between this initial controversy and the actual conduct of Operation 
DESERT FOX in December 1998 against suspected WMD sites in Iraq did little to alter 
Russian perceptions.  Even though the strikes were carried out with conventional 
weapons and the B-1Bs played a relatively small role in the operation, it was reported in 
the Russian press and later confirmed by General Anatoliy Kornukov, then Commander-
in-Chief of the Russian Air Force and Air Defense Forces, that Russian nuclear forces 
were placed on heightened alert.82   
Two things make the general overreaction of the Russians to the deployment of 
B-1Bs significant.  First, it demonstrates an extreme sensitivity regarding the use of 
American strategic systems near the periphery of Russian territory.  Second, it 
demonstrates that the Russians still attached significant “nuclear baggage” to the B-1B, 
even though it had been declared a conventional-only delivery platform in 1991 and 
 
76 Pry, 286. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Pry, 286. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 289. 
31 
                                                
verified as such by the Russians themselves in 1995 – three years before the controversy 
in 1998.  Whether justifiably so or not, the Russian reaction to B-1B deployments for 
Operations DESERT FOX demonstrate the potential difficulty of removing “nuclear 
baggage” from strategic systems, particularly in times of increased tensions.  The lack of 
any apparent concern by the Russians over the extensive use of the B-1B in Operations 
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, however, seems to indicate that the 
“Bone” has finally been accepted as a dedicated conventional weapons platform.  In 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, eleven B-1Bs delivered 2,250 tons of bombs in 432 
sorties.83  This total accounted for half of the overall bomb tonnage dropped during major 
combat operations and was nearly all precision guided munitions.84  The recent 
appearance of the B-1B, for both static display and flying demonstrations, at the 2005 
Moscow International Aviation and Space Salon held at Ramenskoye Airfield seems to 
indicate that the Russians have finally accepted the “Bone” as a conventional platform.  
Captain Steve Jones, one of the B-1 pilots, said “It’s an honor to fly the first B-1s into 
Russia” and “I think it shows how much progress our two nations have made since the 
Cold War.”85  He continued to say that, “The fact the United States would bring one of its 
strategic bombers into this country and that the Russians will allow us to not only display 
the aircraft, but that we’re able to fly it here…it shows how diffused the whole Cold War 
has really become.86  The fact that it has taken ten years since the B-1 transitioned to a 
conventional-only role to get to this point effectively demonstrates that changes to a 
weapon system’s role may be made quickly, but it may take time for perceptions to align 
with the new reality.             
3. B-2A Spirit 
The B-2A Spirit, commonly known as the stealth bomber, is another of several 
attempts to replace the B-52 with a nuclear-armed bomber capable of penetrating the 
Soviet Union’s advanced air defenses.  Whereas previous aircraft would have relied upon 
high-altitude flight, high-speed, or low-altitude penetration to reach assigned Soviet 
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targets, the B-2 was designed to be nearly invisible to radar through the use of radar 
absorbing and defeating “stealth” technology.  SAC planners believed that a long-range 
bomber, capable of operating undetected by the world’s largest and most sophisticated air 
defense system deep inside Soviet territory was the only way to hold Soviet mobile 
ICBMs, at risk.87  In the event of nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the B-2 would be 
tasked to seek out, identify, and destroy the rail-mobile SS-24 and the road-mobile SS-
25s that had dispersed from their garrisons.88
The initial contract for development and production of the Advanced Technology 
Bomber (late designated B-2) was awarded to Northrop in 1981.89  The B-2 was 
developed under a shroud of secrecy and even the program’s budget expenditures 
remained classified until late 1988.90  The first artist’s conception of the B-2 was released 
to the public in April 1988 and the first B-2 was unveiled 22 November 1988.91  The B-2 
first flew in July 1989 and following an extensive period of developmental testing, 
entered service with Air Combat Command in December 1993.92  Original plans called 
for the production of 132 B-2s, but the aircraft’s unprecedented high unit cost and the end 
of the Cold War conspired to limit production to just 21 airframes.93
The B-2 was designed as a nuclear bomber during the height of the Cold War, 
however, it did not enter service until after its “end” in 1993.  Because of congressionally 
imposed production delays, the B-2 did not achieve initial operational capability (IOC) 
until April 1997 – over three and a half years after the first B-2 was delivered to the Air 
Force.94  These two factors had an immediate effect on the weapons that the B-2 was 
initially certified to carry.  Unlike the B-1B, there was no gap between IOC and the 
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fielding of a conventional weapons capability for the B-2 and at IOC the B-2 was 
certified to deliver B83 nuclear weapons and various GPS-aided conventional 
munitions.95  The conventional weapons carriage capability has gradually been expanded 
and now includes a wide variety of unguided and precision guided conventional weapons.  
The B-2’s operational range, as with the B-52 and B-1B, is limited only by crew 
endurance with the aid of in-flight refueling.  The B-2 reached full operational capability 
in December 1999.96
The B-2 made its combat debut as one of the lead elements of Operation ALLIED 
FORCE, the NATO campaign to halt Serbian “ethnic cleansing” of neighboring Kosovo.  
Several B-2s participated in the operation by flying nonstop missions from Whiteman Air 
Force Base, Mossuri to Serbia/Kosovo and back.97  The B-2 is credited with destroying 
33 percent of all Serbian targets during the first eight weeks of the campaign.98  While no 
specific controversy regarding the B-2’s primary role of nuclear warfighting was evident 
during ALLIED FORCE, its presence probably contributed to the overall unease the 
Russians demonstrated throughout the conflict.  The operation of American strategic 
systems, ALCM-armed B-52s, B-1Bs, and in particular stealthy B-2s, in relatively close 
proximity to the periphery of Russian territory likely contributed to Russian fears that 
Operation ALLIED FORCE could easily shift its focus from Serbia to Russia.99   
The B-2 has since participated in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and 
IRAQI FREEDOM without any apparent concerns by the Russians.  This is most likely 
attributable to a general lack of tensions between the United States and Russia and the 
growing level of cooperation between the two nations in the Global War on Terror.  With 
its utility as a conventional weapons delivery platform demonstrated in three major 
combat operations, it now seems the United States can employ the B-2 as necessary 
without too much worry over “nuclear baggage.”  However, for a reminder of its 
continuing role as a nuclear bomber one needs to look no farther than the B-2’s wing and 
squadron designations and lineage.  The 509th Bomb Wing is the direct descendent of the 
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509th Composite Group that was activated in December 1944 to organize, equip, and train 
for atomic warfare against Japan.100  Likewise, the 393rd Bomb Squadron is the 
descendent of the 393rd Heavy Bombardment Squadron, commanded by Colonel Paul 
Tibbets, which carried out the atomic bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki with 
B-29 Superfortress bombers in August of 1945.101       
4. Minuteman III ICBM 
The Minuteman III is a derivative of the original Minuteman ICBM first deployed 
in the early 1960s.  The Minuteman was the world’s first ICBM with solid propellant and 
the Minuteman III was the first ICBM to carry MIRVs (up to three per missile) when 
initially deployed in 1970.102  Between 1970 and 1975, the United States deployed 550 
Minuteman IIIs into hardened silos scattered throughout large portions of Wyoming, 
Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, and North Dakota.103  The Minuteman III originally 
carried up to three Mark 12 reentry vehicles containing the 170 kiloton (kt) W-62 
thermonuclear warhead, and had a circular error probability (CEP) of 220 meters.104  
Beginning in 1979, 300 Minuteman IIIs were retrofitted with the Mark 12A reentry 
vehicle which reduced the CEP to 166 meters and carried the more powerful 335 kt W-78 
thermonuclear warhead.105  With its combat load of three warheads the Minuteman III 
has a range of 7,500 miles (6,750 nautical miles or 12,500 kilometers).106  In the late 
1980s, fifty Minuteman IIIs were removed from their silos in Wyoming to make way for 
the deployment of fifty Peacekeeper ICBMs.107  This reduced the number of deployed 
Minuteman IIIs to 500, which remains the deployed total today. 
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Throughout its 35-year service life, the Minuteman III has averaged an incredible 
99.5 percent missile alert rate.108  To maintain this alert level, the weapon system has 
undergone several modification programs to extend its service life.  The most recent 
modifications include replacement of the propellant and guidance sets to ensure the 
missiles will remain viable until 2020.109  Additionally, the Minuteman IIIs are 
undergoing modification to reduce the umber of warheads carried from three to one.  This 
modification was originally begun as a result of the second Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START II) which would have eliminated all multi-warhead land-based 
ICBMs.110  Even though START II never entered into force, the downloading of 
Minuteman IIIs has continued in order to help meet the reduction targets specified by the 
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002 (SORT).111  There are also plans as part 
of the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle Program to equip 200 Minuteman IIIs with the 
Mark 21 reentry vehicles and W-87 thermonuclear warheads made available due to the 
deactivation of the Peacekeeper ICBMs.112
The Land-Based Strategic Deterrent (LBSD) program is underway to define and 
eventually develop a replacement for the Minuteman III by 2018.113  In the mean time, 
however, the Air Force is proposing to enhance a few Minuteman IIIs to what the 
services terms a Minuteman III “Elite” configuration.114  Air Force Space Command 
officials describe Minuteman III Elite as an interim step towards LBSD that would field 
some of the technologies desired for a future ICBM to upgrade a small portion of the 
existing Minuteman III force to make them more capable against “particularly complex 
targets.”115  While the exact system characteristics have not yet been determined, 
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preliminary options include new reentry vehicles and a new guidance system, possibly 
using GPS, to improve the accuracy of the Minuteman III.116  The proposed Elite 
modifications are still intended for use with a nuclear weapon, but the increased accuracy 
could allow the use of lower yield warheads than are currently deployed.  If the accuracy 
improves enough, the Minuteman III Elite could employ a conventional warhead instead.  
Over the years there have been numerous proposals and studies regarding arming 
Minuteman IIIs with conventional warheads, however, recent studies such as the 2004 
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces look 
towards retired Peacekeeper ICBMs as a better alternative for this role.117  This is 
primarily due to the Peacekeeper’s significantly larger payload capacity, which is four to 
five times greater that the Minuteman III.118  Under current planning assumptions, the 
Minuteman III will continue in its current role as the land-based portion of the nuclear 
triad until it is eventually replaced in the 2020 timeframe after an operational career 
spanning 50 years.      
5. Peacekeeper ICBM 
The Peacekeeper ICBM, originally known by developmental name of “MX,” was 
the United States’ answer to the Soviet SS-18.  The Peacekeeper carries up to ten Mark 
21 reentry vehicles, which contain 300 kt W-87 thermonuclear warheads, and have a CEP 
of 100 meters.119  With a full combat load of ten warheads, the Peacekeeper has a range 
of 6,600 miles (6,000 nautical miles or 11,000 kilometers).120  Numerous basing modes 
for the missile were studied, including various mobile schemes that would reduce its 
vulnerability to a Soviet first strike, but the force of fifty missiles (reduced from the 
initially planned 200) ended up in modified Minuteman hardened silos in Wyoming.121  
The force of fifty Peacekeeper ICBMs attained full operational capability (FOC) in 
December 1988.122  In early 1993, less than five years after having achieved FOC, the 
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United States and Russia signed the START II agreement which called for the 
elimination of the Peacekeeper and all land-based multi-warhead ICBMs.123  The treaty 
never entered into force, but the United States later chose to eliminate the Peacekeepers 
as part of the reductions necessary to meet the warhead totals agreed to under SORT in 
2002.  Peacekeeper deactivation began in October 2002 and will be completed in October 
2005.124
Even though the Peacekeeper will have been removed from service by the time 
this thesis “goes to press,” I include it as a “current global strike capability” because even 
though the missiles are being removed from deployed alert status, their associated flight 
hardware, reentry vehicles, warheads, and silos will not be destroyed.  The rocket stages 
will be stored in environmentally controlled facilities under the purview of the Rocket 
System Launch Program and will be available for government projects.125  The W-87 
warheads will initially rejoin the Department of Energy’s national stockpile, but there are 
plans to equip 200 Minuteman III ICBMs with these warheads and their associated Mark 
21 reentry vehicles.126  The missile silos will not be imploded as with previous ICBM 
deactivations to preserve them for possible future use and to save the expense of 
destroying them.127  Unlike START, which counted missile silos against allowed ICBM 
totals (even if empty), SORT only counts operationally deployed systems against allowed 
warhead totals.  It is technically possible, although highly unlikely that the Peacekeeper 
force could be reconstituted under conditions of sufficient national need.  A more likely 
scenario would see Peacekeeper components employed as part of a conventional prompt 
global strike system.     
6. Ohio-Class SSBN and Trident SLBM 
While not technically a global strike system since the Trident SLBMs carried by 
the Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile submarines lack sufficient range to strike targets at 
global range from the continental United States, I include it because the nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) does provide “global strike-like” capabilities.  From 
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advantageous deployment locations, the SSBN can rapidly project power to numerous 
targets, including ones spread among several theaters of operation. 
The Ohio-class SSBN was designed in the 1970s as a replacement for the 
Lafayette-class SSBNs built in the 1960s.  The Ohio-class subs have twenty-four missile 
tubes capable of carrying the Trident I (C-4) missile or the larger Trident II (D-5) 
missile.128  Original congressional opposition to the new submarines was overcome when 
the Soviets deployed the Delta-class ballistic missile submarine with 4,680 mile (4,137 
nautical mile or 7,800 kilometer) range SS-N-8 SLBMs.129  The USS Ohio, the first of an 
originally planned total of twenty-four Ohio-class SSBNs, entered service in November 
1981.130  The first eight Ohio-class submarines were armed with Trident I (C-4) SLBMs 
which have a range of 4,260 miles (3,870 nautical miles or 7,100 kilometers), a CEP of 
450 meters, and carry up to eight Mark 4 reentry vehicles which contain 100 kt W-76 
thermonuclear warheads.131  Subsequent boats of the class were armed with Trident II 
(D-5) SLBMs which have a range of over 4,560 miles (4,000 nautical miles or 7,400 
kilometers), a CEP of 122 meters, and carry up to ten Mark 5 reentry vehicles which 
contain 475 kt W-88 thermonuclear warheads.132  Due to the end of the Cold War and 
constraints under START, only eighteen Ohio-class SSBNs were constructed and the 
final Ohio-class SSBN, the USS Louisiana, entered service in September 1997.133
Current plans call for retaining fourteen Ohio-class SSBNs in the nuclear 
deterrence role and converting the four oldest boats into cruise missile carriers and 
special operations platforms, designated SSGNs.134  Under the current schedule, the first 
SSGN (the USS Ohio) is expected to enter service in 2007.135  The refit of the entire fleet 
of fourteen SSBNs to carry the Trident II (D-5) SLBMs is scheduled for completion by 
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2007.136  To meet allowed totals for deployed warheads under SORT, the Trident II (D-
5) may be downloaded to carry as few as three warheads (from the current payload of 
eight).137  The Ohio-class SSBNs are expected to remain in service for over twenty-five 
more years with the first one retiring in 2030, and the Trident II (D-5) will remain in 
production at a rate of twelve missiles per year until at least 2011 to ensure missile 
availability through the remainder of the submarines’ service lives.138
Today, the Navy’s emphasis for increased conventional striking power is placed 
on the SSGN conversion effort.   There are no funded plans to arm the Trident II (D-5) 
with conventional warheads, but there was an effort to increase the missile’s 
effectiveness in its nuclear role that could have implications for future conventional 
warhead efforts.  The D-5 Enhanced Effectiveness (E2) Program was to have been a 
three-year effort culminating in a flight test of a more accurate reentry vehicle.139  
Unfortunately, the Navy’s initial funding requests for this initiative were rejected by 
Congress in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and it has not requested funds again since then.140 
The goal of the E2 program was to enhance the missile’s ability to conduct prompt, 
highly accurate strikes and reduce collateral damage through the use of a lower- yield 
warhead.141  The project combined the existing Mark 4 reentry vehicle and W-76 100 kt 
warhead from the Trident I (C-4) with a reentry vehicle body extension that integrates 
existing inertial measurement unit (IMU) and GPS technologies and a flap steering 
system.142  The integrated assembly is similar in size and weight to the Mark 5 reentry 
vehicle/W-88 warhead combination that the Trident II (D-5) normally carries.143  The E2 
program sought increased accuracy through a three-step process:  1) the modified reentry 
vehicle’s integrated IMU initializes with inputs from the D-5’s missile guidance set, 2) 
the reentry vehicle receives and applies a GPS update to the IMU while in 
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exoatmospheric flight, and 3) during reentry the IMU provides steering inputs to the 
control flaps to steer the warhead to its target with GPS-like accuracy.144  While the E2 
Program is intended to upgrade the D-5’s nuclear warfighting capability, the program’s 
technology could be applied to a conventional PGS system.  Despite the lack of official 
program funding, Lockheed Martin conducted E2-related reentry vehicle flight tests in 
conjunction with Trident launches in 2002 and 2005.145   These tests demonstrated the 
modified reentry vehicle’s ability to maneuver to the target with greater accuracy and 
decelerate to “control impact conditions.”146                                     
D. CONCLUSION  
Current global strike capabilities are a product of the Cold War.  Heavy bombers 
were developed with ever-increasing reach and survivability and ballistic missiles 
shortened the time necessary to strike targets at global ranges from hours to minutes.  All 
American global strike systems were originally developed and deployed to deliver 
nuclear weapons.  The paradigm that associates strategic (i.e., long-range, nuclear 
capable or formerly nuclear capable) systems exclusively with nuclear war has proven 
difficult, but not impossible to break.  Many of the weapon systems described in this 
chapter have successfully transformed from dedicated instruments of Armageddon into 
dual-role or conventional-only platforms.  The B-52, B-1, B-2, ALCM, and Ohio-class 
submarine serve as cases in point and demonstrate that it is possible to offload “nuclear 
baggage” and adapt existing weapon systems to address new national security needs that 
were not necessarily envisioned when the systems were originally built.  These cases also 
point out, however, that it is advisable to approach the first combat employment of a 
newly transitioned weapon system with caution since it may take time for other nations to 
adjust to the change.   
 The glaring exception to the above nuclear-to-conventional success stories is the 
intercontinental missile.  Historically, the primary reason for this has been technical.  
Until relatively recently it has not been possible for a missile to deliver a conventional 
warhead over intercontinental ranges with sufficient accuracy to be effective.  A CEP of 
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100 meters is considered excellent for a 300 kt nuclear weapon, but it is useless for a 
2,000 pound conventional weapon.  Recent improvements in guidance technology make 
it feasible to consider intercontinental missiles armed with conventional munitions.  The 
most significant remaining barrier to conventional PGS is the perception that 
intercontinental missiles are “inherently nuclear.”  In actuality, intercontinental missiles 
are no more “inherently nuclear” than are long-range bombers, cruise missiles, and 
former SSBNs.  But, the question remains – will intercontinental missiles ever be able to 
shed their “nuclear baggage” in the same fashion that strategic bombers, cruise missiles, 
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III. CONVENTIONAL PGS CONCEPTS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2005, a formal Air Force Space Command-sponsored Prompt Global 
Strike Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) will begin.147  It is well beyond the scope of this 
chapter (or even this thesis) to compete with the formal AOA, however, this chapter 
examines concepts for conventional PGS capabilities that could be made available within 
the next 15 years, including some that could be deployed almost immediately.  Current 
technology allows for two general alternatives for striking targets at global ranges within 
minutes of a decision to do so:  1) the weapon system may be terrestrially-based (i.e., air, 
land, or sea) and use a modified intercontinental missile or space launch vehicle to transit 
space and strike distant targets, or 2) the weapon system is placed into space and de-
orbited to strike targets on the Earth’s surface when ordered.  This chapter splits 
discussion of conventional PGS concepts into two parts.  First, the chapter surveys 
possible munitions for conventional PGS weapon systems including penetrating 
warheads, GPS-aided maneuverable reentry vehicles, and the Common Aero Vehicle 
(CAV).  Second, the chapter presents several potential terrestrially-based and space-based 
delivery systems.                     
B. CONVENTIONAL PGS MUNITIONS 
Targets commonly envisioned for conventional PGS weapon systems include 
highly valued enemy surface and subsurface facilities, such as command centers and 
WMD production and storage facilities.  In general, there are two types of munitions that 
a conventional PGS weapon system could employ:  those intended to destroy the target 
through kinetic energy alone or those that use an explosive warhead to do the same.  With 
sufficient accuracy, even inert warheads can impart significant destructive force against 
targets due to the extreme impact velocities possible with either terrestrially or space-
based PGS systems.  While conventional PGS systems could be used to effectively attack 
a wide variety of surface targets, the most challenging targets are those that are hardened 
or deeply buried.  Conventional PGS systems have a theoretical advantage over other 
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conventional weapons against this class of target.  This section examines the theoretical 
possibilities and technical realities of strikes against hardened and deeply buried targets 
as well as two possible reentry systems conventional PGS systems may employ.  
1. The Hard and Deeply Buried Target Problem 
Attacks against hardened or deeply buried targets is the mission most commonly 
attributed to conventional PGS capabilities, but it is also the most technically challenging.  
To destroy this class of target requires very high impact velocities coupled with very 
strong and accurate penetrating warheads.  Achieving the necessary impact velocities 
does not present a technical challenge.  Space-based systems are theoretically capable of 
achieving impact velocities of up to 6.6 miles per second (from a 24,000 mile orbital 
altitude) and missile delivered weapons can achieve maximum impact velocities of about 
3 miles per second (15,840 feet per second).148  The two-part challenge resides in 
developing penetrating warheads able to survive these extreme impact velocities and 
providing the necessary accuracy. 
There are two basic methods for penetrating hardened or deeply buried targets.   
The first method employs long metallic rods made of a dense material like depleted 
uranium, commonly referred to as “rods from God.”  The rods are theoretically capable 
of penetrating two to three times their length into the target.149  The obvious weakness of 
this method is that to destroy very hardened or very deep targets requires very long rods.  
Rods in excess of about six feet in length could prove difficult to integrate with the 
delivery vehicle or platform based on payload space constraints.  For example, the Mark 
21 reentry vehicles carried by the Peacekeeper ICBM are 5.75 feet long (although there is 
additional unused “overhead” space) and the maximum height available with in the 
Trident II (D-5) SLBM nose fairing is a little over 6.5 feet.150   
The second method uses an explosive warhead designed to survive penetration of 
the target and then explode.  Presently this method is severely limited by existing 
materials technology.  The extreme velocities necessary to penetrate very hard or very 
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deep targets exceed the ability of current materials to survive the impact.  Current 
theoretical estimates envision materials that could survive impact velocities of 2.4 miles 
per second, but impact velocities up to only about 1 mile per second (5,280 feet per 
second) have been successfully demonstrated.151  When the target is hardened concrete 
(rated to 5,000 pounds per square inch), the survivable impact velocity drops to 
approximately 4,000 feet per second.152  Unfortunately, with current materials, there is a 
trade-off between penetration depth and impact velocity.  When the impact velocity 
increases to above about 2,000 feet per second, penetration depth gradually decreases 
from about 50 feet to less than 10 feet.153  While these limitations place much of the 
penetration potential of missile or space-delivered weapons beyond the reach of current 
technology, they still offer a significant improvement over the 1,500 foot per second 
impact velocities possible with standard aircraft-delivered free-fall weapons.154
Of equal importance to high impact velocities, weapons must also be sufficiently 
accurate to strike desired aim points with precision.  The Peacekeeper is regarded as one 
of the most accurate ICBMs ever deployed.  Using purely inertial guidance, the 
Peacekeeper can attain a CEP of approximately 300 feet.155  This level of accuracy is 
clearly sufficient for a 300 kt nuclear warhead, but is of little use for warheads that rely 
on kinetic energy or conventional high-explosives kill mechanisms.  The high velocities 
necessary to penetrate hard and deeply buried targets contribute to the difficulty of 
precisely guiding the weapon in two primary ways.  First, the laws of physics dictate that 
the faster an object travels, the more difficult it becomes to maneuver that object.  
Second, at reentry velocities greater than about 2.75 miles per second, the reentry vehicle 
is surrounded by plasma which prevents reception of any guidance update signals.156  For 
example, this would prevent a reentry vehicle traveling at these velocities from receiving 
GPS updates after release in the way that current GPS aided munitions like Joint Direct 
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Attack Munitions do.  The combination of new “ultra precise” inertial navigation units 
and maneuverable reentry vehicles represent one potential solution that may eventually 
provide the necessary accuracy.157
2. GPS-Aided Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles  
A near-term capability to deliver kinetic or explosive munitions against terrestrial 
targets could leverage technology intended for the Trident II (D-5) Enhanced 
Effectiveness (E2) program reentry vehicle.  Test flights conducted in 2002 and 2005 
demonstrated the potential of this technology for conventional applications.  As mention 
in the earlier description of the Trident II (D-5), the D-5 E2 program sought to enhance 
the missile’s ability to conduct prompt and highly accurate strikes.158  Plans call for 
leveraging existing Mark 4 reentry vehicle technology combined with a GPS-aided IMU 
and a flap steering system.159  The integrated assembly is similar in size and weight to the 
Mark 5 reentry vehicle normally carried by the D-5.160  Increased accuracy is achieved 
by using GPS to provide a pre-reentry update to the vehicle’s IMU which then provides 
steering inputs to the control flaps to steer the warhead during reentry to its target with 
GPS-like accuracy.161
Receiving a GPS update for the IMU prior to reentry circumvents the problem of 
reentry plasma blocking signals to the reentry vehicle.  The initial tests appeared 
promising, but it remains to be seen if the E2 technology can produce increases in 
accuracy sufficient for conventional applications.  If the accuracy proves adequate, 
explosive or kinetic warheads could be employed against a variety of terrestrial targets.  
The initial tests conducted by Lockheed Martin seem to indicate that the reentry vehicle 
design has the ability to decelerate a penetrating warhead to a survivable velocity of 1 
mile per second or less for use against hard or deeply buried targets.162
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3. The Common Aero Vehicle 
The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) is another reentry system that is currently 
under development and could be available early next decade.  According to the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the “CAV would be an unpowered, 
maneuverable, hypersonic glide vehicle capable of carrying 1,000 pounds in munitions or 
other payload.”163 As initially conceived, the 2,000 pound CAV would be boosted on a 
sub-orbital trajectory by a variety of vehicles including intercontinental missiles (ICBMs 
and SLBMs) and small space launch vehicles, or be deployed from an orbiting space 
platform.   There are currently two planned versions of the CAV.  The first version 
employs existing technology and has a modified cone shape that will allow it to glide for 
approximately 3,000 miles after atmospheric entry with a cross range of 800 miles.164   
The enhanced version of the CAV will use a lifting body shape to achieve glide ranges of 
up to 9,000 miles with a 3,000 mile cross range capability, but will require significant 
advances in thermal protection technologies.165   
Once in the atmosphere, the CAV will glide at hypersonic speeds, maneuver as 
necessary, deploy its payload at the appropriate velocity for the type of munitions carried, 
and strike within ten feet (three meters) of the desired aim point.166  Current plans 
envision the CAV with four basic payload configurations including: 1) a single 1,000 
pound penetrating weapon for use against hard or deeply buried targets; 2) three or four 
Small Smart Bombs (SSBs) for use against surface facilities; 3) six small cruise missiles 
known as Wide Area Autonomous Search Munitions (WAASMs) for use against 
facilities or vehicles; and 4) six small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence 
gathering.167
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The CAV is designed to enter the atmosphere at an angle of 3 degrees rather than 
the 28 degree reentry angle typical for ballistic missiles, and as a result the vehicle spends 
a significantly longer portion of the total mission time within the atmosphere.168  This 
flight profile creates challenges from a thermal protection standpoint but it allows the 
CAV to make trades among altitude, speed and range to enable a variety of munitions 
deployment velocities ranging from 4,000 feet per second for a penetrating weapon to 
subsonic speed for the WAASMs or UAVs.169  The CAV can fly slow enough to allow 
precision maneuver and reception of guidance updates, but at the same time match impact 
velocities with the survivability characteristics of current materials. 
C. TERRESTRIALLY-BASED PGS CONCEPTS                   
Terrestrially-based vehicles transit space to reach and strike targets half a world 
away (i.e., up to 12,000 miles).  Assuming a reentry angle of 30 degrees, it is possible to 
strike targets out to a distance of 9,000 miles within 90 minutes of launch.170  There are 
two basic categories of terrestrially-based concepts.  The first category employs modified 
ICBMs or SLBM to provide a near-term capability.  This requires transitioning existing 
nuclear delivery systems into dual-role or conventional-only platforms.  As noted in 
chapter two, this change of roles is not without precedent, but the associated “nuclear 
baggage” of these systems must be handled with the appropriate level of consideration 
for the sensitivities of other nations.  The second category of terrestrially-based concepts 
make use of modified expendable or partially reusable space launch vehicles to boost 
conventional munitions to designated targets.  While not likely to result in a significant 
operational capability within the next 10 years, these options tend to minimize the 
potential for “nuclear baggage” and may offer increases in operational flexibility over 
concepts using converted ballistic missiles. 
1. Near-Term Terrestrially-Based Concepts 
In order to have a chance of meeting near-term deployment timelines, options for 
conventional PGS capabilities must rely on modified intercontinental missiles (either 
ICBMs or SLBMs).  Stephen Younger, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
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said in 2004 that “[w]e are able to generate those weapons today” and indicated that it 
was possible to field an initial capability within 90 days.171  General Cartwright, the 
Commander of United States Strategic Command, has expressed interest in such near-
term capabilities if computer modeling and flight demonstrations prove sufficient 
accuracy is possible.172  The Trident II (D-5) SLBM and the Peacekeeper ICBM are 
possible candidates to provide a near-term conventional PGS capability.  A recent report 
by the Defense Science Board recommended use of these systems as an opportunity to 
provide near-term conventional PGS capabilities and leverage significant sunk costs in 
the process; however, there are no funded plans to do so at this time.173
a. Trident II (D-5) SLBM 
 Today, the Trident II (D-5) SLBM serves as the cornerstone of the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent.    The missile has a range of over 4,560 miles (4,000 nautical miles or 
7,400 kilometers), a CEP of 122 meters, and carries up to ten Mark 5 reentry vehicles 
which contain 475 kt W-88 thermonuclear warheads.174  The missiles are expected to 
remain in operation aboard Ohio-class SSBNs beyond the year 2030.175  To meet this 
service life requirement, Trident II missiles are committed to production until at least 
2011.176   
 As mentioned before, there are currently no funded plans to arm the 
Trident II (D-5) with conventional warheads, but the technology to do so could be 
leveraged from the languishing Trident II (D-5) E2 initiative.  Given the missile’s throw-
weight capability of 6,000 pounds, it should be possible to carry a militarily effective 
load of conventional munitions.177  However, in order to carry a 1,000 pound-class high 
explosive or penetrating warhead within an E2 modified Mark 4 reentry vehicle, it may  
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be necessary to reduce the number of reentry vehicles carried or sacrifice some amount of 
range.  This is because the conventional warhead would weigh over twice as much as the 
363 pound W-76 nuclear warhead it would replace.178  Substitution of larger reentry 
vehicles may require removal of the Trident II’s third stage rocket motor due to its 
location within the nosecone, but this would significantly degrade the missile’s range. 
 In a conventional role, the Trident II offers significant potential for 
adaptation to a conventional PGS role.  Given the ability to choose a desirable launch 
point, it may be possible to minimize the potential for over-flight of third party nations.  
Also, when launched from clandestine ocean operating locations, the Trident II has the 
ability to reach targets deep within enemy territory in as little as 15 minutes.179  Finally, 
if the E2 technology demonstrations produce significant accuracy increases, it could 
allow conventionally armed Trident IIs to perform precision strikes with either high 
explosive or penetrating warheads.  The most significant drawback to a conventionally 
armed Trident II is the “nuclear baggage” associated with its on-going nuclear deterrence 
role.  Trident II missiles deployed in both conventional and nuclear versions could 
increase the possibility that a launch of a conventional PGS weapon could be 
misidentified as a nuclear-armed launch.  However, the Defense Science Board still 
recommends examining the possibility of converting two additional Ohio-class SSBNs to 
perform conventional missions.180            
b. Peacekeeper ICBM 
 In contrast to the increasing weight carried by the Trident II in the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent force, the Peacekeeper will find itself unemployed by October 2005.  
Originally deployed in the late 1980s as the U.S. answer to the Soviet SS-18, the 
Peacekeeper is being withdrawn from service as part of the U.S. plan to meet the reduced 
warhead totals called for under the 2002 Moscow Treaty.181  In its nuclear role, the 
Peacekeeper carried up to ten Mark 21 reentry vehicles which have a CEP of 100 
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meters.182  With a full combat load of ten warheads, the Peacekeeper has a range of 6,600 
miles (6,000 nautical miles or 11,000 kilometers).183
 As with the Trident II, the Peacekeeper has significant potential to serve as 
the basis for an affordable, near-term conventional PGS capability.  Even though the 
majority of the missiles have been withdrawn from service, their components are stored 
in environmentally controlled facilities under the purview of the Rocket System Launch 
Program and will be available for government projects.184  In fact, Orbital Sciences 
Corporation has announced that it will offer the Minotaur IV, which will use Peacekeeper 
components, for U.S. Government space launches under the Orbital/Suborbital Program 2 
contract.185  If reactivated as part of a conventional PGS weapon system, the existing 
missiles could serve in a conventional capacity until 2020 without a service life extension 
program.186  The combination of the Peacekeeper’s 8,000 pound throw-weight capability 
and technology leveraged from the Trident II E2 Program should allow it to deliver at 
least four reentry vehicles with conventional high-explosive or penetrating warheads over 
a 6,600 mile range.187  Additional range could be achieved with a reduced payload. 
  The Defense Science Board views the conversion of the Peacekeeper into 
a conventional PGS system as too good of an opportunity to pass up.  Its Task Force on 
Future Strategic Strike Forces made this recommendation: 
The Air Force should preserve 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs currently being 
deactivated, and redeploy them to Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral for use 
with conventional warheads.  These weapons would give the United States 
a 30-minute response capability for strategic strike world wide.  The cost 
of this recommendation is about $350 million for development, and $600 
million for deployment, and the system could be ready by 2010.188
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Recent comments by North Dakota Senator Kent Conrad seem to indicate momentum is 
growing for a near-term conventional PGS capability using converted ICBMs.  In a 
meeting of Task Force 21 members, Minot, North Dakota’s base retention committee, he 
remarked that the current Quadrennial Defense Review would also be a Nuclear Posture 
Review, and his sources indicated that it would recommend converting fifty ICBMs to 
conventional roles.189  However, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) stands 
as the largest single barrier to a conventionally-armed Peacekeeper.  Since the treaty does 
not distinguish between conventional and nuclear strategic systems, many of its 
provisions will limit the number of deployed conventional PGS systems and the locations 
to which they may be deployed.  The Defense Science Board recognized these constraints 
and proposed a deployment date following the expiration of START in 2009.190
2. Mid-Term Terrestrially-Based PGS Concepts  
 Given the benefit of longer development times, mid-term conventional PGS 
solutions look beyond the use of modified intercontinental missiles and instead focus on 
small space launch vehicles to boost conventional munitions to distant targets.  Small 
launch vehicles capable of placing 1,000 to 2,000 pounds of payload into low-earth orbit 
have been around for many years, but they have lacked the responsiveness and 
affordability to be considered as possible boost systems for conventional PGS weapon 
systems.  Existing vehicles in this class, such as the Pegasus, normally measure 
responsiveness in months rather than hours and cost approximately $25 million per 
mission.191  U.S. Military requirements for “operationally responsive spacelift” have 
resulted in several developmental space launch vehicle programs that have the potential 
to greatly improve responsiveness and reduce launch cost.  These characteristics could 
make conventional PGS cost competitive with existing global strike platforms.  This 
section focuses on one specific development program, the Force Application and Launch 
from the Continental United States (FALCON) Technology Demonstration Program, 
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which appears most likely to produce capabilities that could mature into an operational 
conventional PGS weapon system by the middle of the next decade. 
The FALCON technology demonstration program is a joint Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency/U.S. Air Force effort to “develop and validate, in flight, 
hypersonic technologies that will enable prompt global reach missions and demonstrate 
affordable responsive space lift.”192  As this quote alludes, the program is divided into 
two tasks.  In the near-term, one task seeks to develop the hypersonic technologies 
necessary for the CAV by flight testing three generations of Hypersonic Technology 
Vehicles (HTVs) with increasingly advanced aerodynamic configurations, thermal 
protection systems, and guidance, navigation, and control capabilities.193  The eventual 
goal of the effort is to produce an autonomous, reusable hypersonic cruise vehicle that 
operates from conventional runways and can reach targets 9,000 miles away within two 
hours by the year 2025.194  The other program task is to develop a Small Launch Vehicle 
(SLV) to launch the HTVs (i.e., CAVs) and demonstrate affordable, responsive space 
lift.195  Total launch costs, excluding the payload, are not to exceed $5 million.  Overall, 
FALCON is a three-phase program involving:  system definition (completed), design and 
development (underway), and technology demonstrations.  Phase II will conclude with 
the integrated flight test of a low-risk first-generation HTV atop the SLV.  Phase three 
calls for the flight testing of an integrated second-generation HTV/SLV system and 
multiple flight tests of the reusable third-generation HTV.196
Space Exploration Technologies, known as SpaceX, is one of the remaining 
contenders competing to build the SLV.  In what seems to represent a significant 
advantage over the other competitors, SpaceX and their appropriately named Falcon I 
launch vehicle currently hold contracts to launch two DOD research satellites in 2005 and 
for up to $100 million in launch options through 2010, not including the launches 
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planned as part of the FALCON program.197  The target date for the Falcon I’s maiden 
flight is 30 September 2005 from a SpaceX launch complex in the Kwajalein Islands.198  
The Falcon I is a 70 foot long, 5.5 foot diameter, two-stage liquid propellant (liquid 
oxygen and kerosene) rocket with a liftoff weight of 60,000 pounds that is designed to 
place approximately 1,100 to 1,500 pounds (depending on orbital inclination) into a 120 
mile circular orbit.199  The Falcon I was designed from the ground up to be both 
affordable and responsive.200  In an effort to increase operational economy, the Falcon I 
first stage is designed for reuse.  Following first stage shutdown and separation, 
parachutes lower it to a soft water landing for later recovery by ship.201  SpaceX 
currently charges $5.9 million for a Falcon I launch, but indicates that discounts are 
available for multi-launch contracts.202  
Published timelines for a typical Falcon I space launch call for horizontal 
integration of the payload and booster four days prior to launch and a 24-hour launch 
countdown.203  These timelines are obviously inadequate for a PGS capability, but could 
likely be shortened significantly with a weaponized version of the Falcon I.  One can 
easily envision a deployment scheme that places a small number of Falcons, perhaps a 
total of eight to ten, “on alert” at Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral Air 
Force Station.  The vehicles, pre-integrated with CAVs, would reside in horizontal 
shelters reminiscent of the “coffin launchers” used by the early Atlas ICBMs.  The 
shelters would not be hardened, but would protect the vehicles from the elements and 
“prying eyes.”  Each falcon would be armed with a single 2,000 pound CAV.  The CAVs 
mated to the “on-alert” Falcons could be configured with a variety of payloads to provide 
rapid response options against various target types. 
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A scenario for the launch of a Falcon PGS mission could unfold as follows.  Upon 
receipt of a launch order, the operations crew selects the on-alert Falcon vehicle (or 
vehicles) with the appropriate armament and initiates the launch sequence.  The roof of 
the chosen shelter(s) slides open and the Falcon immediately erects to a vertical position 
on its launch mount.  Once in a vertical position, loading of the liquid oxygen and 
kerosene propellants begins.  Simultaneously with propellant loading, the launch crew 
uploads the flight plan and target data into the Falcon and CAV guidance units.  Within 
15 minutes of receiving the launch order, the Falcon is fully fueled and targeted for 
launch.   
An expectation for a response time of 15 minutes from order receipt to launch is 
well within the bounds of current technological capabilities.  One can view the Atlas 
ICBMs of the early-1960s serves as a historical analog to the proposed Falcon basing 
scheme described above.  The Atlas was deployed in horizontal “coffin launchers” and 
was only fueled when raised to the vertical position for launch.  The Atlas was 75 feet 
long, 10 feet in diameter, and had a fueled weight of 265,000 pounds, which made it 
significantly larger than the Falcon.204  Even though larger, the Atlas could reach launch 
readiness in between 8 and 15 minutes from first warning.205  Clearly, techniques for 
rapid cryogenic tanking have existed for quite some time.  Rapid targeting capabilities 
also exist today.  A targeting system for a weaponized Falcon could leverage 
technologies developed to rapidly upload flight plan and initial intercept coordinates for 
the National Missile Defense system in addition to over 35 years of U.S. Air Force 
experience in remotely and rapidly conducting ICBM retargeting operations.  It is 
technologically and operationally possible to produce a space launch vehicle-derived, 
liquid fueled PGS boost system with similar responsiveness to a Peacekeeper-derived 
system without the “nuclear baggage.” 
D. SPACE-BASED CONVENTIONAL PGS CONCEPTS  
An alternative to terrestrial basing is to place conventional PGS weapons into 
space and de-orbit them to strike targets on the Earth’s surface.  Often referred to as “rods 
from God,” space-based concepts offer the potential for unmatched responsiveness and 
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impact velocities.  A weapon launched from an orbital altitude of 500 miles, assuming an 
ideal orbital position at launch, could strike a target within 12 minutes at an impact 
velocity of 3 miles per second.206  These potential advantages, however, come with many 
operational, technical, political, and treaty-related strings attached.  While space-based 
concepts have been studied extensively in the past, they seem to have fallen out of favor 
in recent years and nearly all current planning is focused on terrestrial alternatives.207  
They are, however, addressed in this thesis for sake of completeness. 
Recent studies of space-based alternatives have considered placing CAVs, either 
individually or attached to a satellite bus, into orbit for use against high-priority, fleeting 
targets.  The CAVs could be launched into orbit in response to a crisis, similar to 
deploying an aircraft carrier to a trouble spot, or could be intended to maintain a 
continuous orbital presence for response against unanticipated contingencies.  Unlike 
terrestrially-based systems that can hold any target within its range continually at risk, the 
realities of orbital mechanics result in a constantly changing position for the space-based 
systems that increases or decreases potential response times.  Multiple space-based 
systems are required to maintain constant global coverage with response time equal to or 
better than terrestrially-based systems.   
A recent study by the Schafer Corporation divides the space-based deployment 
possibilities into two generations of capabilities, which both rely on the same orbital 
deployment scheme to achieve the best compromise between constellation size and 
system responsiveness.208  Both generations rely on deploying fifteen orbital weapons 
systems into a Walker Constellation with five equally space orbital rings with three 
vehicles equally spaced in each ring.209  The orbital rings would be inclined 50 degrees to 
the equator, which would result in an orbital track that would cover between 50 degrees 
north and 50 degrees south latitude.210  By assuming a 2,400 nautical mile cross-range 
for the CAV (the FALCON program hopes to achieve 3,000 nautical miles), the coverage 
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area is increased to cover virtually the entire globe from 90 degrees north and 90 degrees 
south latitude.211  A weapon system of this type could offer response times from the 
reentry command to target impact of between 60 and 95 minutes.  Smaller constellations 
are possible, but could result in significant gaps in attack opportunities while the vehicles 
orbit into the appropriate de-orbit locations. 
Both space-based alternatives identified by the Schafer Corporation study rely on 
orbital versions of the CAV.  The first generation system would use space launch 
vehicles to deploy individual CAVs into the constellation described above.  The CAVs 
would be equipped with orbital support and de-orbit package that would provide battery 
power and propulsion for a maximum 30 to 90 day orbital stay.212  Given the relatively 
short on-orbit life of this system, the vehicles would not be placed into orbit unless it was 
fairly certain that they would be used.  Failure to operationally employ the systems would 
require the CAVs to be de-orbited into a predetermined disposal location (i.e., a live-fire 
weapons range) in a costly waste of limited resources.  This disposal operation could 
provide valuable training for the crews operating the system, but at very high cost.   
The second generation system would employ satellite buses that would provide 
power, communications, and propulsion for extended orbital operations and could carry 
between four and six CAVs with various munitions load outs.213  This system alleviates 
the potentially wasteful deployment scenario mentioned above.  The weapon system 
could remain on-orbit indefinitely (subject to the life span of the satellite bus) in a state of 
constant readiness.  These orbital “Coke machines” would give ground commanders the 
opportunity to choose the most appropriate weapon for a specific target or call in multiple 
weapons simultaneously without having to wait until the next vehicle orbits into position.  
 Of course, this type of system presents the potential for disastrous consequences 
in the event of a satellite bus failure.  Imagine a scenario where, due to failure of the on-
board propulsion or communications systems, the satellite bus and its payload of four to 
six CAVs, armed with various kinetic and explosive weapons, suffers orbital decay and 
reenters into a populated area.  Overall, terrestrially-based systems offer similar (or 
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better) responsiveness, continuous readiness against world-wide targets, and a much 
greater likelihood to “fail safe” rather than “fail deadly.”  Space-based alternatives also 
face many political and treaty obstacles that will be discussed in the following sections.       
E. CONCLUSION  
This chapter examined how the United States could deploy conventional PGS 
capabilities in the near to mid-term.  It examined the variety of possible munitions and 
reentry vehicle options available to provide militarily useful conventional PGS 
capabilities.  Near-term options include modified Trident II or Peacekeeper 
intercontinental missiles armed with GPS-aided maneuverable reentry vehicles 
containing kinetic or high-explosive warheads.  Mid-term alternatives could leverage 
small space launch vehicles like the SpaceX Falcon to boost CAVs carrying a variety of 
conventional munitions over intercontinental ranges.  Finally, two mid-term concepts for 
space-basing of CAVs were examined.  Technology does not present any “show 
stoppers” for deploying conventional PGS capabilities in the near or mid-term.  The 
following chapter examines several intertwined political, regulatory, and treaty issues that 
could serve to significantly constrain the deployment or effectiveness of conventional 
PGS capabilities. 
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IV. POLITICAL, REGULATORY, AND TREATY CONSTRAINTS 
ON CONVENTIONAL PGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike many other modern weapon systems concepts where cost and technical 
issues commonly form the predominant basis for debate, conventional PGS capabilities 
face a series of political, regulatory, and treaty constraints that supersede concerns over 
cost and technology.  This chapter examines the often intertwined political, regulatory, 
and treaty implications of the proposed conventional PGS concepts discussed in the 
previous chapter.  Each of these areas forms barriers that serve to inhibit progress 
towards development of conventional PGS capabilities that may be overcome with 
varying degrees of difficulty.  Politically, conventional PGS systems suffer from 
lingering perceptions linked to their nuclear past.  Regulations in the form of launch and 
range safety rules may inhibit the timeliness of conventional PGS employment.  Finally, 
bilateral treaties between the United States and Russia may significantly limit the 
deployment locations and numbers of conventional PGS systems.   
B. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
Political constraints on the development and deployment conventional PGS 
capabilities primarily involve concerns related to “nuclear baggage” or the weaponization 
of space.  Both of these political concerns have some bearing on the various near and 
mid-term terrestrial and space-based conventional PGS concepts discussed earlier.  This 
section examines the way existing political mindsets constrain conventional PGS 
development and seeks to identify which concepts have the best chance of successfully 
passing through the political barriers. 
1. Nuclear Baggage 
For terrestrially-based concepts, the single most significant political issue 
involves the perception among senior leaders that the employment of conventional PGS 
weapons could be mistaken for a nuclear strike and result in inadvertent nuclear war.  
This concern, rather than reflective of the inherent characteristics of conventional PGS 
capabilities, is actually an unfortunate byproduct of the continuing Cold War nuclear 
postures maintained by the United States and Russia where both remain ready to “launch-
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on-warning.”  For the inadvertent nuclear war scenario to play out, two things are 
required:  1) an early-warning capability and forces postured to respond in the time 
provided by the warning system and 2) a continuing paradigm that associates 
intercontinental missiles exclusively with nuclear weapons which provides the incentive 
to retaliate.  There are two ways out of this trap.  The first escape route requires the 
elimination of the launch-on-warning postures maintained by the United States and 
Russia.  This topic is handled in detail in chapter six.  The second way out requires 
breaking the “intercontinental missiles are always nuclear-armed” paradigm.  This 
section examines ways conventional PGS capabilities may be made politically palatable, 
even in the presence of enduring launch-on-warning postures.    
The examples of the B-52, B-1B, B-2, and ALCM detailed in a previous chapter 
demonstrated that it is possible to remove nuclear baggage from weapon systems that 
were initially designed to serve as nuclear delivery vehicles.  While the majority of these 
examples maintain dual nuclear and conventional roles and have been used in numerous 
conventional conflicts and contingencies, this may not be the model to emulate for 
conventional PGS.  Given the short flight times and greater sensitivities that seem to 
inherently accompany intercontinental missiles, it may be advisable to have a thicker 
firewall between nuclear and conventional capable PGS systems than currently exist with 
dual-use aircraft.  The case of the B-1B may serve as a better role model, where the entire 
fleet was converted to an exclusively conventional role.  Measures that may help assure 
other nations of the conventional-only nature of a conventional PGS weapon system may 
include:  on-site inspections to verify destruction of nuclear-capable hardware; 
inspections to verify conventional weapons load-outs for deployed conventional PGS 
systems; and basing locations significantly distant from bases for nuclear-armed ICBMs.  
Of course, another option is to adopt a delivery system with no nuclear past.       
The Trident II (D-5) has significant potential to perform well in a conventionally-
armed capacity.  However, its potential for launch misinterpretation is the highest of the 
terrestrially-based proposals presented earlier in this chapter.  Even the best early-
warning systems would find it extremely difficult (likely impossible) to distinguish a 
conventionally-armed Trident II from a nuclear-armed one, since they only differ in the 
payload carried.  Even if conventional Tridents were deployed on separate submarines 
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from nuclear ones, it would be of no use in trying to determine whether the launch 
originated from a submerged submarine designated for conventional operations or one 
designated for nuclear deterrence.  Since the Ohio-class SSBN and their Trident II (D-5) 
SLBMs will form the backbone of U.S. nuclear deterrence in the years ahead, it is 
probably wise to leave this force completely dedicated to this important mission.  
Attempts to arm Tridents with conventional weapons could ultimately undermine their 
deterrence role by contributing to an increased likelihood of inadvertent nuclear conflict. 
On the surface, one might expect the conversion of the Peacekeeper ICBMs to a 
conventional role to fall victim to the same problems that basically rule out such a 
transition for the Trident II.  The Peacekeeper situation is actually quite different and 
provides an opportunity to carryout a “B-1B-like” transition to a conventional-only role.  
Foreign confidence in the conventional-only role of the Peacekeeper could be gained 
through a combination of program openness and executive-level communication.    
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, all of the Peacekeeper ICBMs will have 
been withdrawn from nuclear alert and their silos in Wyoming by October of 2005.  This 
retired status should make the Peacekeeper available for new roles without the potential 
for confusion inherent in a dual-role system.  Conventionally-armed Peacekeepers would 
be deployed Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, a 
significant distance away from the nuclear ICBMs in the north central portion of the 
country.  Due to the significant size difference between the Peacekeeper and the 
Minuteman III, the different infrared signatures produced during launch should serve as 
an additional means to differentiate a conventional PGS strike from a nuclear ICBM 
launch.   
To solidify the Peacekeeper’s conventional-only role, its nuclear-capable front-
end sections (the reentry vehicle busses) should be destroyed and then, like with the B-
1B, the Russians and possibly the Chinese should be allowed to inspect and verify 
completion of this action.  Once the system is deployed, both nations should be granted 
periodic access to the deployment locations to verify the continued non-nuclear status of 
the system.  If it should become necessary to employ a conventional PGS weapon, “Hot 
Line” notifications should be made just prior to launch to ensure the Russians and 
Chinese are not surprised and do not overreact.  This assumes that neither country is the 
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intended target, but one should easily recognize the inherent danger of employing this 
type of weapon against either Russia or China. 
In theory, a terrestrially-based concept that does not use any components that 
were previously associated with nuclear weapons or existing ICBMs should have the 
least difficultly circumventing political concerns over launch misidentification.  
However, as an illustration of how deeply the “intercontinental missile equals nuclear” 
paradigm runs, Congress has zeroed all funding for weaponized testing of the CAV under 
the FALCON program until there are negotiated safeguards in place to ensure the launch 
of a conventional PGS weapon could not be misinterpreted as a nuclear missile launch.214  
These restrictions are in place regardless of the fact that the CAV and its potential Falcon 
launch vehicle have no association with current or planned nuclear weapons.  The Air 
Force has proposed a tailored package of measures to mitigate the chances for launch 
misinterpretation including:  a vow not to test or deploy the CAV on existing ICBMs, 
strategic dialog, cooperative inspections, confidence building measures, shared early 
warning , executive level notifications, and a host of basing and signature enhancements 
to make these vehicles clearly distinguishable from any others.215  The congressionally 
mandated restrictions on the program appear to be overly cautious and the congressional 
language requiring negotiated safeguards with other nuclear powers effectively gives the 
Russians, Chinese, and may be even the French veto power over whether the United 
States ever develops or deploys conventional PGS capabilities. 
Space-based alternatives could also be affected by some of the same 
misidentification concerns as missile or space launch vehicle derived concepts.  While 
not subject to potential launch misidentification, a reentering space-based weapon could 
appear to be a missile in the later stages of its flight and generate a similar possibility for 
misidentification and overreaction.  Employment of space-based systems would require 
pre-strike notifications similar to those contemplated for terrestrially-based alternatives.  
These concerns are but the tip of the iceberg for space-based concepts that take center 
stage in the debate over space weaponization, which is discussed in the next section. 
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2. Space Weaponization 
Conventional PGS capabilities that simply transit space are controversial enough 
based on the previously discussed concerns over the potential for launch 
misidentification.  The possibility of basing these weapons in orbit represents a “political 
hot potato” that few politicians are willing to get involved with at the current time.  The 
perceived or actual weaponization of space has significant political ramifications both 
domestically and internationally.  Unlike with the nuclear baggage issue discussed above, 
there are no mitigation measures that will allow one to maneuver successfully around the 
political obstacles to space weaponization in the near future.  Benjamin Lambeth of 
RAND characterizes the issue of placing strike weapons into orbit as follows: 
The overarching problem connected with this mission area [space force 
application], however, is that – at least today – far greater political 
sensitivities attach to it than those associated with the less provocative 
notion of space control.216
 
The fact that he identifies space control, a typical lightening rod for controversy, 
as less controversial than space force application says quite a bit about the status of the 
debate over crossing the Rubicon of space weaponization.   
There are two basic arguments regarding space weaponization.  The first is known 
as the “sanctuary school” which seeks to keep space free of weapons of any kind and 
does not recognize any immediate threats to the U.S. ability to exercise freedom of 
operation in space.217  Former Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota represented the 
“sanctuary” viewpoint well when he stated in 2001 that, “It would be a disaster for us to 
put weapons in space of any kind under any circumstances.  It only invites other countries 
to do the same thing.”218  The second argument is made by those who seek to weaponize 
space at the earliest opportunity because the eventual weaponization of space is inevitable 
and unilateral restraint by the United States will not stop others from doing so.219  
Proponents of this viewpoint often invoke the history of airpower as an analog for the 
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future path of space power.  General Howell Estes, former Commander of United States 
Space Command, pointed out that: 
The potential of the aircraft was not recognized immediately” and “their 
initial use was confined to observation…until one day the full advantage 
of applying force from the air was realized, and the rest is history.  So too 
[will it be] with the space business.220   
 
Another former commander of United States Space Command, General Joseph 
Ashy, did not cling to political correctness when he stated: 
It’s politically sensitive, but it’s going to happen.  Some people don’t want 
to hear this, and it sure isn’t in vogue…but - absolutely – we’re going to 
fight in space.  We’re going to fight from space, and we’re going to fight 
into space when [U.S. and allied assets on orbit] become so precious that it 
is in our national interest.221
 
Advocates for both groups enthusiastically champion their cause and discussions 
on this subject often become emotionally charged, but 
…the fact remains that there is no more fundamental or more unresolved a 
military space issue in the United States today than the long-festering 
question of whether space should be kept free of weapons at every 
reasonable cost or actively exploited to the fullest extent of its ability to 
underwrite the nation’s security.222
  
Given the unresolved nature of the debate, Benjamin Lambeth concludes that 
“[f]or the time being…there is no indication that the nation is anywhere near the 
threshold of deciding to weaponize space” and that such a decision would “involve a 
momentous political decision that the nation’s leadership has not yet shown itself ready 
to make.”223  For the foreseeable future, barring a move by another power to weaponize 
space, space-based conventional PGS capabilities represent a political bridge too far and 
do not offer significant advantages over terrestrially-based alternatives to warrant 
expending the necessary political capital to deploy them. 
It is also worth noting that terrestrially-based conventional PGS capabilities could 
also become ensnared in the space weaponization debate in a similar manner to the 
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labeling of the National Missile Defense ground-based mid-course interceptors as part of 
“Star Wars.”  While weapons that only transit space are not technically space weapons, 
the distinction between “transiting space” and “space-based” will likely be lost on many 
critics.  A factor that certainly must contribute to clouding this distinction is the fact that 
Air Force Space Command operates the ICBMs and designates its operational missile 
units as space wings. 
C. REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS 
Current U.S. missile launch and range safety rules could prove to be a significant 
impediment to responsive conventional PGS operations.  Peacetime launch and range 
safety rules for space or missile launches prohibit launch trajectories over populated land 
masses and require clearing the airspace along the planned flight path and clearing ocean 
areas where booster stages and components are predicted to fall.224  The time necessary 
to accomplish the required notifications to airmen and mariners and area clearance 
actions prior to launch would effectively eliminate the response-time advantage held by 
ballistic systems over other Global Strike alternatives (e.g., long-range bombers).  The 
notification process is also likely to tip-off the intended target of the strike.  All safety 
rules may be waived in times of war or significant national need, but it is worth noting 
that conventional PGS weapons would likely be used prior to or in lieu of major combat 
operations. 
All of the terrestrially-based concepts available in the near and mid-term are 
affected by these rules since they dispose of two or more booster stages during 
operational flight.  Strike missions with the CAV may allow greater flexibility in launch 
trajectory planning, due to its expected 3,000 nautical miles cross-range capability, which 
will allow booster drops in areas least likely to result in collateral damage.  However, this 
trajectory flexibility may not always be possible, depending on the specific target.  
Unfortunately, ICBM or space launch vehicle derived boosters will require a compromise 
between operational responsiveness and accepting greater calculated risks to public safety 
during launch operations.   
In order to retain a responsive launch capability with current or mid-term 
technology, one must be willing to accept increased reliance on the “big ocean” and “big 
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sky” theories of collision avoidance.  If the planned target is a high enough national 
priority, it may be decided that taking it out warrants the additional risk.  It is worth 
noting that the only currently available PGS capabilities, nuclear-armed Minuteman III 
ICBMs based in the central United States, pose a much more certain threat to public 
safety if employed.  Since their launch trajectories would pass over populated areas, there 
is a greater likelihood that spent booster stages will endanger the general public.  The 
threat to public safety during launch, combined with the certainty of collateral damage 
from its nuclear warhead(s) make the use of the Minuteman virtually unthinkable in all 
but the most-dire of circumstances.  The ultimate solution to ensuring public safety 
requires the use of fully-reusable boosters that return to land back at the launch site or 
recover at designated down-range locations.  Unfortunately, this capability will not be 
available until the far-term. 
Space-based capabilities, on the other hand, seem to offer a significant advantage 
over terrestrially-based systems in the context of range and launch safety.  This is due to 
the fact that launches to deploy the CAV or satellite constellations could be accomplished 
in accordance with existing launch and range safety rules.  Since the launch is simply to 
put the CAV/bus into orbit for future use, releasing appropriate noticves and conducting 
area clearance operations will not compromise mission responsiveness or security.  
Contingency launches for an emergency deployment or to replenish the constellation may 
require accepting similar risks of collateral damage as the terrestrially-based systems 
discussed above. 
D. TREATY CONSTRAINTS         
 The United States is party to several bilateral and multilateral treaties and 
agreements that have the potential to significantly constrain its plans to field 
conventional PGS weapons.  This section examines the implications of three treaties or 
agreements, two of which primarily affect terrestrially-based PGS concepts and another 
that may constrain space-based PGS concepts.  The specific treaties and agreements are:  
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), the 
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and 
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Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (Launch Notification Agreement), and the 
Multilateral Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space 
Treaty), and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects of 1972 (Liability Convention).   
1. START 
 While scheduled to expire at the end of 2009, provisions of START could limit 
the number, type, and deployment locations of conventional PGS weapons in the near-
term because the Treaty does not distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear strategic 
arms.225  Of the possible conventional PGS concepts discussed in this chapter, the only 
ones that could realistically be deployed by 2009 are those based on the Trident II (D-5) 
and the Peacekeeper.  Systems derived from space launch vehicles will likely not become 
available until beyond 2010.  Since the only constraint on Trident would be that missiles 
converted to conventional roles would continue to count towards nuclear totals, this 
section will focus on the constraints START levies on a conventional Peacekeeper.   
 Notional plans call for deploying a force of conventionally-armed Peacekeeper 
ICBMs at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral.  Article IV of START could significantly 
limit or forbid conventional PGS deployments at Vandenberg or Cape Canaveral since 
both are considered to be “space launch facilities.”  Article IV, paragraphs 4b and 4c, 
states that each party shall limit the aggregate total of ICBMs present at space launch 
facilities to no more than the total number of ICBM launchers at that facility, not to 
exceed a total of 20 of which only 10 may be silos.226  Article IV, paragraph 11, states 
that test ranges and space launch facilities must be located at least 100 kilometers from 
“any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs.”227  This could be interpreted as barring 
the operational deployment of ICBM derived conventional PGS systems at Vandenberg 
or Cape Canaveral.  However, it may be allowable to leverage a limited early operational 
capability during system research and development until START expires in 2009.  
 
225 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 31 July 1991 [on-line] ; available from 




                                                
2. Launch Notification Agreement 
 The Launch Notification Agreement, originally signed in 1988, could act to 
restrict the responsive launch capability of terrestrially-based PGS systems.  Article I 
states that:  
Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Centers of the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, no less than twenty-four hours in advance, of 
the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of a 
strategic ballistic missile.228
 
While this agreement was certainly written with test and exercise missile launches 
in mind, since an operational launch at the time of its writing would have been part of a 
nuclear exchange, the agreement makes no distinction between test and operational 
launches.  The notification requirements of this agreement are incompatible with the 
concept of conventional PGS.  The whole purpose of having a conventional PGS 
capability is that we may not know 24 hours in advance that a strike will be necessary or 
the target will not likely remain in place for 24 additional hours.  Since this agreement is 
of indefinite duration, it will be necessary to negotiate a separate protocol to handle 
conventional PGS launches.  Perhaps the previously mentioned pre-launch “Hot Line” 
notifications would be acceptable. 
3. Outer Space Treaty 
Space-based alternatives, in particular, face potential legal challenges based on 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.  Intercontinental missiles, while regarded by some 
as space weapons, are not restricted by the Outer Space Treaty since they pre-dated the 
treaty and were not subsequently banned when it entered into force.  Space-based 
weapons or weapons platforms, on the other hand, may be banned by certain 
interpretations of the Treaty.  Per Article IV of the Treaty, the only weapons explicitly 
banned from deployment in space are weapons of mass destruction (WMD).229   
 
228 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Notification of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, 
31 May 1988 [on-line]; available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/relatagre.htm# 
launchnotifagmt; Internet; accessed July 2005. 
229 Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer Space:  Problems of Law and Policy (Boulder, 
CO:  Westview Press, 1989), 64. 
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Many in the military have chosen to interpret the lack of a specific ban against 
weapons other than WMD, as an implicit authorization for conventional weapons in outer 
space based on the inherent right to self-defense.  This argument may hold some weight 
regarding weapons designed to defend satellites from attack or weapons tasked with 
defending the United States against ballistic missile attack.  The self-defense argument 
holds less credibility regarding weapons based in space with the explicit purpose of 
offensive strike. 
Several passages in the Treaty call into question the legality of placing offensive 
weapons into orbit including the following quotes from the preamble and Article I: 
The States Parties to this Treaty, …  
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,  
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be for the 
benefit of all peoples …,  
Desiring to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific 
as well as legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for 
peaceful purposes,  
Believing that such cooperation will contribute to the development of 
mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations 
between States and peoples…[emphasis mine]230
 
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of 
all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shall be the province of all mankind [emphasis mine].231
 
While not explicitly banning offensive weapons from space, these passages make it clear 
that any attempt to do so is clearly inconsistent with the intent of the Treaty.  The fact 
that the United States and Soviet Union conducted numerous tests and studies for various 
types of offensive space weaponry during the Cold War does not change the negotiated 
intent of the Outer Space Treaty to ensure for the peaceful use of space for the benefit of 
all mankind. 
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty covers the liability of “launching nations” 
for damage their spacecraft cause to other parties to the treaty.  The article states: 
 
230 Reynolds and Merges,  63. 
231 Ibid., 64. 
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Each State Party to the treaty that launches or processes the launching of 
an object into outer space…and each State Party from whose territory or 
facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to 
another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by 
such an object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer 
space…232  
  
The separate Liability Convention provides an expanded treatment of Article VII.  This 
Convention is applicable to both civilian and military space activities and provides for 
absolute liability (unlimited liability for actual damages) for damages on the Earth’s 
surface and on airplanes in-flight.233   
The best-know application of this Convention was in response to the uncontrolled 
reentry of the Soviet Union’s Cosmos 954 spacecraft, a nuclear-powered ocean 
surveillance satellite, in January 1978.  The reentry spread radio-active debris over a 
large swath of Canadian territory including portions of the Northwest Territories, Alberta, 
and Saskatchewan.234  The eventually paid Canada $3 million (Canadian) in April 1981, 
but the overall clean up costs totaled $14 million (Canadian).235        
Article VII and the Convention were obviously intended to provide states legal 
protection against accidental harm caused by space activities, but could certainly be 
applied to purposeful acts.  The provisions of this treaty would seem to give countries 
struck by U.S. space-based weapons a legal avenue to claim damages.  Whether or not 
the United States would pay is open for debate, but the claimant would have legal 
grounds to claim damages, particularly if there is a spillover of collateral damage from 
the primary target.  Presumably, since munitions delivered via sub-orbital trajectories are 
not “space objects.”  Use of terrestrially-based conventional PGS could strike the same 
target as a space-based system, but do not provide the basis for an international media 
circus over the target’s liability claims.            
E. CONCLUSION  
This chapter evaluates the conventional PGS concepts presented in the previous 
 
232 Reynolds and Merges, 65. 
233 Ibid., 167,176. 
234 Alexander Cohen, “Cosmos 954 and the International Law of Satellite accidents,” in Outer Space:  
Problems of Law and Policy, eds. Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges (Boulder, CO:  Westview 
Press, 1989), 168-9. 
235 Ibid., 169. 
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chapter against a series of interrelated political, regulatory, and treaty constraints.  The 
following table summarizes the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various 
conventional PGS concepts and assigns them a value of low, medium, or high based on 
the likelihood that they will be affected, and to what degree, by the constraints. 
 





Launch & Range 
Safety 
START LNA OST/LC 
Near-Term       
Trident II HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW 
Peacekeeper MED LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW 
Mid-Term       
Falcon/CAV LOW LOW HIGH N/A MED LOW 
Space-Based/ 
CAV 
LOW HIGH LOW N/A N/A HIGH 
Far-Term       
Fully-Reusable/ 
CAV 
LOW LOW LOW N/A MED LOW 
Table 1. Conventional PGS Capabilities vs. Constraints  
 
As shown by the chart, the political, regulatory, and treaty constraints presented in this 
chapter are not insurmountable barriers, however, breaking through will require 
transforming the way we think and operate in order for conventional PGS capabilities to 
become reality.  The following paragraphs summarize this chapter’s four key findings 
and recommendations. 
First, the congressionally-imposed limitations on the FALCON program 
effectively illustrate the magnitude of the perception management task that lies ahead to 
allow moving conventional PGS from the drawing board and into reality.  The level of 
concern expressed over a weapon system so totally different from any of our current 
ICBMs demonstrates the consequences of basing major decisions on perceptions rather 
than fact-based analysis.  The comprehensive set of risk mitigation proposals proposed by 
the Air Force go above and beyond what should be necessary to convince anyone who 
could detect the launch (and even those that cannot) that this vehicle is a conventional-
only platform.  The ultimate solution is not technical.  Executive-level communication 
immediately prior to launch between the leaders of the United States and Russia (and 
maybe China) would effectively eliminate the possibility of surprise and 
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misinterpretation.  The current situation that gives other nuclear powers a veto over U.S. 
development and deployment decisions must not be allowed to continue.   
Second, conversion of the Peacekeeper ICBM to a conventional role has the main 
advantage that most of the hardware is available today.  The use of retired Peacekeeper 
ICBMs in a conventional role rather than converting Minuteman IIIs maintains a firewall 
between nuclear and conventional capabilities.  The missiles are paid for which provides 
an excellent opportunity to deploy a relatively low-cost conventional PGS capability and 
recover some of the huge sunk costs previously invested in the weapon system.  The 
missile also has sufficient range and payload capabilities to provide a militarily effective 
conventional capability.  Unfortunately the mindset behind the restrictions imposed on 
the FALCON development program will probably result in squandering this opportunity.  
Third, the constraints imposed by START provide a valuable lesson for future 
arms control negotiators.  What was an effective solution to ensuring maximum 
accountability of ICBM totals and locations at the time the Treaty was written, now, in a 
changed world environment, unnecessarily levies constraints on seeking solutions to 
today’s security concerns.  Given the lengthy gestation periods of today’s modern 
weapon systems, it is probable that it would take until at least 2010 to field an initial 
conventional PGS capability anyway, but the limitations imposed by START guarantee 
this eventuality. 
Finally, maintaining launch responsiveness for conventional PGS systems will 
require a willingness to accept greater risk to the public (foreign and domestic) during 
launch operations.  For this reason, conventional PGS weapons should only be used when 
the level of national need warrants the increased level of risk.  Chances are though, if a 
conventional PGS weapon is believed to be necessary to achieve the desired effect, it is 
probably worth the risk, but this is a decision national leaders will need to make on a 
case-by-case basis.  A better solution will not be available until the far-term when a fully-
reusable booster eliminates the danger posed by discarded booster stages. 
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V. RATIONALE FOR CONVENTIONAL PGS CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Given the constraints on conventional PGS deployment presented in the previous 
chapter, why does the United States desire to develop these capabilities?  In short, the 
driving force behind efforts to field conventional PGS capabilities is the result of a post-
September 11th national security policy combined with efforts to transform the U.S. 
military.  This chapter examines both the policy and military drivers for developing 
conventional PGS capabilities in detail.   
The first section of this chapter examines relevant policy documents including 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and The National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America.  A consistent theme within all three documents is the recognition that 
in the post-Cold War world, deterrence may not be robust enough to ensure the safety of 
the American population against emerging threats from rogue states and non-state actors.  
These documents provide a policy foundation for the prompt and potentially preemptive 
use of military force to address urgent threats to the national security interests of the 
United States.     
The remainder of the chapter examines the military rationale behind the pursuit of 
conventional PGS systems by comparing their expected performance capabilities with 
existing global strike capabilities and forward deployed forces.  In line with U.S. national 
security policy, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) describes a world security 
environment where there is “increasing diversity in the sources and the unpredictability 
of the locations of conflict” that could result in requirements for U.S. military 
intervention or activities on “virtually every continent” against a “wide variety of 
adversaries” with “widely varying capabilities.”236  To meet the challenges presented by 
this environment, the Department of Defense, and in particular the United States Air 
Force, view conventional PGS systems as a transformational capability that could 
increase the responsiveness, reach and economy of force of  U.S. military response 
 
236 Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2001), 6; [on-line] ; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ 
qdr2001.pdf; Internet; accessed August 2005. 
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options available to back up desired national security policy objectives.  In addition to 
providing access to denied areas, conventional PGS capabilities may reduce reliance on 
forward-deployed forces and reduce the need to send U.S. forces into harm’s way.         
B. POLICY DRIVERS FOR CONVENTIONAL PGS CAPABILITIES  
The basis and thinking behind American security strategy has changed 
significantly over the last 60 years, particularly with regard to the preemptive use of 
military force and the effectiveness of deterrence.  Throughout the Cold War, the 
experience of Pearl Harbor shaped America’s mindset and security strategy.  The fear of 
a surprise attack intended to decapitate or disarm the nation led to development and 
deployment of a vast offensive nuclear arsenal.  To increase force survivability, this 
arsenal consisted of a “triad” of delivery systems:  manned bombers, land-based ICBMs, 
and nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles.  The thinking was that 
any potential attacker would be unable to guarantee the destruction of all American 
nuclear weapons in a first strike and would inevitably suffer a devastating retaliatory 
strike.  The Soviet Union pursued a similar strategy to deter the United States from 
contemplating preemptive action against it.  This balance of terror, often referred to as 
mutually assured destruction (MAD), provided the basis for deterrence and theoretically 
eliminated preemption as a viable strategy.  For fifty years, mutual security relied on 
mutual vulnerability to offensively postured global strike systems armed with nuclear 
weapons.      
The current National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States was borne out 
of the post-Cold War environment and colored by the brutal terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001.  The resulting NSS codifies the notion of “preemptive defense” or “the 
best defense is a good offense” into official policy.  The events of 11 September 2001 
serve as a poignant reminder that a threat of assured destruction is not sufficient to deter 
all of America’s adversaries, especially in a world where rogue states and non-state actors 
are acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD).   
The international community’s desire to avoid aggressive, preemptive behavior 
among nations is evident in the norms embodied in the United Nations Charter, 
particularly Article Two: 
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All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.237
 
All Members shall refrain…from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state…238
 
While the above wording forbids the types of action described in the NSS, the new, more 
aggressive nature of the American NSS is not without a legal foundation in international 
law.   Later sections of the UN Charter describe the explicit right of states to act in self-
defense and an implicit right to act preemptively against an imminent threat, as stated in 
Article 51: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations…Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council…239
 
International law, as interpreted by the UN Security Council, attempts to balance the 
inherent risk of instability from preventive wars with the need for timely defense through 
the right of anticipatory self-defense or preemption in response to an imminent attack.240  
In this context an attack is imminent if “a chain of events has been set in motion which 
will inexorably lead to the launching of an attack.”241   
The NSS departs from its firm basis in international law by adapting and 
expanding the concept of imminent threat to include activities by rogue states and 
terrorists aimed at acquiring WMD.242  The United States makes its position and 
willingness to act in the interests of its national security quite clear. 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter 
a sufficient threat to our national security.  The greater the threat, the greater is the 
risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action 
to defend our selves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
 
237 The Charter of the United Nations.  [on-line]; available from http://www.un.org/aboutun/ charter; 
Internet; accessed August 2005. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Marc Weller, “The US, Iraq and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World,” Survival 41, no. 4 (Winter 
1999-2000): 93. 
241 Ibid. 
242 The White House.  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington 
D.C., September 2002), 15. [on-line]; available from, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; Internet; 
accessed August 2005.  
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enemy’s attack.  To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.…[I]n an age where the enemies 
of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, 
the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.243
 
The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction also contains 
preemptive elements.  The strategy is built around three pillars:  nonproliferation, 
counterproliferation, and consequence management.  The counterproliferation pillar is 
further divided into three sub-pillars:  interdiction, deterrence, and defense and 
mitigation.  The third pillar of defense and mitigation contains the wording relevant to 
preventive or preemptive military action.  In the context of this strategy, a good defense 
may also contain offensive elements as illustrated by this passage: 
U.S. military forces…must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed 
adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures.  This 
requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before 
these weapons are used.244
        
As one would expect, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America contains a similar emphasis on preemptive operations to deal with the possibility 
of catastrophic attack.  This passage from the first of the strategy’s three strategic 
objectives, to “Secure the United States from Direct Attack,” clearly illustrates the 
proactive nature of the strategy:    
The danger of catastrophic violence dictates a new strategic imperative:  we will 
actively confront – when possible, early and at safe distance – those who directly 
threaten us, employing all instruments of national power.245
 
The second portion of the strategy describes how the United States will accomplish its 
defense objectives.  In the subsection titled “Deter Aggression and Counter Coercion,” 
the strategy states that “In the current era there are many scenarios where we will not 
want to accept the huge consequences of an attack before responding” and that our 
deterrence policy now places greater emphasis on preventing and protecting against 
 
243 National Security Strategy, 15.  
244 The White House.  The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington 
D.C., December 2002), 3. [on-line]; available from, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/ 
WMDStrategy.pdf; Internet; accessed August 2005.  
245 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C., March 2005), 6. 
[on-line]; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318ndsl.pdf; Internet; accessed 
August 2005. 
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attacks.246  The language favoring preemption is again found in the “Implementation 
Guidelines” as the following passage clearly shows: 
The United States will seize the strategic initiative in all areas of defense activity 
– assuring, dissuading, deterring, and defeating.  Our first priority is the defeat of 
direct threats to the United States….Allowing opponents to strike first – 
particularly in an era of proliferation – is unacceptable.  Therefore, the United 
States must defeat the most dangerous challenges early and at a safe distance, 
before they allowed to mature.…Under the most dangerous and compelling 
circumstances, prevention might require the use of force to disable of destroy 
WMD in the possession of terrorists or others or to strike targets (e.g., terrorists) 
that directly threaten the United States or U.S. friends or other interests.247
      
The policy objectives espoused in the NSS and supporting polices place a 
premium on rapid response, or in some cases preemptive action.  An ability for the U.S. 
military to rapidly defeat adversaries before they can inflict catastrophic damage against 
American territory or deployed forces as called for in the NSS and the supporting 
strategies for combating WMD and national defense requires either an expansive global 
presences within quick striking distance of all conceivable threats or the ability to rapidly 
strike with precision over global distances.  The next section examines attributes of 
conventional PGS capabilities that make them an attractive option for military leaders 
seeking the means to implement the more preemptive aspects of current national security 
strategy while minimizing the risk to U.S. forces.    
C. MILITARY RATIONALE FOR CONVENTIONAL PGS 
The Department of Defense and the Air Force, in particular, view conventional 
PGS capability as a transformational way to meet the policy demands for responsiveness 
to widely separated global threats in an era of a military shrinking force structure.  The 
effectiveness of the traditional strategy of global presence is limited by three factors: 1) 
the size of the U.S. military, 2) access to basing in close proximity to threats, and 3) 
imperfect knowledge of all potential threats.  While not intended to replace all forward 
presence, itself an important element of U.S. conventional deterrence, a conventional 
PGS system could mitigate many of the limiting factors of an expansive global presence.  
According to the 2004 Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, “Global Strike is the ability 
to rapidly plan and deliver limited-duration and extended range attacks to achieve 
 
246 National Defense Strategy, 7-8. 
247 Ibid., 9-10. 
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precision effects against highly valued adversary assets.”248  The plan also states that 
Global Strike capabilities must be capable of defeating anti-access 
strategies imposed by distance, physical hardening or active and passive 
defenses and…in order to meet potentially urgent timelines, Global Strike 
will primarily rely upon long-range, high-speed, kinetic (advanced 
conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic aerospace delivery platforms 
…249
  
Currently deployed B-52, B-1B, and B-2A heavy bombers and nuclear-armed 
ICBMs and SLBMs possess many of the above characteristics but have significant 
shortcomings.  This section examines the military rationale for conventional PGS 
capabilities.  Proposed conventional PGS capabilities promise to deliver measurable 
advantages over existing military force projection capabilities in the areas of 
responsiveness, access, and economy of force.   
1. Responsiveness 
The primary selling point for conventional PGS capabilities is inherent in its 
name.  The ability to hold targets at risk world-wide, and strike them if necessary within 
90 minutes with conventional munitions, represents a capability many military planners 
covet.  General Lance Lord, Commander of Air Force Space Command, identified 
providing a means for conventional PGS capability as one of the Command’s top three 
priorities for addressing the effects and capabilities the nation and its warfighters need the 
most.250  Air Force support of this priority is evident by its desire to attain the 
transformational capability of “rapid and precise attack of any target on the globe with 
persistent effects.”251  According to the Air Force Transformation Flight Plan: 
A non-nuclear, prompt, and persistent global attack capability will provide 




248 Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Future Concepts and Transformation Division, The U.S. Air Force 
Transformation Flight Plan (Washington D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 2004), D16. [on-line] ; 
available from http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2004.pdf; Internet; 
accessed August 2005.  
249 Ibid., D17. 
250 Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Statement of 
General Lance W. Lord at Hearings on FY 2006 Defense Authorization Budget Request for Space 
Activities, 109th Congress, 1st sess., 16 March 2005 [on-line] ; available from http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2005/March/Lord%2003-16-05.pdf; Internet; accessed July 2005. 
251 Transformation Flight Plan, 62-3.  
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response when rapid response is absolutely critical, risks associated with 
other options are too high, or when no other courses of action are 
available.252  
 
Past instances where this type of responsive capability would have been beneficial 
are probably few in number, but there is no way to know for sure.  If the threat 
predictions found in the NSS and the 2001 QDR prove to accurately describe the world’s 
future security environment, then the utility of conventional PGS capabilities may 
multiply significantly.   
One can easily imagine a situation where a credible intelligence report identifies 
the location and timing of a meeting of key Al Qeada leaders or the location where final 
preparations are underway for a WMD attack, but the window of opportunity to act 
against the target is open for only a few hours.  The options available to the President for 
acting on this intelligence are few.  Forward-based forces may be an option, but much 
will depend on the location of the threat relative to those forces and their level of 
readiness.  A global strike mission with strategic bombers from the continental United 
States would be ruled out in this scenario because of the time required to plan the 
mission, prepare the aircraft, and fly to the target.   For example, a B-2 departing from 
Whiteman Air Force Base and flying to a notional target 7,000 nautical miles away will 
require at least 20 hours from a “go order” to strike the target.253  This figure includes 
time required for mission planning and aircraft preparation, but does not factor in an 
allowance for negotiating necessary over-flight permissions.  Certainly, nuclear-armed 
ICBMs or SLBMs possess the necessary responsiveness and ability to strike the target, 
but the “taboo” against nuclear first use and, more importantly, the inherent risk of 
significant collateral damage will “self-deter” the United States from choosing this option 
in all but the most-dire of circumstances.   Today, the President could potentially be left 
with two unsatisfactory options:  do nothing or resort to nuclear weapons.  A 
conventional PGS capability could provide a more politically acceptable solution and put 
 
252 Transformation Flight Plan, 62. 
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“bombs on target” in a relatively brief 45 to 51 minutes, depending on the specific 
trajectory flown, from a launch base in the continental United States.254   
With the possible exception of a future directed energy weapon, no existing or 
planned global strike platform can match the responsiveness of a PGS system that 
operates from or through space.  While it may seem counterintuitive, there are many 
scenarios where a conventional PGS capability could provide a more responsive option 
against an imminent threat than would forward-deployed forces in the same theater of 
operation as the threat.  For example, considering flight time alone, the Tomahawk cruise 
missiles launched as part of the opening wave of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
from naval vessels in the Indian Ocean took over two hours to reach their targets in 
Afghanistan.255  A PGS weapon system could have struck the same targets in less than an 
hour form a launch point in the United States.   
The opening strike of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provides another example 
where conventional PGS weapons could have responded faster than theater forces.  On 19 
March 2003, George Tenet, then Director of Central Intelligence, presented intelligence 
information to the President indicating Saddam Hussein and other members of his 
government were located at Dora Farms, a southern Baghdad property owned by 
Saddam’s wife.256  Based on this intelligence and three hours of deliberation with key 
advisors, President Bush “made a decision to launch a limited precision air strike 
designed to kill Saddam Hussein and leading members of his government.”257   
General Franks, then Commander of United States Central Command, was asked 
if he could strike Dora Farms that night and in response his planners produced a proposal 
to use twenty-four Tomahawk cruise missiles.258  Central Command planners completed 
“weaponeering” actions within an hour at which point Franks received another call from 
Washington that informed him of updated intelligence that indicated there was a 
reinforced concrete bunker at the site, against which the cruise missiles would be 
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ineffective.259  The only aircraft in-theater that possessed the ability to strike the bunker 
and survive Baghdad’s air defenses was the F-117 Nighthawk.260  In order to attain a 
near 100 percent probability of success, two F-117s were tasked to strike the suspected 
bunker location at Dora Farms with two EGBU-27 2,000 pound “bunker busters” 
each.261  By 0259 on 20 March 2003, mission preparations were complete.  Both F-117s 
were armed and their pilots were standing by in the cockpits in anticipation of the “go 
order.”262  The execute order was received from the White House at 0312 and both 
aircraft took off from their base in Qatar at 0338 followed later by the launch of the 
Tomahawks at 0439.263  When the F-117s arrived over the target coordinates, a cloud 
deck obscured the target, but luckily both pilots found holes in the clouds which allowed 
them a mere six seconds to identify the target and drop their bombs.264  At 0543, the F-
117’s four EGBU-27s and the twenty-four Tomahawks (launched from four ships and 
two submarines) struck the compound suspected of housing Saddam Hussein.265
As with the previous Afghanistan example, a conventional PGS weapon, if in a 
similar state of readiness as the F-117s (i.e., strip alert), could have struck the complex at 
Dora Farms within 45 minutes of the execute order, rather than the 2 hours and 31 
minutes required by the F-117s and Tomahawks.  This example illustrates the potential 
response time advantages of a notional conventional PGS system over forward deployed 
forces - even those at high states of readiness.  However, it is worth pointing out that no 
amount of timeliness would have allowed this particular mission to succeed, since 
Saddam Hussein was later found to have not been at the target location.   
A subsequent attempt to eliminate Saddam on 7 April 2003 demonstrated a 
significantly shorter “kill chain” where only 12 minutes elapsed between the strike 
tasking and “bombs on target.”266   This level of responsiveness was only possible as a 
 
259 Franks, 452-3. 
260 Ibid., 453. 
261 Ibid., 455. 
262 Ibid., 457. 
263 Ibid., 457-8. 
264 Ibid., 459-60. 
265 Boyne, 48. 
266 Ibid., 148-9. 
82 
result of the permissive air environment established over Baghdad that allowed B-1Bs to 
orbit over the city awaiting orders to strike time-sensitive targets.  Unfortunately, 
Saddam’s survival cast doubt on the reliability of the pre-strike intelligence.  He was 
either never at the targeted restaurant or somehow managed to escape in the 45 minutes 
between the intelligence tip and the air strike. 
Both of the attempted strikes against Saddam Hussein demonstrate the pivotal 
importance of accurate and timely intelligence.  A conventional PGS capability without 
accurate intelligence simply provides the capability to strike the wrong target faster.  In 
addition to problems providing accurate targeting data, the relative lack of responsiveness 
of current global strike platforms places extreme strain on the intelligence system to 
provide intelligence or warning far enough in advance to allow a response.  Providing 
attack options against highly valued or fleeting targets is the primary reason for 
conventional PGS capabilities.  While still reliant on accurate and timely intelligence, 
conventional PGS capabilities may actually help to mitigate some of our intelligence 
shortfalls.  While it may be very difficult or impossible to obtain intelligence on a 
meeting of terrorist leaders or final preparations for a WMD attack 48 hours in advance, 
it is more conceivable that warning could be received several hours in advance.  Several 
hours notice would be of little use for launching a preventive or preemptive B-2 strike, 
but could be sufficient to allow action by a conventional PGS system.   
The bottom line is that a conventional PGS capability would offer unmatched 
responsiveness against global threats and may even surpass the responsiveness of theater 
forces.  The superior responsiveness of a PGS capability could also serve to maximize the 
utility of existing intelligence collection capabilities by providing a capability to act in 
response to previously unactionable intelligence.   
2. Access 
Global range, an inherent characteristic of a conventional PGS system, is only one 
aspect of “access.”  Other attributes include the ability to strike high-value adversary 
targets in spite of over-flight restriction by sympathetic or neutral third-parties and anti-
access strategies that leverage active and passive defenses.  The 2001 QDR’s second goal 
of “projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access environments and 
defeating anti-access threats” and third goal of “denying enemies’ sanctuary through 
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persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement with high-volume precision 
strikes” are particularly relevant to the concept of access as defined above.267  In order to 
meet these objectives, the Air Force desires global strike capabilities able to defeat “anti-
access strategies imposed by distance, physical hardening or active and passive 
defenses.”268  The 2001 QDR predicts 
Future adversaries could have the means to render ineffective much of our 
current ability to project military power overseas.  Saturation attacks with 
ballistic and cruise missiles could deny or delay U.S. military access to 
overseas bases, airfields, and ports.  Advanced air defense systems could 
deny access to hostile airspace to all but low-observable aircraft.269
 
This section examines how conventional PGS capabilities compare with current 
capabilities regarding the various aspects of “access” with emphasis is placed on the 
ability to penetrate sophisticated air defense systems, vulnerability to basing or airspace 
restrictions, and ability to attack hardened or deeply buried targets. 
Modern air defenses pose a grave threat to most conventional strike aircraft and 
penetration to reach high value targets may require extensive defense suppression efforts.  
Stealthy aircraft, such as the F-117 and B-2, have the ability to penetrate most current 
threats but must rely on the cover of darkness to avoid detection by the “Mark 1 Eye-
Ball.”  Stealth aircraft may have reduced radar signatures, but they remain easy to detect 
visually when silhouetted against a sunny blue sky.   
The Air Force claims that conventional PGS capabilities, operating from or 
through space, hold a significant advantage over existing platforms in their ability to 
penetrate known and projected defenses.270  This penetration capability could one day 
make PGS the weapon of choice to strike WMD storage and delivery systems, command 
and control nodes, and integrated air defenses.271  Very few nations possess the capability 
to detect and fewer still have the ability to engage vehicles with the performance and 
flight characteristics of the CAV or other proposed PGS vehicles.  Because of its speed 
and flight profile, defense against a PGS weapon system present a challenge similar to 
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defending against an ICBM, but is further complicated by the PGS reentry vehicle’s 
maneuver capability.  Given the difficulty the United States has experienced in its efforts 
to field a ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept relatively unsophisticated 
intercontinental missiles, one can safely assume that it will be some time before effective 
defenses against conventional PGS capabilities proliferate widely. 
Advanced air defenses are not the only threat or obstacle that adversaries may 
employ to deny U.S. forces access.  Adversaries may threaten the use or actually use 
WMD against potential U.S. forward bases, which could delay effective combat 
operations pending elimination of the WMD threat.  The threat of WMD use may also 
serve to limit the willingness of third-party nations to allow U.S. forces to operate from 
their territories or through their airspace.  Conventional PGS weapons and other global 
strike platforms circumvent the first part of this anti-access strategy by operating from 
bases outside the range of the adversary’s offensive systems.   
The refusal to grant over-flight permission can significantly impair the utility of 
aircraft and cruise missiles to access the enemy’s territory.  At best, these restrictions will 
only add distance to the mission.  At worst, attacks against a land-locked country/target 
could be impossible without over-flight permission from the bordering nations.  
Operation EL DORADO CANYON against Libya on 14 to 15 April 1986 provides an 
example of the first possible outcome.  A major portion of the U.S. attack plan relied on 
F-111F aircraft based in the United Kingdom.  France and Spain denied the United States 
over-flight rights, so the strike aircraft had to fly a circuitous route over the Atlantic 
Ocean and then through the Straights of Gibraltar to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea 
and Libya.272  The route flown was easily twice as far as would have been necessary with 
French or Spanish over-flight permissions that resulted in a 13-hour round trip for the F-
111s.273  It is easy to imagine a situation where the denial of over-flight rights by a third-
party nation makes an attack impossible.  For example, if the United States had been 
unable to gain over-flight rights from Pakistan in 2001, Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM would have been significantly more difficult.  Of course, if the national need 
is great enough, the United States could choose the diplomatically (and potentially 
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militarily) risky option of penetrating the third-party’s airspace against their wishes. 
The flight of Sputnik I (the world’s first artificial satellite) in October of 1957 
established the precedent that objects in space do not require permission by countries to 
over-fly their sovereign territory.  Conventional PGS capabilities projected to become 
available in the near to mid-term spend the vast majority of their flight path outside the 
atmosphere, and are thus virtually exempt from requiring over-flight permissions.  The 
relatively steep reentry angle employed by systems derived from existing ICBMs or 
SLBMs makes it highly unlikely that atmospheric over-flight of third-party nations would 
be necessary, except in the case of strikes against a small, land-locked country.274  The 
CAV, since it would rely on hypersonic cruise through the upper atmosphere to extend its 
range, faces the potential for greater restriction by over-flight concerns.  However, the 
large cross-range capability of the CAV will allow mission planners to choose flight 
paths that minimize atmospheric over-flight of third-party countries.275  This cross-range 
capability further allows planners to employ trajectories that minimize or eliminate 
orbital over-flight of countries like Russia that can detect and potentially overreact to the 
presence of a CAV overhead.276                       
A third way adversaries may seek to deny American forces access to key facilities 
or personnel is by placing them in hardened or deeply buried facilities.  According to the 
2002 Nuclear Posture Review, over 70 countries use underground facilities for military 
purposes and there are about 1,100 such facilities either suspected or known to have 
strategic functions (such as WMD, ballistic missile basing, leadership, and top echelon 
command and control).277  Attacks against this class of target is the mission most 
commonly attributed to conventional PGS capabilities, but it is also the most technically 
challenging.  A detailed discussion of the means to strike hard or deeply buried targets is 
provided in a previous chapter, so only an abbreviated discussion is provided here.   
To destroy hard or deeply buried targets requires very high impact velocities 
coupled with very strong and accurate penetrating warheads.  Space-based systems are  
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theoretically capable of achieving impact velocities of up to 6.6 miles per second (from a 
24,000 mile orbital altitude) and missile delivered weapons can achieve maximum impact 
velocities of about 3 miles per second (15,840 feet per second).278  Current theoretical 
estimates envision materials that could survive impact velocities of 2.4 miles per second, 
but impact velocities up to only about 1 mile per second (5,280 feet per second) have 
been successfully demonstrated.279  When the target is hardened concrete (rated to 5,000 
pounds per square inch), the survivable impact velocity drops to approximately 4,000 feet 
per second.280  While these limitations place much of the penetration potential of missile 
or space-delivered weapons beyond the reach of current technology, they still offer a 
significant improvement over the 1,500 foot per second impact velocities possible with 
standard aircraft-delivered free-fall weapons.281
3. Economy of Force 
Air Force Basic Doctrine defines “economy of force” (one of the nine principles 
of war) as “the judicious employment and distribution of forces.”282  The true intent of 
this principle is to ensure that sufficient resources are available for use against primary 
objectives and the minimum essential amounts of resources are allocated to secondary 
efforts.283  One can take this reasoning a step further and postulate that if the minimum 
essential amounts of resources are directed towards any one primary objective, it should 
be possible to strike more primary objectives simultaneously, or preserve scare resources 
for future contingencies.  The principle of economy of force also serves as a warning 
against “overkill,” since the excessive use of force may undermine gaining and 
maintaining legitimacy for military operations.284   
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In the 1990s, the combat debut of stealth married up with precision guided 
munitions (PGMs) allowed dramatic reductions in the amount of resources necessary to 
destroy any given target and the number of people placed into harm’s way to accomplish 
the mission.  Two sets of air strikes conducted against Iraq’s nuclear facilities at al 
Tuwaitha (the same site struck by Israel in 1981) during Operation DESERT STORM 
illustrate the significant economy of force enabled by the combination of stealth aircraft 
and PGMs.      
Early in the campaign, several stealthy F-117s attacked the reactors and research 
facilities at al Tuwaitha with minimal support from EF-111 stand-off jamming aircraft 
and aerial refueling tankers.285   Later in the conflict, and believing Iraq’s air defenses 
had been sufficiently degraded, General Horner ordered a large strike package of over 70 
F-16s (plus F-15s for escort, EF-111s for radar jamming, and F-4Gs for suppression of air 
defenses) to conduct a daylight attack on the al Tuwaitha complex and other targets in 
Baghdad.286  Unlike the earlier F-117 strikes, this “strike package” met with significant 
resistance.  Antiaircraft fire encountered while enroot to the target caused the formation 
to break up.  About a quarter of the F-16s were unable to rejoin the group and were 
forced to return to base.  As the strikers approached the target, 27 surface-to-air missiles 
were launched by the Iraqis.  In addition to dense antiaircraft fire, the Iraqis used smoke 
pots to obscure visibility of the target.  To avoid collateral damage, many of the F-16s did 
not drop their bombs.  In spite of the air defense suppression efforts of the F-4Gs, the 
Iraqis shot down two F-16s and their pilots were captured.287  The difference in economy 
of force between the two attacks is hard to ignore. 
While stealth aircraft require very little support from other platforms to reach and 
penetrate to their assigned targets, they still require, at a minimum, aerial refueling 
tankers to achieve global reach without forward basing.  Conventional PGS capabilities 
promise similar improvements in economy of force, but go the additional step of 
eliminating the need for any supporting forces.  Conventional PGS capabilities also have 
the added advantage of not placing friendly forces at risk.  Air Force planners have 
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prepared several case studies that compare the resources used in historical limited strikes 
to the expected economy of force advantages if conventional PGS platforms had been 
employed instead.  Two of these examples are examined below. 
The first case compares the resources necessary to execute Operation EL 
DORADO CANYON against Libya in April 1986 with the projected resources necessary 
if a CAV equipped PGS system was used instead.  The actual mission required over 110 
Air Force and Navy aircraft, of which only thirty-eight (twenty-four F-111Fs and 
fourteen A-6Es) were used to strike the operational objectives in and around Tripoli.288  
The remaining aircraft provided aerial refueling, airborne warning and control, defense 
suppression, and electronic warfare support.  Air Force estimates place the cost of the 
operation at $99.1 million and the capital cost of the aircraft involved at $5.05 billion.289  
This operation also placed sixty-four aircrew members at risk from enemy fire, two of 
which were killed when their F-111 was shot down.290  In contrast, if a PGS system 
armed with CAVs carrying four Small Smart Bombs (SSBs) each had been used instead, 
only four sorties would have been required to strike the primary objectives.291  The Air 
Force estimated the total mission and capital cost would have been $32 million, assuming 
four launch vehicles would be necessary to deliver four CAVs.  A Peacekeeper-derived 
system could potentially accomplish the same mission at even lower economic and 
material cost.  The Peacekeeper’s throw-weight capability could allow it to deliver four 
CAVs (assuming a weight of 2,000 pounds each) with a single sortie.292  In summary, for 
a similar scenario in the future, a conventional PGS capability could reduce total mission 
cost by two-thirds, reduce the required number of sorties by over 100, and place no U.S. 
forces at risk. 
Operation DESERT STRIKE, a retaliatory strike against Iraqi air defense targets 
in response to no-fly zone violations, is similar in scope to the type of operations 
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projected for conventional PGS systems.  This operation employed two B-52s launched 
from Guam in the Pacific Ocean, each armed with eight CALCMs, and thirty-one 
Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from naval vessels in the Persian Gulf.293  The 
targets were eight surface-to-air missile sites and seven command and control nodes, of 
which eleven were damaged or destroyed.294  In addition to the two B-52s and forty-
seven missiles actually used in the strike, a significant amount of support from other 
aircraft was required to position the resources for the attack, provide aerial refueling, and 
attack escort.  This support included:  two spare B-52s held at Guam, fourteen KC-135 
tankers, fifteen KC-10 tankers, one C-5 transport, and F-14s that escorted the B-52s while 
over the Persian Gulf.295  Air Force calculations, based only on cost per flight hour, fuel 
off-loaded by tankers and the cost of the missiles, place the cost of this operation at $7.63 
million per target hit ($114.45 overall).296  If this same attack was conducted with a 
conventional PGS capability, it would have required fifteen CAVs, each armed with four 
SSBs or six WAASMs each, for an estimated cost of $2.04 million per target struck 
($30.6 million overall).297  
D. CONCLUSION  
The policy objectives espoused in the NSS and supporting polices place a 
premium on rapid response, or in some cases preemptive action to defeat adversaries 
before they can inflict catastrophic damage against American territory or deployed forces.  
Conventional PGS capabilities provide an additional option for the President to respond 
to imminent threats to the national security of the United States that appear more likely in 
a post-Cold War, post-September 11th world. 
In an era when a shrinking U.S. force structure threatens the future viability of the 
traditional strategy of global presence, the Department of Defense, and in particular the 
Air Force, views conventional PGS capabilities as a transformational answer to policy 
demands for a responsive military option to address widely separated global threats.  
 







Proposed conventional PGS capabilities promise to deliver measurable advantages over 
existing military force projection capabilities in the areas of responsiveness, access, and 
economy of force.   
The primary military rationale for conventional PGS capabilities is their predicted 
ability to provide unmatched responsiveness.  Historical cases have shown that even from 
an “on-alert” posture, forward-deployed forces have historically required at least two 
hours or more to reach targets within their theater of operations.  Conventional PGS 
capabilities promise global reach within 90 minutes from a similar “on-alert” posture.  
This responsiveness also has the potential to increase the amount of actionable 
intelligence available by reducing the necessary lead-time.  When a truly immediate 
response is necessary, there is no substitute for conventional PGS capabilities.   
Perhaps even more significant than quick response, proposed conventional PGS 
capabilities offer unsurpassed access to an adversary’s highly valued targets.  Advanced 
air defenses, denial of forward basing, over-flight restrictions, and hardened and deeply 
buried facilities do not constrain the ability of conventional PGS weapons to hold vital 
enemy centers of gravity at risk.  The speed, flight path, and cross-range capability of 
proposed Conventional PGS weapons makes interception nearly impossible and 
drastically reduces the potential for over-flight considerations to limit access to vital 
targets.  The ability to strike from well beyond the range of theater ballistic and cruise 
missiles could be a significant benefit to efforts to defeat adversary anti-access strategies.  
Finally, conventional PGS weapons have the potential to hold additional hard and deeply 
buried facilities at risk without resorting to nuclear weapons.  While their penetration 
ability is still constrained by available materials, PGS weapons offer impact velocities 
2,500 feet per second greater than contemporary aircraft-delivered weapons. 
In addition to responsiveness and access, conventional PGS capabilities have the 
potential to offer significant “economy of force” improvements.  While not likely to 
provide the least expensive method to strike a target on a cost-per-weapon basis, 
conventional PGS capabilities could remain cost-competitive when the overall operations 
costs of an operation are included in the analysis.  More importantly, conventional PGS 
capabilities offer a means to strike highly-defended targets without risking the lives of 
friendly forces, which represents the ultimate “economy of force.”  
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VI. CONVENTIONAL PGS AND GLOBAL STABILITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters of this thesis examined various aspects of conventional and 
nuclear global strike capabilities including:  the development and evolution of global 
strike capabilities during the Cold War; current U.S. global strike capabilities; concepts 
for terrestrially-based and space-based PGS capabilities; potential constraints on 
conventional PGS deployment and employment; and the policy and military rationale for 
conventional PGS weapons.  In sum, these chapters addressed the “how” and “why” 
questions regarding conventional PGS.  This chapter addresses the “so what” aspect of a 
United States deployment of conventional PGS capabilities and serves as a counterpoint 
to the rationale for these capabilities presented in chapter five.  While it is technically 
feasible to deploy conventional PGS capabilities in the near-term, and there is significant 
rationale to do so from both policy and military utility standpoints, there is a potential 
price to be paid.  The presence of these weapons may produce unintended consequences 
for the stability of the global security environment, particularly among the existing 
nuclear powers.  This chapter seeks to illuminate these risks and to characterize their 
severity.   
This chapter opens with a general discussion of nuclear deterrence theory, which 
arguably remains a key pillar in support of global stability, even in this post-Cold War 
era.  The contributions of several well-known deterrence theorists are presented to serve 
as a basis for the case studies and analysis that follow.  The next section presents three 
case studies that examine the strategic thinking and nuclear strategy, doctrine, force 
structure, and posture of the United States, Russia, and China.  The final section analyzes 
the potential impact of conventional PGS capabilities on the stability of the global 
security environment by drawing on the tenets of nuclear deterrence theory and the three 
case studies.  Does the presence of responsive conventional global strike weapons 
capable of precision strikes anywhere on the global in less than 90 minutes create a 
“security dilemma” that undermines the perceived credibility or security of the Russian 
and Chinese nuclear deterrent forces?  If so, will these weapons produce a “tipping point” 
that drives unintended consequences in the posture or size of their nuclear arsenals?  Will 
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the deployment or employment of U.S. conventional PGS weapons contribute to an 
increased likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war?  Some fear that the inability of an 
adversary or third party country to differentiate the launch of a conventional PGS weapon 
from a nuclear-armed missile could instigate a nuclear retaliatory strike.  How valid is 
this concern regarding Russia and China?  The deployment of conventional PGS 
capabilities present a golden opportunity to de-emphasize nuclear weapons, but must be 
accompanied by significant changes to the nuclear force postures of the major nuclear 
powers, particularly the United States and Russia, to avoid detrimental effects to the 
stability of the global security environment. 
B. DETERRENCE THEORY  
The concept of deterrence, “the ability to dissuade someone from an action by 
frightening that person with the consequences of the action,” predates the advent of 
nuclear weapons but gained new significance following the use of atomic weapons during 
the final stages of the Second World War.298  The United States and other major powers 
have devoted sixty years of strategic thought, dominated by various concepts of nuclear 
deterrence, in an effort to define a global security architecture that accounted for the 
unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons.  Even in today’s post-Cold War 
environment, nuclear deterrence considerations remain important, if less publicized. 
Soon after the Second World War, Bernard Brodie and several others began an 
academic discourse that eventually provided the enduring principles that are known today 
as nuclear deterrence.  He believed the atomic weapon fundamentally changed the nature 
of warfare because of its unprecedented combination of tremendous destructive capability 
and relatively small size.  In his words, “the atomic bomb seems so far to overshadow 
any military invention of the past as to render comparisons ridiculous.”299  To 
demonstrate the near pointlessness of relying on traditional air defenses in the face of a 
nuclear attack, he used the example of German V-1 “buzz-bomb” attacks against 
London.300  On just one day, On 28 August 1944, Germany fired 101 V-1s at London of 
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which ninety-seven were shot down.  London was able to “absorb” the four V-1s that 
leaked through the defenses, but he points out that the situation would have obviously 
been quite different had the V-1s been carrying nuclear weapons.301  The difficulties of 
providing for a perfect defense led Brodie to conclude: 
Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win 
wars.  From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.  It can have 
almost no other useful purpose.302
 
Brodie went on to describe desirable characteristics of the military force structure 
necessary to avert, or deter, a future war with nuclear weapons.  The first priority is to 
ensure the “possibility of retaliation in kind,” which he points out “does not have to be 
100 percent certain” as long as the adversary believes there is a “good chance” it will 
occur.303  A nation must prepare to fight a war involving nuclear weapons with the forces 
available at the start of hostilities because most industrial capability will, in all likelihood, 
be destroyed at the outset, preventing the “grand mobilization” possible in the World 
Wars.304  Brodie also recognized the necessity for survivable forces and command and 
control capabilities to ensure the ability to retaliate, and thus deter an attack in the first 
place.  Brodie’s proposed deployment concept for the retaliatory force bears a striking 
similarity to the methods employed by the major nuclear powers to this day.  He called 
for the dispersal of atomic weapons and their delivery vehicles, underground storage, 
independent communications, and pre-delegation of authority for commanders to act 
while under attack.305  Brodie’s prescription for nuclear deterrence was to “reduce our 
vulnerability in order to reduce the chances of being hit at all” by making “the prospect of 
aggression much less attractive to the aggressor.”306                  
Writing in the late-1950s following the Soviet launch of Sputnik, Albert 
Wohlsetter presents a view of nuclear deterrence that is very similar to Bernard Brodie’s, 
but differs regarding the difficulty of maintaining stable deterrence.  Wohlstetter also 
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emphasizes the necessity to be able to “strike second” to deter a nuclear attack, but argues 
that the advent of intercontinental missiles and their inherent ability to attack with little 
warning makes this task increasingly difficult.307  In order to remain survivable in the 
missile age, Wohlstetter wrote that a capability to “strike second” must be able to 
“hurdle” several “successive obstacles.”308
Such deterrent systems must have (a) a stable, “steady state” peacetime 
operation within feasible budgets…They must also have the ability (b) to 
survive enemy attacks, (c) to make and communicate the decision to 
retaliate, (d) to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete their 
mission, (e) to penetrate enemy active defenses…and (f) to destroy the 
target in spite of any “passive” civil defense in the form of dispersal or 
protective construction or evacuation of the target itself.309  
 
Wohlstetter assessed that maintaining a deterrent force capable of overcoming the 
above obstacles “demands hard, continuing, intelligent work, but it can be achieved.”310  
To further highlight the importance of survivable second strike capabilities, Wohlstetter 
likens the inherently destabilizing situation where two countries each possess the 
capability to destroy the other’s retaliatory force and society to an “old-fashioned 
Western gun duel.”311  He wrote, “It would be extraordinarily risky for one side not to 
attempt to destroy the other, or to delay doing so, since it not only can emerge unscathed 
by striking first but this is the sole way it can reasonably expect to emerge at all.312  
In addition to his ideas on force survivability, Wohlstetter presented several 
insights that could have easily been drawn from the pages of the 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review.  He acknowledges the inadequacies of deterrence as a stand alone strategy.  
Wohlstetter called for the development of advance conventional capabilities to meet 
cases of limited aggression and for greater emphasis on active and passive defenses to 
“limit the dimensions of the catastrophe in case deterrence should fail.”313  Finally, he 
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recognized that many of the measures necessary to ensure a survivable nuclear deterrent 
force, such as keeping missiles and bombers on alert, operating from dispersed locations, 
and mobile platforms, significantly “increase the risk of an irrational or unintentional act 
of war.”314
Fast-forwarding to the end of the Cold War, Kenneth Waltz contends that nuclear 
deterrence is not as problematic or difficult as Wohlstetter predicted.  Harkening back to 
the works of Bernard Brodie, Waltz presents a view of deterrence that requires only a 
“force that can survive a first strike and strike back hard enough to out-weigh any gain 
the aggressor had hoped to realize.”315  He also asserts that deterrence does not rely on 
destroying cities, but rather depends on “what one can do, not on what one will do.”316  
According to Waltz, deterrence works because, given a survivable second strike force, 
the retaliator determines the level of damage to inflict upon the aggressor.317  His belief 
that even small nuclear arsenals, if survivable, can effectively deter a numerically 
superior adversary may become increasingly relevant as Cold War nuclear arsenals 
continue to shrink and the number of nuclear states continues to rise. 
Brodie, Wohlstetter, and Waltz wrote about the things that lead to successful 
nuclear deterrent relationships.  Robert Jervis devoted significant effort to exploring the 
pitfalls of nuclear deterrence that could lead to nuclear confrontation even if both 
countries maintain survivable second strike capabilities.  These threats to the viability of 
deterrence usually result from “security dilemmas.”  Jervis defines a security dilemma as:  
“the means by which states try to make themselves more secure often have the undesired 
and unintended consequence of making others less secure.”318  He writes specifically 
about several forms of crisis instability that generally result from a shared fear of surprise 
attack.319  In general, crisis instability can drive a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the 
actions each side takes out of the fear that it may be the victim of surprise fuel the fears 
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of the other side, producing a war neither side sought.”320  There are many factors that 
may aggravate crisis instability.  A few examples of these factors include:  states unaware 
of actions by their force that may send mixed signals or escalate the crisis; ignoring the 
security dilemma by failing to appreciate the extent to which their actions “menace” the 
other; and a tendency to attribute all of the adversary’s observed activities to some 
overarching plan.321
Most deterrence concepts discussed above emphasize “imposing a cost” as the 
actual deterrence mechanism.  For example, if Country A attacks Country B, Country B 
will retaliate against country A’s industrial capacity and cities.  The assumption is that 
the cost imposed by B will deter A from attacking B in the first place.  The Department 
of Defense recently produced the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept which 
prescribes targeting multiple elements of an adversary’s “decision calculus.”  This 
document defines strategic deterrence as “the prevention of adversary aggression or 
coercion threatening vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival.”322  
According to the document, “strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take 
grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.”323
The Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept identifies three elements of an 
adversary’s decision calculus regarding a possible course of action:  1) perception of 
benefits, 2) perception of costs, and 3) perception of the consequences of restraint (i.e., 
doing nothing).324  Exploitation of this approach allows one to leverage all of the 
instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military, and economic) to triple 
the number of “means” available to achieve the “end” of deterrence.  Country B may now 
attempt to deter Country A by denying benefits, imposing costs, and inducing restraint.325  
For example, B may deny the benefit of A’s attack by preemptively striking A’s WMD 
capability or by relying on missile defenses to defeat an attack after launch.  Country B 
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may also employ diplomatic or economic incentives to induce A not to attack.  This 
approach to deterrence provides expanded opportunities to deter actors (state or non-
state) that are unconcerned about the possibility of nuclear retaliation.     
The intended take-away from this  discussion is that very little has changed since 
1946 regarding the general requirements for successful nuclear deterrence.  Even in 
today’s post-Cold War world, nuclear deterrent relationships among the major nuclear 
powers remain an important ingredient in the global security framework.  Unfortunately, 
Cold War alert postures remain, and with them the potential for security dilemmas and 
crisis instability.  New, more proactive concepts of deterrence, as presented in the 
Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept, seek to deter by affecting multiple 
elements of the adversary’s decision calculus.  Attempts to “deny benefits” through 
preemptive strikes, possibly with conventional PGS capabilities, or by deploying missile 
defenses have the potential to introduce instability by threatening other nations’ ability to 
“impose costs.”   
C. CASE STUDIES  
This section presents three case studies that examine relevant examples of 
security policy, nuclear strategy or doctrine, force structure, and force posture that serve 
as the basis for a later analysis of the policy and security implications of a U.S. decision 
to deploy conventional PGS capabilities.  The differing threat perceptions and military 
capabilities of the United States, Russia and China result in different implications for 
each nation.  Current U.S. thinking, as espoused in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, 
covets enhanced conventional strike capabilities, such as conventional PGS, as a means 
to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons and to reinforce the credibility of the nation’s 
strategic deterrent against a wide variety of existing and emerging threats.  Russia’s 
reliance on a large, highly ready, and capable ICBM force, coupled with a crumbling 
early-warning system, and an overall perception of insecurity raise the risk of 
misunderstandings resulting from employment of conventional PGS capabilities by the 
United States.  The potential Chinese reaction is a “wild card.”  Will the deployment of a 
U.S. conventional PGS capability finally push China to expand the size, mobility, and 
readiness of its nuclear forces?  The following case studies examine these issues in detail. 
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1. United States 
Throughout the Cold War, the United States relied on a “triad” of long-range 
bombers, ICBMs, and ballistic missile submarines as the cornerstone of its strategic 
deterrent.  Following the end of the Cold War, U.S. nuclear strategy, posture, and force 
structure were slow to change.  During the 2000 presidential election, then Governor 
George Bush criticized the Clinton Administration’s slowness to adjust to the conditions 
of the post-Cold War security environment.  Specifically, Bush accused the 
administration of remaining “locked in a Cold War mentality” and charged that the 
United States needed to “rethink the requirements for nuclear deterrence” in order to 
better “fend against the new threats of the 21st century.”326   
The Bush administration pursued a two-tier approach to adjusting the U.S. nuclear 
posture.  First, the President set out to change the dynamics of the United States-Russia 
strategic relationship to better reflect the changed relationship between the two countries.  
President Bush publicly stated that “Russia is no longer our enemy” and vowed to align 
U.S. nuclear policy accordingly.327  Administration officials professed that even though 
Russia retained a substantial nuclear arsenal, the growing level of cooperation allowed 
for a “new strategic framework” to replace reliance on mutually assured destruction.328  
The United States also claimed that it would “no longer plan, size or sustain its nuclear 
forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the 
former Soviet Union.”329   
The second tier of adjustments aims to redress the credibility of U.S. strategic 
deterrence.  The failure of the United States nuclear arsenal to deter the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001 illustrates the limits of nuclear deterrence.  Additionally, some 
believe the combination of international taboos against the use of nuclear weapons and 
their unprecedented destructiveness may convince potential adversaries, particularly 
terrorists and rogue states, that the United States will be self-deterred from retaliating 
 
326 Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Nuclear Weapons:  Changes in Policy and Force Structure (Washington 
D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, 2005), 1, CRS, RL31623. 
327 Ibid., 2. 
328 Ibid., 5. 
329 Ibid. 
99 
                                                
with nuclear weapons unless its national survival is at stake.330  The administration plans 
to address this perceived deterrence “credibility gap” through improved capabilities for 
conventional strike and defense. 
a. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 
 In January 2002, the Department of Defense presented the classified 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress where it generated significant controversy 
and was eventually leaked to the press in March of that year.331  The NPR does two 
primary things.  First, it established a “New Triad” as the foundation for U.S. strategic 
deterrence.  Second, the NPR establishes the baseline nuclear force structure and posture 
that was later codified in the 2002 Moscow Treaty. 
 The framework for U.S. strategic deterrence defined by the New Triad 
expands in scope of to include defenses and infrastructure in addition to the traditional 
strike forces.  The first leg consolidates the former nuclear triad (bombers, ICBMs and 
ballistic missile submarines) into one and adds an expanded capability for precision 
conventional strike to form the “offensive strike forces.”332  The second leg of the New 
Triad consists of active and passive defenses, including national missile defense, and the 
third leg consists of a revitalized nuclear weapons infrastructure.333  All three legs of the 
New Triad are “bound together” by enhanced command and control and intelligence 
capabilities.  The Secretary of Defense, in his forward, acknowledges and justifies the 
resource implications of the New Triad as follows: 
Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed nuclear weapons, and 
increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has resource implications.  It 
costs money to retire old weapons systems and create new capabilities.  
Restoring the defense infrastructure, developing and deploying strategic 
defenses, improving our command and control, intelligence, planning, and 
non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives and 
investments.  However, these investments can make the U.S. more secure 
while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.334
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  As stated above, the New Triad intends to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear 
weapons and improve the ability to deter WMD attacks by greater emphasis on non-
nuclear strike capabilities.  The NPR asserts that “U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited 
to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares” and that a “new mix” 
of conventional and nuclear forces is necessary to address the “diverse set of potential 
adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming 
decades.”335  Non-nuclear strike forces are also advantageous for limiting “collateral 
damage and conflict escalation.”336  One particularly interesting passage in the NPR 
mentions that improvements in the accuracy and timeliness of targeting information may 
make it possible to substitute non-nuclear strike capabilities for nuclear weapons in some 
cases.337  Industry analysts have determined that conventional PGS capabilities could 
cover between 10 and 30 percent of the targets now covered by nuclear weapons and 
United States Strategic Command wants to conduct a study to more definitively assess 
this possibility.338  Finally, in line with the thinking of the Strategic Deterrence Joint 
Operating Concept, the NPR asserts that long-range precision strike capabilities that are 
able to strike “a wide range of targets throughout an adversary’s territory may dissuade a 
potential adversary from pursuing threatening capabilities.339
 From a force structure perspective, the NPR is less of a departure from the 
familiar.  The NPR bases the size of the nuclear force off of the ability to address three 
types of contingencies.  First, the force must be able to handle “immediate contingencies” 
in response to “well-recognized, current dangers,” such as responding to a WMD 
attack.340  The second type of contingency is what the NPR describes as a “potential 
contingency,” which consist of “plausible, but not immediate dangers,” such as the 
emergence of new hostile competitors or the re-emergence of a “hostile peer 
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competitor.”341  The final category consists of “unexpected contingencies” that present 
“sudden and unpredicted security challenges,” such as could result from a regime change 
in an existing nuclear power that transfers control of its weapons to a hostile 
government.342
 Te actual end-state totals of nuclear weapons represent a significant 
reduction below the levels negotiated under START, but do not go as low as many had 
hoped.  The following table (Table 2) displays the projected 2012 end-state numbers, 
derived from Congressional Research Service Estimates, for warheads and delivery 






Minuteman III 500 500 All downloaded to single-warhead configuration 
Trident II (D-5) 336 864 Assumes 12 deployed SSBNs with 24 D-5s each; 3 
warheads per missile; excludes 2 subs in overhaul 
B-52H 76 500 Can carry 20 ALCMs each; assumes only 25 B-52 
dedicated to nuclear role  
B-2 21 336 Can carry 16 nuclear weapons each 
 933 2,200  
Table 2. United States Planned Nuclear Weapons Totals by 2012 
 
  One should note that the force structure totals (delivery vehicles) are the 
same as were agreed to for START II and the lower warhead totals required by the 
Moscow treaty are achieved by only counting “operationally deployed” warheads (those 
actually mated to missiles or stored near bombers) and downloading the number of 
warheads each delivery vehicle can carry.344  The NPR specifically states that the 
warheads removed in this downloading process will be retained in storage “as a basis for 
reconstituting the responsive force.”345  The decision to keep the removed warheads in 
storage as a hedge against future contingencies is one of the more controversial aspects of 
the NPR.  In a relatively short time period the number of deployed warheads could jump 
to nearly 3,500 (the START II levels) by simply increasing the number of warheads 
carried by each Trident II and by making more weapons available to the B-52 fleet. 
                                                 
341 Woolf, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 16. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid., 25-6. 
344 Ibid.,  
345 Nuclear Posture Review, 54. 
102 
                                                
b. U.S. Nuclear Posture 
  In addition to presenting the recommended strategic force structure, the 
NPR, somewhat surprisingly, recommended no changes to the alert status of U.S. nuclear 
forces.  The bombers will remain off-alert (though capable of being generated to nuclear 
alert), the ballistic missile submarines will continue their deployments, and, most 
significantly, the ICBMs will remain on-alert.  During the 2000 presidential campaign, 
candidate George W. Bush promised sweeping changes in the U.S. nuclear posture 
including a pledged to “remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger 
status.”346  In that same speech he characterized weapons on hair-trigger alert as an 
“unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation.”347  The NPR’s answer to this pledge is 
found in the following statement: 
U.S. forces are not on “hair trigger” alert and rigorous safeguards exist to 
ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons safety, security, reliability, 
and command and control.  Multiple, stringent procedural and technical 
safeguards are in place to guard against U.S. accidental and unauthorized 
launch.348     
Unfortunately, this view is unlikely to be shared by Russia and, no doubt, contributes to 
maintenance of a similar posture of its ICBM force.   
  Several prominent public figures have spoken out against the continuance 
of high alert levels since the release of the NPR in 2002.  For example, former Senator 
Sam Nunn cited a RAND report in a recent speech that pointed out that the risk of 
nuclear use between the United States and Russia is inconsistent with the other aspects of 
the relationship between the countries.349  Senator Nunn summarizes the situation as one 
where by “keeping our nuclear weapons on hair trigger now increases the risk it was 
designed to reduce.”350  In a recent article, former Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara characterized current U.S. nuclear policy as “immoral, illegal, militarily 
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unnecessary, and dreadfully dangerous.”351  He also argues that, “To launch [nuclear] 
weapons against a nuclear power would be suicide.  To do so against a non-nuclear 
enemy would be militarily unnecessary, morally repugnant, and politically 
indefensible.”352
  It seems that the authors of the NPR recognized these concerns as 
evidenced by the new emphasis placed on non-nuclear strike and defense capabilities, but 
could not muster the bureaucratic courage to make any tough force structure choices.  As 
noted above, almost all reductions will be made by downloading, rather than eliminating 
existing delivery vehicles.  This could be the result of the lingering effects from the last 
time such “radical” steps were proposed.  During the conduct of the previous NPR in 
1994, Ashton Carter, President Clinton’s assistant secretary of defense for nuclear 
security and counterproliferation, proposed and championed significant changes to the 
U.S. ICBM force.  His attempts to introduce options for the significant reduction, the 
elimination, or at least the de-alerting of the Minuteman ICBM force “triggered a revolt” 
in the Pentagon.353  Perhaps, now over three and a half years after the release of the NPR, 
it is time to reassess the alert levels of U.S. nuclear forces in light of the trade-offs that 
may be possible concerning conventional PGS capabilities.  De-alerting or eliminating 
U.S. land-based nuclear-armed ICBMs could eliminate a significant source of concern 
over the employment of conventional PGS capabilities, namely the potential for a 
nuclear-armed nation to misinterpret the launch as a nuclear attack.        
2. Russia 
During the Cold War and most of the following decade, a realist theoretical 
perspective of international relations formed the central tenant of Soviet (and later 
Russian) foreign policy thinking.  Mutual threat and rivalry kept the superpowers focused 
on nuclear issues.  The Soviets thought in terms of a “geopolitical triad” based on zero-
sum games, balances-of-power, and spheres of influence.354  The concept of zero-sum 
games was a product of the bipolar Cold War environment where a gain for one 
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superpower automatically resulted in a loss for the other.355  Regarding the concept of a 
balance-of-power, the Soviets regarded the nuclear balance, based on rough parity rather 
than numerical equality, as the most important balance with the West.356  The concept of 
spheres of influence attained prominence during the Yeltsin years and was a source of 
increased Russian tensions over NATO expansion and the NATO campaign against 
Serbia.357     
Concurrently with the greater sense of partnership between the United States and 
Russia, a “new Russian thinking” has emerged regarding their approach to foreign policy.  
Under President Putin, Russian foreign policy thinking has begun to alter all three areas 
of the traditional “geopolitical triad” through a “twofold” approach that:  1) avoids 
mention or suggestion of political-strategic competition with the West and 2) pursues a 
more “selfless” approach to strategic stability.358  The zero-sum approach of the past is 
evolving into a “positive-sum” mindset.359  Also, President Putin is pursuing an agenda 
of “cooperative balance” that emphasizes areas for cooperation or collective action (e.g., 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons) rather than areas that highlight divisions.360   
Finally, he is adopting a “more sophisticated treatment” of spheres of influence that does 
not force Russia to fight battles it can not win (e.g., supporting, rather than resisting a 
United States presence in Central Asia after 9/11).361
Bobo Lo points out that Russia’s transition to new foreign policy thinking is 
“evolutionary” rather than “revolutionary” in nature and that even though significant 
progress has been made, “regime attitudes towards security and geopolitics continue to 
bear the stamp of their Soviet (and Yeltsinite) past.”362  Despite their progress toward 
“new thinking,” the Russians cling to two vestiges of their realist past.  The first is their 
belief that Russia is a “great power,” which places them one step above “regional power” 
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status but is one step below its former status as a “superpower.”363  The nuclear balance 
remains important to Russia since nuclear weapons remain its “most potent symbol of its 
identity as a great power.”364
a. Russian Nuclear Doctrine 
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the massive political and 
economic changes undertaken by the Russian government resulted in significant 
hardships for nearly all of Russian society.  The military was particularly hard hit.  The 
former Soviet military was divided among the 15 former Soviet Republics in a rather 
haphazard fashion, mostly depending on where particular units were stationed when the 
Soviet Union broke up.  Funds for procurement, operations, maintenance, and personnel 
were drastically cut.  The drawdown of Russian general purpose forces in the post-Soviet 
era may be viewed, without exaggeration, as a near catastrophe.  The size and readiness 
levels of the Russian military forces fell off drastically and are only now beginning to 
stabilize.  Given this situation, many in the Russian military and government believed 
that nuclear weapons would provide the “best bang for the buck” until the economy could 
gain strength and allow greater spending on conventional weapon systems.         
 In recognition of the relative strength of Russia’s nuclear forces and the 
weakness of its general purpose forces, Russia’s new military doctrine emphasizes the 
role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression and warfighting.  Under the new 
doctrine, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if attacked with nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and more significantly, in response to 
“large-scale aggression using conventional weapons.”365  The new Russian doctrine is 
reminiscent of the “massive retaliation” strategy employed by the United States in the 
1950s when it was believed that it would be too expensive to match the Soviet Union’s 
conventional superiority.  Ironically, Russia’s current nuclear doctrine is the result of a 
reversal of roles where it now perceives an inability to match the growing conventional 
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capabilities of the West, particularly in precision guided munitions and stealth 
technology. 
 The origins of this doctrine extend back to the mid-1980s and the final 
years of the Soviet Union.  The deployment of U.S. land, sea, and air-launched cruise 
missiles capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads caused concern 
among Soviet military leaders over the possibility of “strategic conventional attacks.”366  
The inability to differentiate nuclear cruise missiles from conventional ones led the 
Soviets to claim they would have to respond as if the attack involved nuclear weapons.367  
The Soviets asserted that this type of response was consistent with their declared policy 
of “no first use” of nuclear weapons because they would be responding to “nuclear” 
warning.368
 The display of American high-tech precision weapons and stealth aircraft 
during Operation DESERT STORM in early 1991 further contributed to Soviet (and later 
Russian) concerns over Western conventional superiority.  The apparent ease with which 
the U.S.-led coalition destroyed Iraq’s Soviet equipped and trained military was 
particularly alarming.369  In May of 1991, General Igor Rodionov stated in an interview 
that the Soviet Union’s hard-won parity with the West had been “destroyed” as a result of 
the huge disparity that existed between Soviet and American conventional weaponry.370  
These concerns did not dissipate with the fall of the Soviet Union.  According to Peter 
Pry, numerous Russian military writings express the concern that “the United States 
could launch a surprise attack using advanced conventional weapons to destroy Russia’s 
nuclear forces, and then blackmail Moscow into submission with the threat of nuclear 
annihilation.”371
 The expansion of NATO eastward and the air campaign conducted against 
Serbia in the late-1990s appears to have been the peak of Russian concerns about a 
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possible NATO attack.  Russian military analysts of the time chose to interpret Operation 
ALLIED FORCE as “an image of a possible future scenario with Russia on the receiving 
end of surgical strikes against industrial, infrastructure, and military targets,” to 
selectively destroy Russia’s nuclear forces and command and control without provoking 
a nuclear response.372  This is exactly the type of scenario Russia’s new nuclear doctrine, 
that disavows “no nuclear first use,” is designed to deter.  The use of nuclear weapons in 
response to a conventional attack was simulated in Russia’s first post-Cold War major 
military exercise, known as Zapad-99, in June of 1999, coincidentally on the heels of 
NATO’s campaign against Serbia.373  In this exercise, the scenario involved aggression 
against Kaliningrad and Belarus to which “Russian forces responded to precision strikes 
on Russian and allied territory with limited nuclear strikes against the countries from 
whose territories the offensive was launched.”374  This exercise evaluated the concept of 
using nuclear weapons to “de-escalate” a conflict where conventional forces were not 
able “to mount a sustained defense of Russia’s national interests.”        
b. Russian Nuclear Force Structure 
 As one would expect, given Russia’s doctrinal emphasis on nuclear 
weapons, the nuclear forces have experienced a relatively gradual reduction in forces.  
Most of the reductions that have occurred to date are the result of arms control 
agreements negotiated before the fall of the Soviet Union.  The following table (Table 3) 
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Number  Warheads Remarks 
ICBMs    
SS-18 100 1,000 Approximately 50 will retire by 2009 
SS-19 130 780 Most will retire by 2009; 30 new missiles in storage 
SS-24 15 150 Will retire in 2005 
SS-25 300 300 Will be withdrawn by early next decade 
SS-27 40 40 In low-rate production 
SLBMs    
SS-N-18 96 288 Assumes six Delta III subs; 3 warheads per missile  
SS-N-23 96 384 Assumes six Delta IV subs; 4 warheads per missile; 
total includes 3 subs in overhaul 
Bombers    
Tu-95 (MS6) 32 192 Can carry 6 ALCMs or bombs 
Tu-95 (MS16) 32 512 Can carry 16 ALCMs or bombs 
Tu-160 14 168 Can carry 12 ALCMs, SRAMs, or bombs 
Total 855 3814  
Table 3. Russian Delivery Vehicle and Warhead Totals 
 
 While the above numbers would seem to indicate a rather robust nuclear 
force, they only tell half of the story.  In spite of the fact that the Strategic Rocket Forces 
were receiving 80 to 90 percent of the Russian military procurement budget by 2000, the 
Russian nuclear forces will face significant attrition as 80 percent of the ICBMs and 
SLBMs will reach the end of their operational-lifespan by 2010.376  Russia hopes to 
extend the service-lives of some of the SS-18s and SS-19s to 2016, but the prospects for 
success are highly uncertain.377  Originally, Russia hoped to produce about 400 SS-27s 
between 1998 and 2010, but this number was revised downward to 150-170.378  Even this 
lower number is unlikely, given the current production rate of only six missiles per 
year.379   The sea-based portion of the Russian nuclear triad faces even greater obstacles 
to modernization.  There are currently two new Borey-class ballistic missile submarines 
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under construction and a third one planned.380  Each will be capable of carrying twelve 
SLBMs, however, the Bulava SLBM has not yet been flight tested.381   
 Without successful service-life extension programs or new procurement 
by the end of this decade, the Russian nuclear forces will consist of approximately 200 
ICBMs, a largely obsolete bomber fleet, and potentially no SLBMs.  The Russian nuclear 
forces may have received emphasis in doctrine and in the budget, but it has not been 
enough to ensure a sustainable force into the next decade.  Russia finds this particularly 
distressing in light of a theoretical U.S. ability to “upload” 2,400 stored nuclear 
warheads, without prior warning, to existing missiles and bombers.382  Russia will not 
have this option since its reductions to meet the 1,700 to 2,000 deployed warhead limit 
imposed by the Moscow Treaty are primarily being made by eliminating delivery 
systems.383  By the beginning of the next decade, Russia could find itself close to nuclear 
parity with Britain, France, and possibly China. 
c. Russian Missile Warning System and Nuclear Posture 
   In the late-1960s the Soviet Union began to deploy elements of a 
comprehensive missile attack warning system intended to provide timely detection of an 
incoming strike, assess its scale, determine its origin, and estimate possible damage in 
order to allow leadership to choose an appropriate course of action.384  A warning system 
with these capabilities is an essential element of a launch-on-warning posture that enables 
leaders to launch a retaliatory strike while under attack.  This strategy attempts to 
maximize the size of the retaliatory force by launching alert forces before they can be 
destroyed.  However, the extremely grave consequences of a false alarm mandate that the 
warning system possess unquestioned reliability.  According to analysis by Pavel Podvig, 
the Soviet Union never completed a comprehensive warning system capable of detecting 
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all possible threats.385  Technical difficulties and delays combined to lower the Soviet’s 
(and later the Russian’s) expectations for what the system could provide.  Based on the 
reality of their system’s limited capabilities, the Russians appear to have settled for a 
system that can provide warning of a massive attack, but not necessarily detect isolated 
launches from all possible threat locations.386   
 At its high point in the late-1980s, the Soviet warning system consisted of 
a network of missile warning radars and satellites.  The radars provided coverage of all 
approaches to Soviet territory, except for a gap that was opened to the northeast towards 
possible SLBM launch locations in the northern Pacific Ocean when the radar at 
Krasnoyarsk was determined to violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.387  The 
space-based warning system consisted of eight to nine satellites in highly-elliptical orbits 
(HEO) augmented by a single satellite in geo-synchronous orbit that provided coverage 
of ICBM fields in the United States, but provided virtually no capability to detect SLBM 
launches.388
 Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited a 
capable warning system that has since deteriorated for a variety of reasons.  As a result of 
technical problems and funding issues, the space-based portion of the warning system has 
only two operational HEO satellites remaining, which each provide only six hours of 
coverage per day.389  A significant gap in Russia’s westward facing radar coverage 
opened when the government of Latvia demolished the warning radar at Skrunda in 1998, 
but a new radar site brought on-line in Belarus has since mostly closed the gap.390  
Overall, the space-based portion of the warning system remains fragile and the majority 
of the radar network is located in other countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Azerbaijan) and could become a hostage to changing relations. 
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 The jury is still out on what level of danger the deteriorating state of 
Russia’s missile warning systems represents.  Does the imperfect vision of Russia’s 
warning system make it more likely to launch missiles based on false or misinterpreted 
data, or does knowledge of the system’s limitations induce caution and restraint?  The 
following real-world event is often cited as “proof” for both of these arguments. 
 On 25 January 1995, NASA launched a Black Brant scientific rocket from 
Norway towards the North Pole that was initially misidentified by a Russian early-
warning radar site as an American Trident II SLBM launched from the North Sea toward 
Russia.391  President Yeltsin is reported to have accessed his equivalent of the “nuclear 
football” in preparation to initiate a possible nuclear retaliatory strike, but instead of 
ordering a launch, he and his advisors remained vigilant for signs of a broader attack.392  
In a classic demonstration of bureaucracy at work, Norway provided the necessary prior 
notification of the launch, but it was not forwarded to the Russian military.393  
 Pavel Podvig sees the deterioration of the Russian system as an 
opportunity for stability, not as a prescription for disaster.  In his view,  
the Russian early-warning system…has virtually lost it importance as an 
integral component of the command and control system of nuclear forces.  
The quality of information about missile launches that the system can 
provide and its reliability seem to be so low that it is highly that this 
information will ever be used as a basis for a decision to initiate a launch-
on-warning strike.  The only marginal capability the system seems to 
provide is a detection of a massive missile attack.394
His philosophy is “if it is broken, don’t fix it.”395  If the Russian early-warning system 
were to eventually fail completely as a result of gradual degradation, the potential for 
hasty, possibly erroneous retaliation decisions would fade away with it. 
 The other side of the debate, represented by a 2003 RAND study perceives 
danger, not stability as the natural result of continued degradation of Russia’s early-
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warning system coupled with alert nuclear forces.  In the scenario above, the report 
author credits Russia’s restraint and patience to its ability to receive confirmation from its 
early-warning satellites that U.S. ICBMs were still in their silos, a luxury that is now only 
available about 25 percent of the time.396   In a statement by the report’s author quoted in 
an Aviation Week article, he describes today’s situation as follows: 
So the sum of all our fears in this is we have a blind, vulnerable Russia 
that might be compelled to launch very quickly in a crisis based on very 
little, if any, early warning information…and if there was a [nuclear] 
detonation on Russian soil, how could Russian leaders know if it came 
from the U.S., a terrorist, a ballistic missile from the South or detonation 
of an aging Russian weapon?  Today the greatest threat from Russia 
comes not from its strength, but from its weakness.397   
In addition to Russia’s worsening blindness to surprise attack, The RAND report finds 
other aspects of Russia’s nuclear posture potentially destabilizing.  The vast majority of 
Russia’s alert nuclear forces are ICBMs based in fixed silos or road-mobile SS-25s that 
are largely restricted to garrison.  According to RAND analysts, Russia is only able to 
keep one or two ballistic missile submarines on patrol with sixty-four warheads each and 
between nine and eighteen single-warhead SS-25 “on the road” at a time.398  The 
“survivable” fraction of Russian strategic forces (assuming there is a threat) amounts to 
between 2 and 4 percent of its total available warheads.                
3. China 
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Russian thinking was dominated 
by the bi-polar balance between the superpowers.  China’s focus, even after becoming a 
nuclear power itself, was and remains distinctive.  Chinese grand strategy relies on a two-
part concept to evaluate and maintain the proper balance between economic development 
and a security environment conducive to the former.399  The first part is the concept of 
“comprehensive national power” (CNP) that Chinese planners use to “evaluate and 
measure” China’s national standing relative to other nations based on “qualitative and 
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quantitative measures of territory, natural resources, economic power, diplomatic 
influence, domestic government, military capability, and cultural influence.”400  The 
second portion of the concept is the “strategic configuration of power,” or “shi,” which 
translates roughly as “alignment of forces.”401
More recently, another strategy, known as the “24 Character Strategy,” has been 
employed by China’s security and diplomatic services as a way to “downplay China’s 
ambitions” in the short-term and “build up China’s power to maximize options for the 
future” over the long-term.402  Specifically, the guidance first issued by Premier Deng 
Xiaoping in the early 1990s directed the following:  “observe calmly; secure our position; 
cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a 
low profile; never claim leadership; and make some contributions.”  Taken together, the 
concepts of CNP and “shi” and the “24 Character Strategy” provide a useful basis for 
understanding Chinese nuclear policy and strategy, as well as, possible Chinese reactions 
to future U.S. conventional PGS capabilities.      
a. Chinese Nuclear Strategy 
Assessing the true nature of Chinese nuclear strategy has seemed to 
present a difficult challenge for Western observers and analysts.  This may be largely due 
to the fact that China’s approach to nuclear possession and use differs so drastically from 
the deterrence concepts familiar to observers of the United States and Soviet Union.  This 
“square peg” does not fit into the “round hole” we have constructed for it.  In a recent 
article, Sun Xiangli, Deputy Director of the Arms Control Research Division at the 
Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, attributes three 
characteristics to Chinese nuclear strategy:  1) the policy of “no first use,” 2) retaining 
only a limited nuclear deterrent force, and 3) support for complete world-wide nuclear 
disarmament.403  This framework is used to provide insight into Chinese nuclear thinking 
and strategy with particular regard to the likely effect of growing conventional superiority 
by the United States. 
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The Chinese policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons dates back to 
China’s first nuclear test explosion on 16 October 1964.404  From the very beginning of 
its status as a nuclear weapons state, China pledged to never be the first to use nuclear 
weapons under any circumstances and to never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
weapons states.405  This pledge was deeply rooted in Mao Zedong’s personal belief that 
nuclear weapons could serve only the single purpose of retaliating against a nuclear 
attack.406  The policy was also a carefully crafted attempt to present a non-
confrontational nuclear doctrine that would not invite preemptive nuclear strikes by the 
United States or Soviet Union.407  China is the only declared nuclear weapons state to 
have consistently adhered to an unconditional “no first use” policy. 
In recent years, some analysts believe the growing conventional 
superiority of the United States could force China to move away from its “no first use” 
policy.  Pan Zhenqiang, a retired Major General of the People’s Liberation Army, 
contends that “unlike all the other nuclear weapons states…China has never intended to 
use its nuclear capability to make up for the inefficiency of conventional capabilities vis-
à-vis other world powers.”408  Such a policy change could have several detrimental 
effects for China including:  instigating confrontational bi-lateral relations with the 
United States; increasing crisis management risk; undermining international arms control 
efforts; damaging China’s international reputation; and complicating regional 
relations.409
The second fundamental aspect of Chinese nuclear strategy involves 
maintaining a small, defensively oriented nuclear force.  Mao believed even small nuclear 
arsenals represented overkill and a danger to humanity, and thus chose to avoid a costly 
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arms race with the United States and/or the Soviet Union.410  Based on this belief, Moa 
chose to build a small nuclear arsenal based on the principle of “minimum deterrence” 
where even a small number of nuclear weapons, if they could be reliably delivered to 
their targets, would be enough to inflict “unacceptable damage” on any would be 
attacker.411  The level of destruction China believed necessary to achieve “unacceptable 
damage” was significantly less than called for by contemporary Western estimates, such 
as those by Robert McNamara that called for a minimum of 400 nuclear weapons to deter 
the Soviet Union.412  Continued adherence to “no first use” allows China to keep its 
nuclear totals low by only requiring a number of weapons sufficient for what the Chinese 
call a “minimum retaliating strike.”413  The relatively small size of China’s nuclear force 
today provides evidence that it remains committed to minimum deterrence.                   
The third aspect of China’s nuclear strategy is a commitment to global 
nuclear disarmament.  Maintaining a very small nuclear force and policy of “no first use” 
should serve to deemphasize the importance of nuclear weapons and contribute to 
China’s credibility as an advocate for disarmament.  China has called for all nuclear 
weapon states to sign a treaty that renounces the “first use” of nuclear weapons under any 
circumstances as a further step toward fulfilling the obligations of Article VI of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.414
b. Chinese Nuclear Force Structure and Posture 
In accordance with China’s policy of “no first use” and strategy of 
minimum deterrence, its deployed force of nuclear delivery systems and warheads 
remains the smallest, by far, of the three nuclear powers covered in this chapter.  China’s 
“triad” of strategic forces consists primarily of land-based missiles, but it does have 
approximately 100 obsolete medium-range bombers (based on the Soviet’s 1950s era Tu-
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16) and a single ballistic missile submarine.415  Currently, China has only about twenty 
nuclear delivery vehicles capable of reaching the continental United States and another 
twenty that could threaten Alaska and Hawaii.416  The following table (Table 4) provides 
a summary of China’s current strategic nuclear forces based on estimates from the 
Department of Defense and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.417
Delivery Vehicle Number Range (kilometers) Remarks 
Land-Based Missiles    
DF-3A (CSS-2) 14-18 2,790-2,900 6-10 Launchers 
DF-4 (CSS-3) 20-24 5,470-5,500 10-14 Launchers 
DF-5/5A (CSS-4) 20 8,460-13,000 Silo-based; Upgrading to Mod 2 
DF-21A (CSS-5) 19-23 1,770-1,800 34-38 Launchers 
DF-31 (CSS-X-10) 0 7,250-8,000 Developmental; road-mobile; 
initial deployment in 2005-2006 
DF-31A 0 11,270-12,000 Developmental; road-mobile; 
initial deployment in 2007-2009 
SLBMs    
JL-1 (CSS-NX-3) 12 1,770+ One Xia-class sub; 12 missiles 
JL-2 (CSS-NX-4) 0 8,000 Developmental; based on DF-31 
Bombers    
Hong-6 (B-6) 100 3,100 Estimated number nuclear capable  
Total 185  All missiles and bombers are 
assumed to carry single 
warheads/bombs  
Table 4.   Chinese Nuclear Forces 
 
 In addition to its relatively small size, when compared to the rival forces 
fielded by the United States and Russia, China’s nuclear force maintains a very low state 
of readiness.  For example, the DF-5A (CSS-4) silo-based ICBMs must be elevated to the 
surface for launch and reports indicate that the missiles are stored unfueled and without 
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warheads on a day-to-day basis.418  The Chinese effort to develop a more survivable 
nuclear force has progressed slowly.  The road-mobile DF-31 ICBM was successfully 
tested in 1999, but has not yet entered service.419  A longer range version, the DF-31A, 
capable of reaching targets in the continental United States is expected to enter service by 
the end of the decade.420  Development of a ballistic missile submarine, traditionally 
viewed as a prerequisite for a survivable second strike capability, has been a lengthy 
development process for China.  The Xia, China’s lone ballistic missile submarine, was 
launched in 1981, but did not successfully launch a JL-1 missile until 1988.421  As of 
2003, the Xia’s missile system was still not fully operational, and the submarine had yet 
to sail beyond Chinese territorial waters.422  The Xia is stationed at the Jianggeshuang 
submarine base, which is believed to be the storage location for its JL-1 missile 
warheads.423  Work has begun on a new ballistic missile submarine program, Project 094, 
designed to carry an SLBM derived from the DF-31, but estimates place deployment of 
this capability well into the future.424  
 Bernard Brodie theorized nearly sixty years ago that for a nuclear 
deterrent force to be effective, it only needed to provide a credible threat of retaliation in 
kind.425  The relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, combined with fixed-site 
basing and low readiness levels would seem to leave it vulnerable to preemptive 
elimination by the superior nuclear forces of the United States and Russia, or even the 
advance conventional precision munitions available to the United States.  However, this 
situation represents nothing new for China.  One possible explanation for China’s 
apparent lack of concern could be an assessment that the United States and Russia are not 
very motivated (if motivated at all) to attack, so very little is necessary to deter them.  
China’s gradual move towards mobile forces should be viewed as a positive change that 
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could enhance crisis stability by offering better survivability and not require any changes 
to its day-to-day nuclear alert levels.  The world would be a much safer place if the 
United States and Russia were willing to adopt a similar nuclear posture.    
D. ANALYSIS OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL PGS  
 This section evaluates the impact and severity of potential disruptions to the 
stability of the global security environment that may result from the introduction of U.S. 
conventional PGS capabilities.  Two specific questions are addressed.  First, to what 
extent could U.S. conventional PGS capabilities create a “security dilemma” by 
increasing Russian and Chinese perceptions of vulnerability?  If vulnerability is 
increased, what possible actions will Russia and China take to restore a perception of 
balance?  Also, if the United States were to anticipate increased perceptions of 
vulnerability by Russia and China, what measures could it take to defuse the situation 
ahead of time?  Second, to what extent could the deployment or employment of U.S. 
conventional PGS capabilities contribute to the risk of an inadvertent nuclear exchange 
between the United States and Russia or China?   How valid is this concern based on the 
nuclear postures of Russia and China?  What measures can the United States implement 
to mitigate or eliminate this possibility?  The answers to these questions will ultimately 
determine whether U.S. conventional PGS capabilities become valuable military options 
or a threat to global stability.  
1. Will Conventional PGS Create a “Security Dilemma?” 
 According to the 2001 NPR, the United States desires expanded non-nuclear 
strike capabilities as a way to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons and enhance the 
credibility of its deterrent posture.  Conventional PGS capabilities could fill this need by 
providing a rapid response, precision strike capability that can defeat a variety of target 
types.  Will the deployment of conventional PGS capabilities by the United States cause 
Russia and China to develop increased perceptions of vulnerability? 
 In short, the answer is yes.  The inherent characteristics that allow conventional 
PGS capabilities to deny a rogue state or terrorist organization the benefit of its hard and 
deeply buried facilities, WMD storage areas, and missiles through a preemptive strike, 
could also be turned against strategic targets, such as missile silos, in Russia and China.  
Both nations have exhibited concerns over the dominance of existing U.S. conventional 
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forces as demonstrated in DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING 
FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.  Technically, conventional PGS capabilities do not 
expand the threat already posed by existing U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities.  
However, the greater speed of PGS verses other conventional capabilities and the greater 
usability verses nuclear capabilities will likely combine to produce a greater overall sense 
of vulnerability.  Even assuming Russia and China do not feel threatened directly, 
conventional PGS capabilities could be destabilizing if for no other reason than they may 
make the United States more likely to resort to force instead of diplomacy.  Assuming 
Russia and China perceive greater vulnerability, what, if anything, will they do to 
reestablish balance with the United States?         
As discussed in the case study above, Russia already feels threatened by the 
conventional warfighting capabilities of the United States.  This perceived vulnerability 
contributed to Russia’s decision to renounce the former Soviet Union’s “no first use” 
pledge and adopt a nuclear doctrine that allows for nuclear retaliation in response to 
attacks with conventional weapons.  Other procedural remedies to reduce the 
vulnerability of Russian strategic forces have also been implemented previously.  For 
example, to reduce their vulnerability to preemptive strike, Russian ICBMs are on alert 
and are reportedly able to be launched within twelve minutes.426  The relatively low 
percentage of “survivable” forces (deployed ballistic missiles submarines and mobile 
ICBMs outside of garrison) amounts to only 2 to 4 percent of Russia’s entire force.  
While fiscally impractical, increasing the percentage of warheads deployed on ballistic 
missile submarines or increasing the number of mobile ICBMs deployed outside of 
garrison could reduce Russia’s perceived level of vulnerability.  Any reduction in 
Russia’s perception of vulnerability will likely need to come in the form of measures 
taken by the United States to reduce the threat it projects. 
As with Russia, it is fairly certain that U.S. conventional PGS capabilities would 
contribute to an enhanced sense of Chinese vulnerability vis-à-vis the United States.  
While having been vulnerable to American conventional and nuclear capabilities for 
quite some time, China’s commitment to “no first use” and minimum deterrence have 
significantly limited the scope of China’s response by preventing increasing the size and 
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readiness of its strategic forces.  China’s on-going programs to field mobile ICBMs and 
improved SLBMs should work to reduce the level of potential crisis instability by 
increasing the survivability of Chinese strategic forces. 
Recently, there have been rumblings from inside China that the time may have 
come to renounce it policy of “no first use” and minimum deterrence.  Major General 
Zhu Chenghu, Dean of China’s National Defense University, presented this case recently 
in remarks he characterized as his own personal view rather than that of the 
government.427  Even though he claimed to be speaking on his own behalf, his remarks 
generated great controversy in the United States and China.   
Bruce Blair, the President of the World Security Institute, recently wrote an article 
refuting the logic of Zhu’s proposal.  He argues that China’s nuclear program has 
“remained virtually etched in stone for many decades” in spite of the fact that the 
superpowers built up huge nuclear arsenals and placed them on “hair-trigger” alert.428  
China’s current policy has also endured the more recent provocations of being officially 
added back to U.S. nuclear war plans as a target in January 1998 and being identified as 
an “immediate threat” by the 2001 NPR.429  Blair reasons that if China’s nuclear policy 
has lasted this long in the face of significant nuclear threats, why would it be renounced 
now in the face of U.S. conventional superiority?430  Blair also points out that Zhu’s 
proposal to shift to a “first use” policy is suicidal unless China can achieve “a meaningful 
level of escalation dominance” over the adversary, which given the wide disparity in 
nuclear capabilities between the United States and China is extremely unlikely to occur 
without a significant Chinese nuclear buildup.431  In order to accomplish this buildup, 
China would need to restart its fissile materials production facility (closed since 1990), 
design new nuclear warheads, and resume underground nuclear testing, but all of this 
would involve an “implausibly radical departure from China’s current course.”432
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In summary, both China and Russia would likely perceive a deployed U.S. 
conventional PGS capability as an additional source of vulnerability.  However, neither 
country will be able to take significant action to restore the balance due to fiscal or policy 
constraints.  Any reduction to the overall level of vulnerability perceived by Russia and 
China will likely have to come in the form of measures taken by the United States to 
reduce the level of threat it projects.  Possible avenues available to the United States are 
to limit the deployment of conventional PGS system to a “silver bullet” force sized to not 
threaten major portions of the Russian and Chinese nuclear deterrent forces.  However, 
restricting the conventional PGS deployment to this size will significantly reduce its 
ability to provide meaningful support to the Combatant Commanders in support of 
regional contingencies. 
2. Will Conventional PGS Increase the Risk of Inadvertent War? 
One of the most common arguments against the deployment or employment of 
conventional PGS capabilities that operate from or through space is potential that a PGS 
launch could easily be mistaken for the launch of a nuclear-armed missile.  This 
possibility was again asserted in a recent Congressional Research Service Report on the 
subject of conventionally-armed ICBMs.433  This section evaluates the severity of the 
threat posed by conventional PGS employment for an inadvertent nuclear exchange and 
then examines the utility of various potential technical, procedural, and policy solutions 
to this problem. 
The scenario is simple but frightening.  For example, the United States launches a 
conventional PGS strike against a target near the periphery of Russian territory.  Because 
of the poor condition of Russia’s space-based early-warning system, it does not detect the 
initial launch at all.  As the PGS weapon nears its target it is picked up by part of the 
Russian ballistic missile warning radar network.  Since the PGS weapon has made several 
maneuvers during reentry. The radar is unable to accurately determine the object’s launch 
location or predicted impact locations.  The radar operator believes the object originated 
from the vicinity of an ICBM field in North Dakota and is headed towards the early-
warning radar site in Azerbaijan.  In actuality the PGS weapon was launched from 
Vandenberg Air Force Base on the coast of California and is headed towards a target in 
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Iran.  However, the erroneous report that goes forward to senior Russian leaders warns 
that a missile warning site is under attack from an American ICBM.  Believing this to be 
part of the first wave of a massive attack that is underway but not yet detected (or that the 
radars have been “spoofed” somehow), the Russian leadership orders a retaliatory launch 
against counterforce and command and control targets in the United States.  The belief 
that they were already under nuclear attack lessened the normal inhibitions against 
launching a nuclear strike, since the only remaining goal available was damage limitation 
in a nightmare scenario.   
How likely is this to occur?  In order for this scenario to be possible at all, there 
are two prerequisites.  First, the country in question must be able to detect an attack while 
it is in progress.  Basically, it must possess some type of early-warning system.  Second, 
the country must have the ability to “launch on warning.” Its nuclear forces must be 
generated to a level of alert that allows a retaliatory launch before the attacking warheads 
strike their targets.  In today’s world, only the United States and Russia meet both of 
these requirements.        
As presented in the Russian case study above, the Russian nuclear force structure, 
force posture, and the state of its early-warning system combine to produce several risk 
factors for the above scenario.  Heavy reliance on vulnerable, silo-based ICBMs tends to 
result in a “use them or lose them” mentality.  Also, the relatively few “survivable” 
forces (deployed SLBMs and mobile ICBMs outside of garrison) available could detract 
from a willingness to “wait and see” what is really happening.  A deteriorating early-
warning system leaves the leadership uncertain as to whether what has been reported by 
the system is all there is.  The amount of danger represented by Russia’s current status 
depends on which view of reality one holds.  If one subscribes to Pavel Podvig’s view, 
they will be less concerned since Russia’s leadership is aware of the limitations of their 
system and they will not trust it enough to make irrevocable decisions, like launching 
ICBMs.434  The position taken by the 2003 RAND study is more pessimistic in tone.  The 
message there is that Russia is blind and vulnerable and may make poor decision based 
on poor-quality information.435  A third view is presented by Mickhail Tsypkin.  Upon 
 
434 Podvig, History of the Russian Early Warning System, 22-3. 
435 Hughes, 67. 
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initial detection there will be concern as the warning crews attempt to determine whether 
there is only one object or a mass attack, but within five to seven minutes the Russians 
will have determined the trajectory and know that it is not headed for Moscow.436  
However, the entire system will have suffered “a very bad shock.”437
There are many things that may be done to reduce or eliminate the risk of an 
inadvertent nuclear exchange resulting from the employment of a conventional PGS 
weapon.  The Air Force has proposed a variety of technical and procedural mitigation 
measures that include:  strategic dialog (signals U.S. intentions, plans, and shapes 
expectations); basing of conventional PGS on coasts away from nuclear ICBMs; 
conventional/nuclear firewall (readily detectable signature differences); on-site 
inspections to build confidence (similar to those for START); implement the previously 
agreed to shared early-warning system (also have direct executive-level communication); 
cooperative signature enhancement (easily distinguishable trajectory); and careful 
mission planning to minimize chance that conventional PGS will approach Russia and 
appear threatening.438  These measures may be adequate and prevent the worst from 
happening, but all have their limitations.  Each of these measures requires either a level 
of technological sophistication (which the Russian warning system does not have) or a 
fundamental level of cooperation and trust.  In today’s environment these characteristics 
may be easily obtained, but imagine a scenario where United States-Russian relations 
sour as they did during the NATO air campaign against Serbia.  These measures treat the 
symptoms, but do not cure the underlying problem. 
One way to reduce the danger would be to follow China’s example.  Its nuclear 
posture, while posing concerns for its survivability against two preemptively postured 
nuclear superpowers, presents no possibility of an unintentional nuclear exchange.  In the 
long-run, if the United States wishes to deploy a conventional PGS capability that can 
provide significant warfighting support to the Regional Combatant Commanders, instead 
of a limited “silver bullet” force, something must be done to address the Cold War-legacy 
 
436 Mikhail Tsypkin, interview by author, from notes, Monterey, Ca., 23 August 2005. 
437 Ibid. 
438 Headquarters U.S. Air Force, “The Common Aero Vehicle:  Addressing Congressional Concerns,” 
(briefing presented to U.S. Congress, Washington D.C., December 2004), 20-26. 
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force postures that make an inadvertent nuclear exchange possible (if not likely).  Given 
the Russian’s current reliance on nuclear weapons for national security, it is unlikely that 
they will unilaterally volunteer to remove their ICBMs from alert status.  However, if the 
United States initiates the de-escalation of nuclear postures by taking its nuclear ICBMs 
off-alert, the Russians may be convinced to do the same once their vulnerabilities are 
addressed.  Because of the Trident II’s short flight-time and counterforce capability, the 
Russians may also require that the Ohio-class submarines patrol outside the range of 
targets in Russia.  The exact de-alerting scheme adopted is not important.  What is 
important is beginning the process to eliminate the possibility of prompt nuclear 
annihilation as a result of false or misinterpreted warning.  The Cold War has been over 
for fifteen years, it is time for the two nuclear superpowers to catch up. 
The time has come for the United States to make a choice.  It can keep the 
nuclear-armed ICBM, which will remain, vulnerable and unusable in all but the most 
nightmarish scenarios, or it can leave it behind in exchange for a robust conventional 
PGS capability that operates from or through space.  A decision in the near future would 
allow the opportunity to forgo replacement of the Minuteman III, and instead channel 
scare procurement dollars into an operationally responsive spacelift capability that can 
also be leveraged to serve as the means for boosting conventional PGS weapons.  
Combining these programs provides the Air Force with the capability that it really wants 
to operate for the twenty first century.  
E. CONCLUSION  
This chapter covered a significant breadth of material relevant to the interaction of 
conventional PGS with the stability of the global security environment.  It began with a 
survey of leading principles of nuclear deterrence, some of which were first presented 
nearly sixty- years ago.  However, their age has not diminished their value.  Of particular 
note is the potentially destabilizing interaction between deterrence theories designed to 
“inflict a cost” and those intended to “deny benefits.”  The former tend to emphasize 
survivable second strike capabilities, while the latter exploit preemption. 
The second section presents three case studies that examine the current and future 
direction of the United States, Russian and Chinese nuclear strategy, force structure, and 
force posture.  Each of these areas has implications for conventional PGS capabilities.  
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The United States is moving to deploy advance conventional capabilities to reduce its 
emphasis on nuclear weapons while maintaining a large, ready nuclear force.  Russia 
faces continued dependence on nuclear weapons due to its crumbling general purpose 
forces.  However, Russia’s high alert posture combined with a degraded early-warning 
system serves as a source of risk for inadvertent nuclear war.  The Chinese case presents 
a completely different philosophy about nuclear posture and the size of force necessary to 
successfully deter.  China’s “no first use” and minimum deterrent policies should serve as 
a model for other nuclear nations to follow in the twenty first century. 
The third section analyzes the risks of introducing conventional PGS into the 
security environment described in section two.  Because of the speed and precision of 
conventional PGS capabilities, they create a security dilemma for both Russia and China.  
Both countries’ nuclear retaliatory forces could be vulnerable to attack with conventional 
PGS weapons.  Since both nations have exhausted the means available to reduce their 
vulnerability, it falls upon the United State to take action to reduce the threat it projects 
toward Russia and China.  Finally, this section analyzed the contribution of conventional 
PGS to the risk of an inadvertent nuclear exchange between the United States and China 
or Russia.  Russia’s force structure, high-alert posture, and deteriorating early warning 
system are all risk factors that could lead to grave danger. China’s low-alert level and 
policy of “no first use” present virtually no opportunity for an inadvertent nuclear 
exchange. 
The United States faces a key choice in the near future.  It can cling to land-based 
nuclear ICBMs or it can instead move towards conventional PGS capabilities.  A 
reduction in the rapid retaliatory postures of the United States and Russia are necessary to 
allow for their safe operation.  Conventional PGS capabilities provide the opportunity to 
forgo replacement of the Minuteman III.  The program savings could be channeled into 
operationally responsive spacelift capabilities that may be leveraged to also boost 
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VII. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis was written with the intent to expand the debate over conventional 
PGS weapons and cut through the perceptions and propaganda to the true core issues 
affecting the future of this transformational capability.  The ultimate aim of this thesis is 
to influence the decision calculus of senior Department of Defense and government 
policy makers on this important topic.  Several key policy implications are highlighted: 
B. FINDINGS 
The follow paragraphs highlight the key findings of this thesis: 
1. Precedents for Nuclear-to-Conventional Conversion 
All American global strike systems were originally developed and deployed to 
deliver nuclear weapons.  The paradigm that associates strategic systems exclusively with 
nuclear war has proven difficult, but not impossible to break.  The B-52, B-1, B-2, 
ALCM, and Ohio-class submarine have successfully transformed from dedicated 
instruments of Armageddon into dual-role or conventional-only platforms.  These 
systems serve as cases in point and demonstrate that it is possible to offload “nuclear 
baggage” and adapt existing weapon systems to address new national security needs that 
were not necessarily envisioned when the systems were originally built. 
2. Conventional ICBMs? 
The glaring exception to the above nuclear-to-conventional success stories is the 
intercontinental missile.  A CEP of 100 meters is considered excellent for a 300 kt 
nuclear weapon, but it is useless for a 2,000 pound conventional weapon.  Recent 
improvements in guidance technology make it feasible to consider intercontinental 
missiles armed with conventional munitions.  But, the question remains – will 
intercontinental missiles ever be able to shed their “nuclear baggage” in the same fashion 
that strategic bombers, cruise missiles, and submarines have? 
3. Near and Mid-Term Conventional PGS  
Near-term conventional PGS options include modified Trident II or Peacekeeper 
intercontinental missiles armed with GPS-aided maneuverable reentry vehicles 
containing kinetic or high-explosive warheads.  Mid-term alternatives could leverage 
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small space launch vehicles like the SpaceX Falcon to boost CAVs carrying a variety of 
conventional munitions over intercontinental ranges or place CAVs for into orbit for later 
use.  Technology does not present any “show stoppers” for deploying conventional PGS 
capabilities in the near or mid-term. 
4. Launch Misidentification Safeguards 
The comprehensive set of risk mitigation measures proposed by the Air Force 
should ensure adequate safeguards against launch identification mishaps for near-term, 
single sortie conventional PGS operations.  These measures go above and beyond what 
should be necessary to convince any country capable of detecting a conventional PGS 
launch (and even those that cannot) that this vehicle is a conventional-only platform.  As 
a minimum, executive-level communication immediately prior to launch between the 
leaders of the United States and Russia would effectively eliminate the possibility of 
surprise and misinterpretation. 
5. START Constraints 
The constraints imposed by START will effectively delay conventional PGS 
deployment until after the Treaty expires in 2009.  Treaty negotiators must look beyond 
the current situation to consider how treaty provisions might constrain future options if 
world security conditions change.  It is probable that it would take until at least 2010 to 
field an initial conventional PGS capability without START constraints, but the 
limitations imposed by START guarantee this eventuality. 
6. Policy Rationale 
The policy objectives espoused in the National Security Strategy and supporting 
polices place a premium on rapid response, or in some cases preemptive action to defeat 
adversaries before they can inflict catastrophic damage against American territory or 
deployed forces.  Conventional PGS capabilities provide an additional option for the 
President to respond to imminent threats to the national security of the United States that 
appear more likely in a post-Cold War, post-September 11th world. 
7. Responsiveness 
Conventional PGS capabilities promise to provide unmatched responsiveness.  
Historical cases have shown that even from an “on-alert” posture, forward-deployed 
forces have typically required several hours to reach targets within the theater of 
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operations.  Conventional PGS capabilities enable global reach within 90 minutes from a 
similar “on-alert” posture. 
8. Hard and Deeply Buried Targets 
Conventional PGS weapons have the potential ability to hold additional hard and 
deeply buried facilities at risk without resorting to nuclear weapons.  While their 
penetration ability is still constrained by available materials, PGS weapons offer impact 
velocities 2,500 feet per second greater than contemporary aircraft-delivered weapons. 
9. Economy of Force 
Conventional PGS capabilities offer significant “economy of force” 
improvements over existing capabilities.  While not likely to be the least expensive on a 
cost-per-weapon basis, conventional PGS capabilities could remain cost-competitive 
when the overall operations costs of a mission are included in the analysis.  More 
importantly, conventional PGS capabilities offer the ultimate “economy of force” by the 
ability to strike highly-defended targets without risking the lives of friendly forces. 
10. Defeat Anti-Access 
Conventional PGS capabilities offer unsurpassed ability to defeat adversary anti-
access strategies.  Advanced air defenses, denial of forward basing, over-flight 
restrictions, and hardened and deeply buried facilities do not constrain the ability of 
conventional PGS weapons to hold vital enemy centers of gravity at risk. 
11. Nuclear Deterrence Theory 
Nuclear deterrence theory remains important today as a predictor of potential 
“security dilemmas” created by conventional PGS capabilities.  Of particular note is the 
potentially destabilizing interaction between deterrence theories designed to “inflict a 
cost” and those intended to “deny benefits.”  The former tend to emphasize survivable 
second strike capabilities, while the latter exploit preemption. 
12. Cold War Legacy 
Russia’s contracting nuclear force structure, high-alert posture, and deteriorating 
early warning system present a series of risk factors for inadvertent nuclear war that are 
exacerbated by the potential employment of conventional PGS capabilities.  In contrast, 
China’s low-alert level and policy of “no first use” present virtually no opportunity for an 
inadvertent nuclear exchange. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research and analysis conducted in the course of preparing this 
thesis, the following recommendations are made: 
1. Conventional Peacekeeper 
The Peacekeeper ICBM should be converted to a conventional role.  The missiles 
are paid for and the hardware is available today.  This provides an excellent opportunity 
to leverage sunk costs to deploy a relatively low-cost near-term conventional PGS 
capability.  The missile has sufficient range and payload capabilities to provide a 
militarily effective conventional capability.  The use of retired Peacekeeper ICBMs in a 
conventional role rather than converting Minuteman IIIs or Trident IIs also maintains a 
firewall between nuclear and conventional capabilities. 
2. GPS-Aided Reentry Vehicles 
The Air Force should seek to capitalize on the technology developed in the 
currently unfunded Trident II Enhanced Effectiveness Program.  The goal should be the 
development, testing, and eventual production of modified Mk 21 reentry vehicles to 
allow GPS-aided operation and precision maneuver during reentry.  The Project could 
provide a near-term, low-risk capability until such time that the Common Aero Vehicle 
becomes available. 
3. CAV Development 
The Air Force should continue to aggressively seek Congressional restoration of 
funding for “weaponized” CAV development.  Launch misidentification is not a valid 
issue during since all launches will be conducted in accordance with standard notification 
procedures.  Resolution of the launch misidentification issue should be worked 
concurrently with weapon system to provide an incentive for reaching resolution.  The 
current situation that gives other nuclear powers a veto over U.S. development and 
deployment decisions must not be allowed to continue. 
4. Launch Safety 
Balancing launch responsiveness for conventional PGS systems with range safety 
requirements require a willingness to accept greater risk to the public (foreign and 
domestic) during launch operations.  For this reason, conventional PGS weapons should 
only be used when the level of national need warrants the increased level of risk.  This is 
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a decision national leaders will need to make on a case-by-case basis.  Unfortunately, a 
better solution will not be available until the far-term (or way-far-term) when a fully-
reusable booster eliminates the danger posed by discarded booster stages. 
5. Nuclear ICBM Divestiture 
An opportunity was missed in 1994 for the Air Force to divest itself from land-
based nuclear ICBMs which resulted in the estimated $5.5 billion programs to refurbish 
various components of the Minuteman III.439  In the near future, the Air Force will be 
face a similar decision, this time on whether to proceed with the Land Based Strategic 
Deterrent (LBSD).  The Air Force should take this opportunity to pursue land-based 
conventional PGS capabilities in accordance with the New Triad.  Funding for LBSD 
should be reprogrammed into providing a responsive space launch capability for that 
supports PGS and launch-on-demand.  Nuclear deterrence is best performed by the 
virtually invulnerable ballistic missile submarine and the Trident II (D-5).  It has the 
survivability and the accuracy to strike any desired target.  The Air Force can then focus 
on providing responsive conventional deterrence and strike against the new threats of the 
twenty first century instead of perpetuating the shadows of the twentieth century. 
6. De-Alerting 
In order to fully exploit the potential of conventional PGS capabilities, the United 
States must pursue an end to the Cold war nuclear force postures maintained by itself and 
Russia.  Procedural and technical mitigation measures may work adequately against the 
threat of an inadvertent nuclear exchange for a small, “silver bullet” conventional PGS 
system, but in order to provide meaningful support to major theater contingency 
operations, a more reliable solution is required.  Force postures of both the United States 
and Russia must be altered so that the launch of nuclear weapons “on warning” is no 
longer possible or necessary.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The most significant finding of this thesis is that conventional PGS weapons are 
not in and of themselves destabilizing, but when they are combined with the enduring 
Cold War postures of American and Russian nuclear forces they become a valid cause for 
 
439 Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Nuclear Weapons:  Changes in Policy and Force Structure (Washington 
D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, 2005), 28, CRS, RL31623. 
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concern.  The possible implications of conventional PGS capabilities simply highlight the 
danger we quietly face everyday.  The continued presence of American and Russian 
nuclear forces on “hair trigger” alert poses a risk to our nations inconsistent with the 
other aspects of our relationship.  To not deploy conventional PGS capabilities because of 
perceptions of a renewed nuclear arms race or inadvertent nuclear war, allows us to 
dodge the tough decision.  We must finally clear away the last vestiges of the Cold War 
in order to be able to deploy capabilities necessary to protect American security interests 
in the post-Cold War world. 
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